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ABSTRACT 
The objective of this thesis describes the characteristics that distinguish shipping 
companies that have a superior safety standard, called blue-chip, from those being sub-
standard. The different characteristics of the companies having different safety standard 
are important to be aware of, as they indicate how safety may be improved in ship 
transportation. The scope of the study is limited to focus on recurrent high-risk accident 
scenarios arising in ship organisations and systems that are assumed to be of a complex 
nature. In order to establish this insight safety is considered in a broad context, ranging 
from what happens at the operational scene, back to the strategies and tactics adopted by 
the shipping companies. The analytical approach emphasise on data interrogation. 
According to Fragola (2003) “Data “interrogation” is the process of data collection 
and investigation from a variety of perspectives, alternatively dissecting it into its 
underlying (yet often unknown) patterns”.  
 
This approach has made it possible to consider the safety level, and the safety culture of 
organisations, in relation to the economical conjectures of the business. It was found 
that the safest companies had a more mature safety culture. This maturity measurement 
focused on the organisations underlying pattern of safety attitudes, beliefs and values. 
Another section of the thesis found that the accident risk of shipping companies follows 
an inverse relationship to the economical performance of the company. When the 
economical performance in shipping decline, the accident risk increase and vice versa. 
Both the strength of the relationship and its instant effect are important to be aware of. 
While changes in safety culture are assumed to take years, the relationship to 
economical performance is instant and also seems to occur within mature safety 
cultures. It seems as if the organisations switch between different modes of interest, 
while the underlying pattern of values, beliefs and attitudes may remain unchanged. 
Because this relationship can be supported with quantitative evidence, this study has 
contributed to the causal understanding of ship accidents and safety in general. A 
question is raised whether it is correct to use terms like organisational accidents or 
system accidents, as these seem to be rooted in economical parameters. Therefore the 
term Commercial Accidents is proposed. The thesis is structured in a series of ten 
papers.  
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 DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ADAC Allgemeiner Deutscher Automobil Club 
ANN Artificial Neural Network 
Asset Play Asset play means to speculate with buying and selling ships i.e. to buy a ship when its 
market value is believed to be below its future value, and sell it off when the market 
value is believed to be over its value in a future market 
Blue-Chip company A company that owns or operates ships of high safety standard 
Commercial Risk Risks related to the uncertainties in economical profit making (including market risk, 
strategic risk and financial risk) opposed to Operational Risk 
DAMA DAtabank til sikring av MArine operasjoner (DAtabank for the safety of MArine 
operations) 
Data interrogation Data “interrogation” is the process of data collection and investigation from a variety 
of perspectives, alternatively dissecting it into its underlying (yet often unknown) 
patterns. (Fragola, 2003) 
FOC Flags of Convenience. Flags of registry that due to low labour costs attract foreign 
ship owners to convert to this flag. These flags are also attended with minimal 
governmental involvement in the shipping conduction. 
H&M Hull and Machinery Underwriter 
ILO International Labour Organisation 
IMO International Maritime Organisation 
ISM-code International Safety Management Code (in short) 
Loss Ratio Portion of vessels at risk that is lost due to accidents within a specified period of time 
NN See ANN 
Operational Risk Risks related to operational hazards such as grounding, collisions, fires and structural 
failures. 
P&I club Protection and Indemnity club 
Safety standard The real (often unknown) ability to avoid accidents related to aspects of the hull, crew, 
machinery, or equipment; such as for lifesaving, fire fighting, and pollution prevention 
Serious Accidents Serious accidents are breakdowns resulting in the ship being towed or requiring 
assistance from ashore; flooding of any compartments; or structural, mechanical or 
electrical damage requiring repairs before the ship can continue trading. 
SMAQ Ship Management Attitude Questionnaire 
SOLAS Safety Of Life At Sea 
Sub-Standard Company A company that owns or operates sub-standard ships 
Sub-Standard Ship A ship of low safety standard. Substantially below the standards by laws or 
international conventions 
Total Loss Total loss are accidents where the ship ceases to exist after a casualty, either due to it 
being irrecoverable (actual total loss) or due to being subsequently broken up 
(constructive total loss). 
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
1 
INTRODUCTION  
 
STAKEHOLDERS IN SEA BORN TRANSPORT 
There is a range of stakeholder in the maritime domain. In order to understand the 
dynamics in shipping it is necessary to familiarise with these stakeholders. The 
involvement of stakeholder can be illustrated by the Independent’s (1996) description of 
an accidental vessel called Sea Empress “Built in Spain; owned by a Norwegian 
registered in Cyprus; managed from Glasgow; chartered by French; crewed by 
Russians, flying a Liberian flag; carrying an American cargo, and pouring oil onto the 
Welch coast”. In reality the involved regulatory regimes, insurance clubs and 
companies, classification societies and salvage teams could also be added to the list of 
stakeholders. Each stakeholder has certain ways to influence the shipping activities and 
safety (Anderson, 1998). In the subsequent text some of the most important 
stakeholders (Figure 1) are briefly described.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Mechanism between maritime stakeholders (Langli, 1998) 
 
The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) entered the regulative scene in 1948. 
IMO is the United Nations specialised agency responsible for controlling maritime 
safety and preventing pollution from ships. IMO adopts new regulations through 
conventions and resolutions and then the flag states ratify and enforce the regulations.  
The most known conventions are the SOLAS (Safety Of Life At Sea) and the MARPOL 
(MARitime POLlution) conventions. The International Safety Management (ISM) code 
is a part of SOLAS that specifically address functional requirements and responsibilities 
of safety management. Other relevant conventions are the STCW (Standards of 
Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for seafarers) and a series of conventions 
related to limitation in amount of liability in compensation of damages. The STCW 
convention has also links to another UN body called the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO). While IMO has a focus towards the ship and the operation of the 
ship, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) has a focus on the crew’s social 
justice and human and labour rights.  
Ship Owner / Management Vessels 
Flag State 
Control 
Freight / 
Charter 
Agreement 
Class- 
Socieites
Regional Authorities 
IMO 
Insurers 
Port State 
Control
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Even tough the flag states ratifies IMO’s conventions, the motivation and enforcement 
of the regulations varies. During the 1960s (Beer, 1968) focus was aimed at certain 
flags of registry that were labelled Flags of Convenience (FOC). The FOC have a weak 
enforcement, low taxes and cheap crews (Bergantion & Marlow, 1998; Xianshu, 2000). 
From the accident statistics it could easily be read that the ships flying FOC carries a 
higher risk (Ponce, 1990). This fact has resulted in a role conflict, as there are different 
stakeholders who imposes the risk, are exposed to risk and regulates the risks (Brooks, 
1996). Therefore, the stakeholder that is exposed to the risk started to enhance their 
involvement in the 1980s. The Port States started to inspect the visiting ships with 
reference to IMO and ILO conventions. Non-compliances, or deficiencies, typically 
have to be corrected before next port visit. Major deficiencies may result in lasting 
detentions. 
 
Ship insurance is a formal agreement that limits the economical risk of damaging the 
vessel, cargo, or any third parties. Today it is also becoming regular to be insured 
against the loss of hire related to an accident. In principle the costs of losses are 
distributed on several ships. Ship insurance has roots back to the 13th century (Thorsen, 
1926). During the 18th century insurance became more regular and in the mid 1800s the 
international competition for ship insurance grew. At the early 18th century the 
Protection and Indemnity (P&I) clubs emerged. This insurance was to cover liabilities 
for third parties. The P&I clubs have no profit making motives as the dividends are paid 
back to the clubs’ members i.e. those being insured (Bennett, 2001). The Group of P&I 
clubs emerged at the turn of the 20th century pools the risk of extremely large claims. In 
this way the risks are in reality pooled among the majority of ship owners and is 
characterised by the world’s cheapest insurance. While the P&I clubs have characterises 
of an ideal organisation, the Hull Underwriters insuring the ship itself are mostly private 
enterprises.  
 
Earlier the business idea of the Classification Societies was to provide the service of 
classifying the ships’ technical standard. Both design rules and periodical inspections 
should assure that the ships were seaworthy and also indicate the standard of the ships. 
This knowledge was valuable for the insurance companies for estimation of correct 
premiums. At some tome the insurance companies stopped using the classifications as a 
direct input for assessment of premiums, the classification societies instead assured that 
their subscribed ships satisfied their minimal rules. Hence today, the insurers require the 
subscription to a classification society, but do not take any further use of the knowledge 
held by the societies. Today the nine members of International Association of 
Classification Societies  (IACS) classify 98% of the world tonnage.  
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The most important business stakeholder is probably the cargo owner who is the 
consumer of the transportation service. This stakeholder has direct influence of the 
decision within a shipping company. To ensure that the shipping companies have a 
satisfactory standard they applies a vetting practice. A vetting is an audit where 
potential ships and shipping companies are assessed in meeting their stated 
requirements. The Erika accident illustrates however that the vetting regime not is able 
to filter out all substandard vessels. Within the passenger transportation several 
consumer associations have started to assess the safety standard of various ships. One 
example is the “Greek Island Hoppers” warning of Express Samina prior to her fatal 
accident. This far only the stakeholders in the transportation shipping market are 
mentioned. In reality the shipping market also included the new building market and the 
scraping markets with their own stakeholders. 
 
COMMERCIALISATION OF MARITIME SAFETY 
Shipping is a mature market where the existing practice of the stakeholders is rooted in 
traditions and decades of experience. While shipping is considered as a market 
governed by free competition, also the stakeholder act in a competitive environment. 
Several cargo owners do however consider the shipping transportations as a 
homogenous service. Because the service is considered to be homogenous, the cargo 
owners have no interest in paying for safety and quality (Tamvakis & Thanopoulou, 
2000). Even the stakeholders that directly are involved in control of risk, like the flags 
of registry, P&I clubs, Hull and Machinery underwriters and classification societies act 
in an environment where they compete with roughly identical services. The individual 
insurance companies have similar policies, the individual classification societies have 
about the same sets of rules and the flags of registry all follow IMO’s conventions. In 
such a mature markets the importance of market shares tends to increase. Therefore the 
stakeholders tend to be more interested in being large than to critically evaluate the risk 
of accidents. Substandard ships and shipping companies can easily provide their service, 
under any flag, any class society and for a cheap insurance premium.  
 
KNOWLEDGE ABOUT SAFETY 
In a historical context concern about safety can most distinctly be read out of laws. 
While there exist laws regulating safety that are about 4000 years old, it seems as if 
safety first became a scientific area during the 1930s. Cramer (1930) stated, “as a 
matter of fact, we find that practical insurance business has hitherto made little or no 
application of the results offered by mathematical theory of risk”. Simultaneously 
Heinrich (1931), who also worked for insurance, developed his theories of how 
industrial accidents could be prevented. From the late 1960s through the 1980s the 
experience and knowledge of safety advanced within many industrial domains. A range 
of new technologies were commercialised during the 1960s and 1970s. Examples are 
nuclear power, offshore oil production and space shuttling. These technologies 
introduced high risks, which had to be analysed with new modelling approaches such as 
Fault Tree Analysis and Failure Mode and Effect Analysis. At the late 1970s and the 
1980s extensive investigations were accomplished into accidents like Felixborough, 
Bravo, Piper Alpha, Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, King’s Cross, Herald of Free 
Enterprise and Challenger. The insight obtained from these investigations seems to 
increase the intensity of research into safety, which in turn has resulted in an extensive 
knowledge base.  
 
REASONING ABOUT SAFETY 
Before going into more details of this knowledge, it is necessary to describe what the 
knowledge about safety is and how it is used. Knowledge about safety involves both 
which Conditions (circumstances, situation, evidence, etc.) that are hazardous and Rules 
(certain compounds of Conditions) determining how these conditions may turn into an 
unwanted Performance (failure, accident, loss etc.). There are in general three types of 
logical reasoning about the Conditions and Rules that may cause a Failure. The three 
types of reasoning are deduction, induction and abduction (Coyne et.al., 1990).  
 
 
 
 
Logical deductio
knowledge of t
Condition that th
capsize it is give
given the fact tha
abduction that t
development of 
involves more u
which may not r
have historically
accidents (Bird, 
however, attem
dominating mari
accidents (figure
 Deduction:   condition + rule   → performance
Induction:   condition + performance → rule 
Abduction:   rule   + performance → condition 4 
Figure 2: The three types of reasoning about safety 
n is the mode of reasoning that is the most objective as it only applies 
he actual conditions and accepted rules. For example, given the 
is ship has lost its stability and the Rule that all unstable ships will 
n that the Performance is that this ship will capsize. On the other hand, 
t a ship has capsized together with the same rule it can be reasoned by 
he ship was unstable. Within science, induction is regarded as the 
theories (rules) from observations of certain phenomena. Induction 
ncertainties as the rules are generated from individual observations, 
epresent the general or real situation. The regulators of maritime safety 
 been too uncritical towards induction of rules from individual 
1969; Ayeko, 1999; Pidgeon & O’Leary, 2000). The latest decade, 
pts are made to become more proactive (Neumann, 1995). The 
time safety regulations can be traced back to the conditions of single 
 3).  
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Figure 3: Examples of inductive reasoning behind regulation of maritime safety  
Source: compiled from different sources like (IMO, 1998; Anderson, 1998; Fields & Rostant, 2000) 
 
PERSPECTIVES ON SAFETY 
The three types of reasoning are presented to better understand how our present 
knowledge about safety has been obtained. The knowledge about safety is can be 
obtained through three types of perspectives. The perspective of an accident investigator 
(Perspective 1, figure 4) is limited to the understanding of why individual accidents 
occurred. Therefore the investigator applies abductive reasoning to determine what 
conditions that caused the accident.  According to Kristiansen (2000) “It is often more 
easy to identify failures in the last stages of an accident than in the initiating stage. 
Decision makers therefore tend to look for measures that limit the damage rather than 
avoiding the accident”. Consequently, the reactive regulations in figure 3, does not 
seem to address the basic causes of the accidents (lower actual causes in figure 4) 
(Ayeko, 1999). In a statistical perspective it is possible to prove that accidents in 
general involves certain conditions (Perspective 2). For instance, the statistical evidence 
reveals that accidents are more frequent onboard old ships compared to the newer 
vessels. This perspective is helpful because it may be a guide to identify important 
hazardous conditions. Even though it can be proved that old ships carry a higher 
accident risk, the casual explanation behind this finding remains unknowns. It might be 
that older ships are operated differently or that old equipment has a higher failure rate. 
In order to understand why, knowledge of cause-effect chains (Rules) has to be applied. 
Therefore, through a management perspective (Perspective 3, figure 4) certain 
conditions or hazard can be pinpointed because their perceived dangers and actual 
hazards (Causes) can be identified. This perspective applies deductive reasoning (figure 
2). It can for instance be concluded that all corroded hulls has less strength, and 
therefore corroded technical condition of a ship is hazardous. Even though this 
perspective may explain the cause-effect chains behind statistical relationships, it does 
not indicate any priority of the risk. It might be that corroded hulls in fact are weaker, 
but that the higher risk related to old ships are caused by other factors (figure 4). In 
Poor emergency preparedness  + Titanic (1912)      → SOLAS convention  
Weak liability for spill cleanup + Torrey Canyon (1967)     → Civil Liability Conv. (IMO) 
Poor barriers against pollution + Torrey Canyon (1967)   → MARPOL (IMO) 
Weak liability for spill cleanup  + Exxon Valdez (1989)     → OPA90 regulation (USA) 
Poor RoRo standards  + Herald of Free Enterprise (1989)  → SOLAS amendments  
Poor safety management   + Scandinavian Star (1990)   
+ Aegan Sea (1992) + HFE(1989) → ISM code (IMO) 
Poor RoRo standards  + Estonia (1994)    → SOLAS amendments  
Weak enforcement by stakeholders  + Erika (1999)     → Post Erika 
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order to prevent accidents efficiently it is important to address the basic causes of the 
accidents, represented as the lower black actual causes in figure 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Variations of perspectives on safety and accident prevention 
 
KNOWLEDGE ABOUT ACCIDENT CAUSES (CONDITIONS) 
None of the three perspectives precisely address the basic causes of the accidents in 
figure 4. Wagenaar (1987) accomplished a pioneer study of the hazardous conditions 
that were relevant in the maritime domain. He investigated in detail the causes of 100 
ship accidents. He found that 97% of the accidents were caused by operator (or human) 
error, and that there was typically more than one operator error. The typical ship 
accident has more than 20 causes, whereof several have an independent nature. This 
complexity justifies that the typical ship accident is a result of a complex scenario. 
Consequently the scenarios are not of a series structure as indicated in figure 4, but 
rather consisting of a complex pattern of causes as illustrated in figure 7. Rasmussen 
(1983) and Reason (1990) classifies an operator error as a Slip, Lapse, Knowledge-
based or Rule-based mistake. According to Goossens & Glansdorp (1998) who 
investigated more than 300 navigational incidents “…in two-thirds of the cases, 
incidents began with a tactical event, meaning relatively close to the point-of-no-return. 
… Errors involving decision-making and implementing a new course and speed seems 
to be minor (substantially less than 10 percent)”. Fragola (2000) describes this as an 
Error of Commission “the actions was intended, the consequences were not.” 
Consequently the typical navigational ship accidents (collision, grounding, contact, etc.) 
are a result of intended tactical actions that were decided on false premises. This 
indicates that the errors are not a result of difficulties in the navigational task 
themselves, but rather the understanding of the situation or the context of the task 
(Williams, 1996; Rasmussen, 1997; Hollnagel, 1998; Fragola, 2000; Wilde, 2001).  
 
Based on this understanding of operator errors, one should then expect that navigational 
equipment that facilitates survey of the situation would result in improved safety. 
3. Management perspective:  
A range of potential accident 
scenarios with weak reference 
to actual losses 
1. Investigator perspective: Knowledge of the causes of an isolated 
accident with weak reference to the generality of the problems. 
2. Statistical perspective: 
Proving properties of accidents 
with weak reference to casual 
links. 
Accidents: 
 
Casual Chains:          
 
Actual Causes:       
 
Perceived Dangers:         
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However, the installation of radars during the 1960s did not result in any improved 
safety records (Gardenier, 1976). The gained information seemed to be used to sail 
more proximate to shore and other ships (Gardenier, 1976; Perrow, 1984,1999).  
Wagenaar (1987) stated that the basic causes of operator errors are dependent of the 
activity’s work environment, rather than personal and situational related factors. The 
major types of operator errors contributing to the occurrence of accidents are wrong 
habits, wrong diagnoses, lack of attention, lacking training and unsuitable personality. 
The findings of investigations into ship accidents (Karlsen & Kristiansen, 1980; 
Waagneaar, 1987; Spouge, 1985; Sheen, 1987, Cahill, 1990; NOU, 1991; Crainer, 
1993) roughly corresponded to the findings of investigations into accidents in other 
industrial domains (NOU, 1977; Kemeny, 1979; Kletz, 1985; IAEA, 1986; Fennel, 
1988; Hidden, 1989; Cullen, 1990; Pat’e-Cornell, 1993; Vaughan, 1996). Some of these 
findings are listed in table 1.  
 
Table 1: Conditions found to describe safety level  
Explicit hierarchal levels, poor communication, conflicting understanding of safety, poor management 
commitment, poor status of safety managers, poor work morale, safe practice was not rewarded, poor 
procedures, no or extreme reactions on deviation from procedures, poor cooperation, low information 
turnover and monitoring of safety performance, poor training, low perceived importance of safety 
training programs, poor cleaning and formal order, weak physical barriers against hazards, poor 
ergonomically conditions, poor physical work environment, high mental and physical stress, little 
resources to tackle responsibilities, insufficient manning, weak ability to adapt responsibilities to the 
situation, weak job satisfaction.  
 
The findings in table 1 have also been revealed in research into both shipping 
organisations (Itoh & Anderson, 1999; Parker, 1998; Sanquist, 1995) and non-maritime 
organisations (Zohar, 1980; LaPorte & Consolini, 1991; Paulsen, 1999) that have not 
experienced disasters.  
   
KNOWLEDGE ABOUT ACCIDENT DEVELOPMENT (RULES) 
These findings from accident investigations (table 1) satisfy both the Conditions and the 
Performances in figure 2. It is therefore possible to induce a range of Rules that 
describes why accidents occur. One example is to induce the rule (Rule 1, figure 5) that 
accidents are caused by human failures (Carver, 1992; Reason, 1990; Rasmussen, 1982, 
1983). Recent studies by SIRC and MAIB (2004) demonstrate the important impact 
crew fatigue has on the accident frequency (Rule 2). It is also possible be more precise 
and address those factors that cause humans to make errors. Williams (1986) have 
developed one comprehensible error assessment technique that both includes and 
assessment of the task and the context of the task (Rule 3). Because both the difficulty 
of the tasks and the quality of the context are determined by the organisation, Hollnagel 
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(1998) and Reason (1997) have developed theories that focus on organisational 
weaknesses (Rule 4). A refinement of rule 4 is to focus on the safety culture (Rule 5).  
 
All these rules are generalisations of the content of table 1. An alternative and more 
comprehensible reasoning approach to induce Rules is to ask why the Conditions in 
table 1 occur. One example is to state that poor safety management (Deming, 1991; 
Alteren, 1996; Reason, 1997) may result in these conditions (Rule 6). Perrow has a 
more sophisticated theory. He states that the system designs in are too complex and 
tight-coupled when disasters are being triggered by these factors (Rule 7). His idea is 
therefore to simplify the systems in order to make hazards more explicit, which is 
supported by both Wilde (2001) and Rasmussen (1997). Rasmussen has however 
induced an even more comprehensible theory. He states that characteristics of our 
modern dynamic society both produce accidents and reduce our ability to learn from 
accidents (Rule 8). Hovden (1996) have a stronger focus on organisational changes 
(Rule 9). 
 
Figure 5:  Examples of rules generated (induced) from the conditions of table 1. 
 
THE IMPERFECTIONS IN SAFETY KNOWLEDGE  
There are several imperfections or insufficiencies in our present knowledge of safety. 
These insufficiencies may form barriers for a further knowledge expansion. The first 
insufficiency is that knowledge obtained from accident investigations is dependent of 
what that investigation perceives and how he interprets these perceptions (Pedrali et.al, 
2002). There may be important factors that are not identified (Johnson, 2000c). 
Investigations often tend to search for blame and not for objective causes (Wagenaar, 
1997; Pidgeon & Leary, 2000). Therefore one may suspect that only the more 
perceptible actual causes presented at the bottom in Figure 4 are described. When the 
rules in figure 5 are induced, however, it is necessary to assume that no other 
knowledge exists other than that stated (closed world assumption). As a result some 
rules have been induced that are in explicit conflict. The rules presented in figure 6 are 
one simple example of conflict resolution (A,B,C). It is known that older ships are more 
Rule 1. Conditions in table 1 → Human failures cause accidents 
Rule 2. Conditions in table 1 → Crew fatigue cause accidents 
Rule 3. Conditions in table 1 → Task and task context cause accidents 
Rule 4. Conditions in table 1 → Organisational weaknesses cause accidents 
Rule 5. Conditions in table 1 → Poor safety culture cause accidents 
Rule 6. Conditions in table 1 → Poor safety management cause accidents 
Rule 7. Conditions in table 1 → Complex and tight-coupled system designs cause accidents 
Rule 8. Conditions in table 1 → Our modern dynamic society cause accidents 
Rule 9. Conditions in table 1 → Organisational changes cause accidents  
Rule 10.  … 
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frequently involved in accidents. This indicates that technical degradation determines 
the accident rate. However, when investigating the accidents it is seen that they are 
caused by human failures and not technical failures alone. This conflict intuitively 
indicates that some knowledge is missing. It might be that older ships are operated or 
managed differently or that the crew of the older vessels are in some way different. 
Anyhow, this knowledge is not yet obtained even though the conflict has been discussed 
for a century (Kysten, 1907).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Example of conflicts resolution originated from the closed world assumption 
 
There are other and newer insufficiencies in the safety knowledge. Although some of 
the rules in figure 5 have similarities the originators tend to stress importance and the 
uniqueness of their own theories. According to Wilde (2001) accidents are a result of 
failures in the risk perception of individuals. Perrow (1984, 1999) stress that aspects of 
the technical system design cause the accidents. Reason (1997) states that the causes lie 
within organisational culture, while Rasmussen (1997, 2000) also includes aspects of 
the society. Also within the professional domains conflicts have emerged. When the 
belief in precise modelling of human performance stagnated during the early 1990s, the 
focus shifted towards a conflict between different approaches. The analysts either 
belong to the school of human reliability or to the cognitive (Hollnagel, 2000; Fragola, 
2000). At the late 1990s it was acknowledged that two decades of research into safety 
culture had neither results in valid tools nor established proves that support its assumed 
high importance (Cox & Flin, 1998; Hale, 2000; Guldemund, 2000; Sorensen, 2002). 
Also here the focus was instantly shifted to whether the functional or an interpretive 
viewpoint is most correct (Glendon & Stanton, 2000). Consequently accident 
investigations have induced that human errors cause them to occur. It is however 
difficult to deduce that a certain behaviour will cause an accident. Simultaneously 
accident investigations have induced that safety culture are extremely important. It is 
however not yet deduced what safety performance that is the result of given safety 
culture. 
 
FOCUS ON RECURRENT ACCIDENT SCENARIOS 
Frankhauser (2001) proposed another fundamental worry by stating “In today’s 
applications there is an ever-increasing demand for components with higher and higher 
reliability. As a result of this the statistical basis for failure rates inferred from 
A: If a ship is old Then the risk of accidents rise 
B: If a ship is old Then the its equipment is old 
      If the equipment is old Then its failure rate tend to rise 
      If the failure rate rise Then the risk of accidents rise 
C: If a ship accident has occurred Then it is unlikely that it is a result of technical failures 
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corresponding field data diminishes, with the ultimate consequence that the uncertainty 
in this information increases more and more”. Even though this statement referred to 
component reliability, this is a matter of concern because out present knowledge is 
based on findings from the 1970s and 1980s. At this time the world economy was very 
volatile and management was concerned with increasing globalisation and competition. 
As a consequence of this management the focus on quality assurance (Costin, 1999) 
increased during the 1990s (Cameron & Quinn, 1999). As a result, the organisations of 
today are managed in another way than they were when our present knowledge was 
formed. Consequently, the knowledge is only valid for those accidents scenarios that 
reoccur. Waagenaar (1997) suggests that an accident analysis should only focus on the 
causes that may reoccur. Reason (1998) states that a recurrent accident scenario 
included at least three elements. The Universals (1) represents the ever-present hazards, 
the Local traps (2) are the characteristics of the work place that lure people into repeated 
patterns of unsafe acts and the Drivers (3) that make people do erroneous behaviour. 
Reason indicates that, while there might be a multitude of Local traps, the number of 
Drivers is limited, focusing on economical variables and production pressure. Also the 
number of Universal hazards is of a limited character. This indicates that the recurrent 
scenario may be divided in two separate phases, a diverging phase where the 
consequences of the Driver expand, and a converging phase where the Universal 
hazards are released by the Local traps.  A detail of the analysis is also that the Local 
traps be manifested by perceived dangers that not contribute to the development of the 
accident scenario. It is likely that some of the Conditions that are listed in table 1 are of 
such a character.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Conceptual illustration of a complex recurrent accident scenario 
 
The characteristics modern high-risk domains like nuclear power, offshore and process 
industries differ between plants, nations and over time. These differences restrict the 
possibility in collecting uniform empirical data that may reveal the characteristics of 
recurrent accident scenarios. Shipping on the other hand is known for its conservatism 
and takes place in an environment under a uniform international regulation. In additions 
the differences between the best and poorest performing shipping companies, with 
respect to safety, is perceived as relatively large (Donaldson, 1994). The hazards (1) that 
Accidents: 
 
Casual Chains:          
 
Actual Causes:       
 
Perceived Dangers:         
Converging Phase 
 
Diverging Phase          
Local Traps (2)         
Universal Hazards (1)        
Drivers (3)         
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govern today were also present centuries ago. The characteristics of today’s workplace 
have also centuries of history, even though the equipment has been improved. The 
international shipping market matured a century ago (Koopmans, 1939; Zannetos, 1966; 
Stopford, 1997). Therefore it is might be that the drivers (2) in the market have been 
stable. The drivers behind the crew’s behaviour may have changed. Anyhow, there is a 
fear chance that ship accidents for several decades have been formed by a scenario that 
is of a recurrent character. 
 
ANALYSIS OF RECURRENT ACCIDENT SCENARIOS 
Given that the analytical focus should be aimed at recurrent accident scenarios, this may 
give certain restrictions in the analytical approach. Hovden (1998) has outlined a 
general way of modelling of risk information. He describes five different sources of 
information about accident risk (risk = ƒ(X1, X2, X3, X4, X5)) where the five sources are 
presented in table 2.  
 
Table 2: Summary of main features of information dealing with risk problems (Hovden, 1998) 
 Property Notations Modelling Inference Rules 
X1 Deterministic Certainty X1=a Empirical Logical 
X2 Stochastic Probability F(X2) = P(X2<x2,λ) Analytical 
X3 Uncertainties in values X3→[Xn-Xm] Both 
Statistical and 
Mathematical 
X4 Uncertainties in parameters -∞ ≤ X4 ≤+∞ Expert judgement 
X5 Lack of knowledge X5→ ? Heuristic 
Heuristics, intuition 
and dialogue 
 
In summary Waagenaar (1998) has stated that the important knowledge is related to the 
accident causes that reoccur. Reason (1998) describes the elements of the recurrent 
accident scenario. Hovden (1998) has outlined broad range of main features of risk 
information. Then the task is to select which analysis approach in table 2 that is most 
suitable for analysis and identification of recurrent accident scenarios. Fragola (2003) 
have proposed an approach for identification and analysis of “Emerging Failure 
Phenomena in Complex Systems”.  He states that “In these cases, .. , the underlying 
system is neither orderly enough to be considered regular, nor disorderly enough to be 
considered random, and can therefore be defines as being “complex” because it will 
succumb to neither deterministic analysis nor probabilistic analysis”. Consequently, 
Fragola suggest that such that recurrent accidents scenarios in complex and high-risk 
systems should be analysed with what he calls data “interrogation” (X4 and X5 in table 
2). According to Fragola this approach “ involve a means of evoking subtle patterns 
from data or from the physical phenomena themselves by “interrogating” the data until 
it yields it secrets”.  In as broad sense the induction of rules that cause accidents 
(Jonhson, 2000 a,b,c), incidents and near misses may fall under this description (Schaaf 
& Lucas & Hale, 1991). Even though Fragola considers the data “interrogation” as a 
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proactive technique, it may very well be used on historical data to search for 
characteristics of recurrent maritime accident scenarios.  
 
Deming (1982, 1986, 1991) claims that he was not the first one that put emphasis on the 
distinction between “special causes”, in terms that they are not under the responsibility 
of management and in contrast to the “common causes” that are produced by the 
system. In the context of analysing recurrent accident scenarios, common causes are 
high relevance. Deming indicated that the common causes constitute 94 % of the total 
volume of causes. While Deming’s theories are aimed at quality control, there exist 
several theories that also consider consequence of the accidents. It is common to make a 
distinction between those accidents that have an impact solely on the element that fail 
itself and those accidents that directly damages or threatens the safe functioning of 
whole systems or ship functions, or expose other humans for danger. The first type of 
accident is typically an occupational accident. Reason’s (1997) “individual accident” or 
Perrow’s (1999) “component accidents” are of similar nature. The second type of 
accident is more hazardous as it has the potential to develop into disasters resulting in 
extensive damage to assets, loss of human life and pollution. This high-risk accident is 
called a “concept accident” Kristinasen (2000), “organisational accident” (Reason, 
1997) or “system accident” (Perrow, 1999). For a ship, this type of accident is typically 
grounding, a foundering, a collision, a fire, an explosion or a breakdown.  
 
DEFINING BLUE-CHIP AND SUB-STANDARD 
In other industrial domains the utilisation of quantitative risk analyses (QRAs) and 
safety cases were becoming regular during the 1980s. Examples of risk acceptance 
criteria are the ALARP (As Low As Reasonable Practical), De minimis (risk of event < 
10-4) and various utility-based criteria (Krappinger, 1971; Morgan, 1990; Reason, 1997; 
Skjong, 1998, 2001; Floyd, 2000). Within shipping there exist several criteria 
describing a ship’s unsatisfactory safety standard. Commonly used criteria have been 
poor seamanship, unseaworthiness, non-compliance or being sub-standard. Anderson 
(1998) refers a judge’s description of unseaworthiness: “To be seaworthy, a vessel must 
have that degree of fitness that an ordinary careful and prudent shipowner would 
require his vessel to have at the commencement of the voyage having regard to all 
probable circumstances of it” Another definition is described in the Seaworthiness Act 
(§ 2): “A ship is considered unseaworthy when, because of defects in hull, equipment, 
machinery or crewing or due to overloading or deficient loading or other grounds, it is 
in such a condition, that in consideration of the of the vessel’s trade, the risk to human 
life associated with going to sea exceeds what is customary.” Customs, which also is 
used in the considerations of poor seamanship, is however an imprecise norm. Non-
Compliance became a more specific criterion, as it address the norm represented by 
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precise regulations. If a ship does not fulfil the regulations it is per definition Non-
Compliant. Non-Compliance can be identified through deficiencies in ship inspections 
or non-conformities in ISM audits. However, as the typical ship has a couple of 
deficiencies in a Port State Control Inspection and a couple of non-conformities in an 
ISM-audit, the majority of ships in commercial trade are in fact Non-Compliant. 
Therefore the term Sub-Standard has been acknowledged. In general, a ship is regarded 
as substandard if the hull, crew, machinery, or equipment; such as for lifesaving, fire 
fighting, and pollution prevention; are substantially below the standards by laws or 
international conventions (US Coast Guard, 1993).  
 
Simultaneous as the norms for safety acceptance advanced, the subject of the 
assessment has changed. From focusing on the technical and regulative subjects, the 
trend the latest 25 years have been to address the company behind the ships. It has been 
common to state that behind any Sub-Standard ship there is a Sub-Standard owner or 
manager (Cahill, 1990; Crainer, 1993; Everard, 1995; Donaldson, 1998). This utilisation 
of the criterion dilutes its explicitness as there are few regulations governing how 
owners or managers are to conduct their daily tasks. If it is accepted that some 
companies have a poorer ability or motivation to focus on safety, this intuitively 
indicates that the safety standard of both ships and companies follows some level of 
gradation. It is then interesting to ask what type of companies that is at the opposite side 
of the scale, being unusual safe. LaPorte and Consolini (1991) defined the term High 
Reliability Organisations (HRO). The definition of HROs is however relatively limited. 
The term “quality” owners, managers and companies are used, but the term “quality” do 
in fact encompass more than safety (Soukas & Rouhiainen, 1993; Costin, 1999).  The 
term “Blue-Chip” companies are used by inventors on a stock that is considered reliable 
both with respect to dividend income and capital value. Cox and Flin (1998) drew the 
line between “Blue-Chip” companies and their superior focus on safety. In this study 
the terms Blue-Chip and Sub-Standard represents the extreme poles in the scale of an 
organisation’s safety level. To get a more hands-on understanding of the terms, it can be 
stated that each of the terms encompasses 20%-30% of the world fleet.  
 
OVERVIEW OF STUDY  
The objective of this thesis describes the characteristics that distinguish shipping 
companies that have a superior safety standard, called blue-chip, from those being sub-
standard. The different characteristics of the companies having different safety standard 
are important to be aware of, as they indicate how safety may be improved in ship 
transportation. With reference to the previous section, the scope of the study is limited 
to focus on recurrent high-risk accident scenarios arising in ship organisations and 
systems that are assumed to be of a complex nature. In order to establish this insight 
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safety is considered in a broad context, ranging from what happens at the operational 
scene, back to the strategies and tactics adopted by the shipping companies. Therefore 
this study follows a thematic structure as presented in figure 8.   
 
Figure 8: Outline of thematic structure 
 
It is assumed that the explanation of accidents follow an organisational dimension from 
the scene where the actual losses take place to the basic causes within the top-level 
management or even the environment (Heinrich, 1931; Bird, 1969; Kjelle’n & Hovden, 
1993; Wagneaar, 1997; Reason, 1997; Rasmussen, 1997; Hollnagel, 1998; Cooper, 
1999; Koster, 1999; Ayeko, 1999). Each of the five levels introduces various types of 
knowledge, data sources and influences from different stakeholders. At the top of this 
figure we have the knowledge about the actual losses. This information is objective as it 
can be described in terms of injuries, deaths, insurance claims, damage to assets or lost 
ships. In order to prevent losses it is necessary to address the immediate casual level 
like the operational scene onboard a ship (figure 8, level 2). Such knowledge can be 
inspection findings, observation of unsafe acts, audit findings and near miss reports. As 
described earlier the investigative perspectives (figure 4) have suggested that the 
observable deficiencies at the operational scene are results of more distal organisational 
factors. Safety culture is one example of the content of organisational factors (level 3). 
The last 20 years considerable research have been accomplished to establish insight into 
the organisational factors (table 1). It is believed that the organisational factors are 
related to the decisions taken and the commitment demonstrated at the top-level 
management level through business strategies and tactical decisions (level 4). At last 
these management decisions have to be seen in relation to the environment in which the 
company act (level 5). 
 
In order to understand how aspects of the environment, management, organization and 
onboard workplace influence on the safety performance, the thesis both address aspects 
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Level 4:  
 
 
 
Level 5:  
UNSAFE ACTS
ONBOARD WORKPLACE FACTORSSHIP STANDARD 
ACCIDENTS
ENVIRONMENT 
ORGANISATION
MANAGEMENT
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within each level, between several levels and the model in its entirety.  A series of ten 
papers have been written. Some of these are published in conference proceedings and 
some are submitted to relevant journals. The title of the papers, and their scope are 
presented in table 3. 
 
Table 3:  Papers with title and reference to levels in figure 8 
Paper Level Title of paper 
Paper 1 1 to 5 What are the causes of ship accidents? 
Paper 2 1 to 5 Modelling the safety performance of maritime operations–aggregation of symbolic knowledge 
Paper 3 1 & 2 Ship safety standard classification based on accident history and port state control findings 
Paper 4 1 to 5 Safety Assessment of Ship Operators – A Neural Network Approach 
Paper 5 3 The relationship between safety cultural factors and the safety standard of shipping companies 
Paper 6 3 Measuring the safety standard of organizations 
Paper 7 3 Measuring the Quality of Safety Cultures 
Paper 8 4 & 5 
A Search for Risk Drivers in the Freight Market  (Commercial ship accidents - a macro level 
perspective) 
Paper 9 4 & 5 
Risk Drivers in the Liner Market (Commercial ship accidents - a micro level perspective into 
the passenger ship market) 
Paper 10 4 & 5 
Risk Drivers in the Tramp Market (Commercial ship accidents - a micro level perspective into 
the tanker market) 
 
DATA INTERROGATION 
Data “interrogation” is the process of data collection and investigation from a variety 
of perspectives, alternatively dissecting it into its underlying (yet often unknown) 
patterns…Some of the techniques employed are slicing the data set according to known 
underlying variables, or overlaying data gathered from different perspectives, or 
imbedding data into previously established logical or phenomenological structures.” 
(Fragola, 2003). In this way data interrogation has similarities with a heuristic search 
technique. There seems to be four relevant types of heuristic search mechanisms (I, II 
and III and IV), whereof the three first are of a manual character. In these three (I, II and 
III) approaches the analyst search to reveal structured patterns in the dataset. When 
there exist no predefined knowledge there is still the possibility to use heuristic search 
through more automated computer techniques (IV). With reference to figure 2, these 
approaches go through loops where first a candidate Rule is produced (induction figure 
2), then its quality is assessed through deduction and the candidate Rule is improved. 
Then the process is started over again until a satisfactory Rule has been induced. 
 
I. Consider parts of the datasets according to known underlying variables 
II. Consider parts of the datasets relative to an overlaying data gathered from different 
perspectives. 
III. Consider data relative to previously established logical or phenomenological structures. 
IV. Allow a computerised heuristic search to reveal possible patterns. 
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In a safety perspective the first three approaches (I) can be exemplified with the analysis 
of near misses, audit findings, incidents or deficiencies. When applying the first 
approach, the dataset is assessed relative to known underlying variables e.g. table 1. In 
this (abductive) way it can be found that certain underlying variables may have higher 
relevance (at a lower level in figure 2). This process can also be done through software 
like Tripod-delta (Shell, 1994). If however, the data is assessed relative to overlying 
data (II) such as of collisions, groundings, capsize, foundering, fire, explosion etc. this 
may also reveal some pattern within the considered data (at a higher level in figure 2). 
The idea of considering the dataset relative to figure 2 is in itself an example of the third 
approach (III). Analysis through LCM (Bird, 1967), SMORT (Kjell’en et.al. 1987); 
CASMET (Koster et.al., 1999) are other examples. Wagenaar (1997) and Koster et.al. 
(1999) compare some of these approaches. Another approach is Johnson’s (2000 a,b,c) 
Evidence-Analysis-Consequence (EAC) analysis approach. There exist examples of 
data interrogation of the latest example (IV). Luxhøj & Williams (1999) have presented 
a project where they use neural networks and expert system technology to analyse 
aircraft maintenance databases with the objective of defining “more refined “alert” 
indicators for national comparison purposes that can signal potential problem areas by 
aircraft type for safety inspector consideration”.  In a maritime safety context Hashemi 
(1995) and his colleagues used an artificial neural network to predict the type of 
accident that would occur under different combinations of navigational conditions on 
the lower Mississippi River.  
 
In both the manual and automated interrogation there are no leading assumptions about 
what the next step or the result will be. In contrast conventional statistical inference are 
governed by the defined apriory assumptions or hypotheses, the carefully selected 
variables and the inflexible statistical inference rules. In this way data interrogation may 
represent a more objective results possibly at the expense of the barrier against 
induction of spurious Rules. Spurious Rules may be induced because many independent 
variables (white conditions in figure 2) may together arbitrarily describe a dependent 
variable (Performance), without being valid in a general situation. The combination of 
several perspectives does however reduce the likelihood of entering this pitfall. While 
data interrogation (IV) may apply the same techniques as within artificial intelligence, 
expert systems, machine learning and knowledge based methods, it differs from these 
approaches as it do not attempt to replicate human decision making (Fukunaga, 1990; 
Michie, Spegelhalter & Taylor, 1994; Ripley, 1996; Nilsson, 1998). Today tools for 
data interrogation like artificial neural networks, pattern recognition, data mining and 
learning Bayesian networks are available in standard professional software packages 
like SAS, SPSS, Hugin and MatLab.  
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It is difficult to strictly classify the thesis as a descriptive or an explorative study.  It is 
descriptive because the resulting characteristics that distinguish the safe companies from 
the less safe are linked to the importance of variables and the relationship between 
variables. The study may also be considered as explorative because of its broad context, 
its use of data interrogation and search for characteristics of maritime recurrent accident 
scenarios. There are in fact few doctorate studies that address this broad view even 
though experts like Heinrich (1931), LaPorte and Consolini (1991) Wilde (2001), 
Perrow, (1999), Reason (1997) and Rasmussen (1997) all express that safety involves 
something more than fragmentary knowledge. 
 
COLLECTING BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE ABOUT ACCIDENT SCENARIOS 
The two first tasks was to collect existing data on that is needed to apply a data 
interrogation approach within safety is to collect existing knowledge of what the causes 
of ship accidents are, and how they develop into accidents. These two tasks respectively 
forms the two first papers (table 2). In the context of data interrogation the results of 
these studies may form one important source of background knowledge for all 
approaches (I, II, III and IV). 
 
The first paper outlines the stat-of-the art knowledge of causes of ship accidents. The 
paper especially focuses on the Investigative perspective and the Statistical perspective 
in figure 4 (Perspective 1 and 2).  However, the contradictions presented in figure 6 are 
discussed with reference to the perspectives outlined in figure 4.  
 
While the first paper focus on causes of accidents (Conditions in figure 2), the second 
paper focus on the development of accidents from these conditions (Rules in figure 2). 
As earlier described there exists a range of models describing why accidents take place 
based on more distal factors (figure 2), typically of operator or organisational nature 
(figure5). Some thirty of these models are compared. These models represent much 
expert insight and therefore a good basis for aggregation of causal relationships 
(symbolic rules). This paper takes the Investigative perspective and the management 
perspective in figure 4 (Perspective 1 and 3). Because a significant share of these 
models focus on the understanding of operator errors (figure 5) these rules are held 
separate. Besides knowledge that actual models represents, there exists knowledge that 
makes it possible to assess the relevance of these models (Rasmussen, 1997). Therefore 
the models are assessed, and based on this assessment a new model is aggregated 
(presented in figure 8). 
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DEVELOPING A NORM FOR ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY STANDARD  
While the two foregoing studies collect background knowledge that can be used in 
approach (I) and (III) there exists no intuitive norm that indicates the safety standard of 
an organisation (overlaying data in II). Contradicting knowledge as presented in figure 
4, in addition to the stochastic element of an accident scenario makes any reasoning 
about safety uncertain and vulnerable for critics. It would be favourable if a norm of 
distribution in safety standard was developed, analogous to the norm the Gaussian 
distribution represents for the distribution human’s intelligence quota (IQ). If such a 
norm existed, actual safety performance may indicate what the real safety standard of 
the organisation is, like the performance of an IQ-test indicates a person’s intelligence. 
This study (Paper 3) first develops this norm distribution, and then develops and 
validates two classification techniques that indicate a ship, or a shipping company’s, 
actual benchmark within this norm. The two techniques respectively apply accident 
statistics and safety inspection findings. This study is important especially in the second 
(II) and (IV) data interrogation approaches where it is required that the overlying data 
(Performance) e.g. safety level or loss is fairly reliable. 
 
INTERROGATION BASED ON ARTIFICIAL NEURAL NETWORKS 
The first full data interrogation approach (Paper 4) was to train an artificial neural 
network to reveal the dependency patterns in a given dataset. In artificial neural 
networks the dataset is divided into two parts, a set of independent variables (level 2 to 
5) and typical one dependent variable (Performance in figure 2) like losses (Level 1) or 
safety inspection results (Level 2). Then a training procedure applies a heuristic search 
to adjust the network structure to optimally represent the relationship between the 
dependent variables and the independent variables. In this way the resulting network 
structure represents the Rule (figure 2) that describe how the data can determine the 
Performance. At this stage of the research it was believed that artificial neural networks 
were advantageous to produce insight into how safety can be described thorough 
organisational factors. If the datasets are of sufficient size artificial neural networks 
have the potential to represent any relationships. A main obstacle was the required data 
size. Therefore the symbolic knowledge aggregated in Paper 2 was incorporated in the 
structure of the neural network. This lead the neural network to interrogate the data 
relative to the previously established structures outlined in figure 8. In this context the 
artificial neural network is a hybrid between the (III) and the (IV) data interrogation 
approaches. With reference to the language used within neural network literature it 
represents an hybrid between symbolic and sub-symbolic networks.  
 
Considerable efforts were assigned to this work, probably of about twenty percent of the 
total workload. Even though it only is presented in a single paper the obtained insight 
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was large. A yet unpublished study on datasets reaching 2500 randomly selected ships it 
was found that the networks were efficient in combining data but still the predictable 
abilities were not considered to be sufficient.  
 
INTERROGATION OF ORGANISATIONAL FACTORS 
During the last two decades extensive research into organisational factors have been 
accomplished. The finding of these studies are simplified and presented in table 1 and 
figure 5. This part of the thesis focuses on Rule 5 in figure 5 (Safety Culture). 
Guldenmund (2000) summarises the situation on research into safety culture: “Although 
safety culture and climate are generally acknowledged to be important concepts, not 
much consensus has been reached on the cause, the content and the consequence of 
safety culture and climate in the past 20 years. Moreover, there is an overall lack of 
models satisfying either the relationship of both concepts with safety and risk 
management or with safety performance”.  Given this unsuccessful history, it might be 
wise to consider alternative, or unconventional, approaches in the analysis of safety 
culture. Therefore the situation in safety culture research gives free rain to the 
demonstration of the possibilities in data interrogation. 
  
This part of the thesis consists of three papers (5, 6 and 7). The approach is to combine 
the data interrogation approaches II and III. With reference to figure 2 the questionnaire 
responses represents the Conditions. The safety standard developed from the techniques 
in Paper 3 represent the Performance. Then the task is to find the Rule that represents 
the link between the Conditions and the Performances. In this context the approach is a 
mix of data interrogation II and III. In paper 5 first nine shipping companies are ranked 
according to their safety standard (Performance), and then existing techniques and 
conceptual models (Rules) are searched to find a relationship between questionnaire 
response data and the known safety standard.  
 
In paper 6 a type III interrogation is applied with a new developed principle of data 
interrogation. Because the Rules in Paper 5 only marginally described the relationship 
between the questionnaire responses and the safety performance, a new Rule was 
proposed. The idea is that improved safety management reduce the stochastic character 
of safety performance. Therefore a poorly managed organisation, experience that 
different types of incidents and failures occur in an independent manner. This 
phenomenon can be explained with reference to established knowledge. Within 
statistical inference it is known that conventional distributions like gamma and Poisson, 
the variance decrease with decreasing event rate. Hence if safety management is 
improved the failure rate is decreased and the variation in failures from one time period 
to another is reduced. Because the stochastic element is reduced, the relative influence 
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of the deterministic character of the safety performance is improved. In a real situation 
one may experience that the time series of different safety performance parameters tend 
to correlate. Correlation indicates that the processes are governed by a common variable 
e.g. Reason’s (1998) earlier described elements in the recurrent accident scenario. 
Hence the proposed Rule was based on reasoning with correlation matrixes. Based on 
the new Rule of Paper 6, the approach in Paper 5 was repeated in Paper 7 with great 
success revealing some important cultural characteristics involved in a maritime 
recurrent accident scenario. 
 
INTERROGATION OF VARIABLES DESCRIBING MANAGEMENT AND BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 
The underlying cultural patterns that were identified in the papers 1 to 7 indicate that the 
top-level management commitment and tactics have a large impact on safety. Because 
the task of the top-level management is to make the company running and produce 
profits and at the same time allocate resources it is intuitive that there may be a 
connection between economical parameters and accident statistics. In Paper 8 the type 
III of data interrogation is applied where the time series of both market accident 
statistics (Performance) inspected with reference to the pattern of conjectures in the 
freight market (Conditions) back to late 19th century up until today. Given the long 
distance between the onboard work conduction, where the accidents take place, and the 
fluctuations of the freight market or even world economy, it was not obvious that the 
relationship could be revealed even if it existed. However, the study was successful and 
indicates a certain mathematical relationship between the series (Rule). 
This study indicates that there is a reverse relationship between economy and the 
likelihood of accidents i.e. when the freight market drops the accident rate increase.  
 
In order to be sure that this relationship is not spurious a variation of tests were tried 
out. First the second derivatives of the series were compared in order to be sure that the 
negative correlation also is present for yearly fluctuations. While Paper 8 have a macro 
perspective on this relationship it was also tested that the relationship was valid at a 
micro level for individual shipping companies. Paper 9 and 10 do this for passenger ship 
companies and tanker companies respectively.  
 
DATA SOURCES 
In this type of analysis any obtainable data can be assessed. The data that is used on this 
study is presented in table 4 defined for each of the levels in figure 8. The first row 
represents the Performance in figure 2. To increase the reliability of the Performance 
also safety inspection findings are used to represent the data on the Performance (Paper 
3). The remaining rows include data of Conditions that may explain why or how 
recurrent accident scenarios take place onboard ships.  
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Table 4: Types of applied data and their relevant level in figure 8. 
Level in Figure 3 Types of data 
Level 1  Accident data, total loss, serious accidents and insurance claims 
Level 2 Safety Inspection data, ship design data 
Level 3 Safety attitude data  
Level 4 Annual reports, Organisational structure 
Level 5 Fleet size data, freight rates 
 
ACCIDENT DATA 
The accident statistics is mainly collected from a database held by the Lloyd’s Maritime 
Information Service (LMIS). This database contains data on accidents onboard 
commercial ships over 50 gross tons for the whole world fleet. Lloyd’s Register until 
has held the database recently when it shared the ownership with Fairplay. The 
accidents are categorised either as total losses, serious or severe accidents and non-
serious accidents.  
 
Total loss are accidents where the ship ceases to exist after a casualty, either due to it 
being irrecoverable (actual total loss) or due to being subsequently broken up 
(constructive total loss). The latter occurs when the cost of repair would exceed the 
insured value of the ship. Statistics of total losses are available from the latter part of the 
18th and up until today. There are numerous of interface to this database. In this study 
the majority of total loss data are collected from the written publications of the database. 
This publication have changed name over time from Lloyd’s Casualty Return to World 
casualty Statistics. In order to calculate total loss frequencies the size of the world fleet 
is collected from the World Fleet Statistics. Serious accidents are breakdowns resulting 
in the ship being towed or requiring assistance from ashore; flooding of any 
compartments; or structural, mechanical or electrical damage requiring repairs before 
the ship can continue trading. In this context serious casualty does not include total loss. 
Non-serious incident are any event reported to LMIS and included in the database, not 
being categorized as serious or total loss. Each accident is also categorised according to 
the accident types: 
 
Also insurance claim statistics for ships insured by Norwegian companies. Only hull 
insurance claims excess of the own-risk limit for 1985 to 2002 are included. These data 
cover roughly 62000 ships and 21000 claims. In 1990 the own-risk limit was increased. 
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Table 5: Categorisation of losses (Lloyd's World Casualty Statistics, 1994) 
Type Description of loss 
Foundering Includes ships that sank as a result of heavy weather, springing of leaks, breaking in 
two, etc., but not as a consequence of the categories listed below. 
Missing After a reasonable period of time, no news having been received of a ship and its fate 
being therefore undetermined. 
Fire/Explosion Includes ships lost as a result of fire and/or explosion where it is the first event reported. 
Collision Includes ships lost as a result of striking or being struck by another ship, regardless of 
whether under way, anchored or moored. 
Contact Includes ships lost as a result of striking an external substance – but not another ship 
(collision) or the sea bottom (wrecked/ stranded) e.g. drilling rigs/ platforms. 
Wrecked/ 
Stranded 
Includes ships lost as a result of touching the sea bottom, sandbanks or seashore, etc. as 
well as entanglement of underwater wrecks. 
Other Includes war loss (and encompassing loss occasioned to ships by hostile acts), hull / 
machinery damage or failure which is not attributable to any other category. 
  
INSPECTION DATA 
The ParisMOU database (http://www.parismou.org) presents the type of deficiencies or 
detentions from all inspections in European and Canadian ports. The Equasis database 
(http://www.equasis.org) presents the number of deficiencies and detentions on sailing 
ships that have been inspected by PaisMOU, TokyoMOU and US Coast Guard. The 
search engines vary slightly between these databases. Both databases contain inspection 
data for about the last four years and ships that have been involved in a total loss are 
rejected from the Equasis database. Hence, only the ParisMOU inspections are available 
for lost ships.   
 
ADAC Motorwelt is a German magazine written for the members of the ADAC 
Automobile Association. Each spring since 1998 this magazine performs an inspection 
of European ferries and ro-ro passenger ships. The inspection variables are listed below 
and are assessed on a five point linguistic scale (Very good, good, satisfying, defective, 
very defective) measured on six areas. These are Safety Information, Construction, Fire 
Protection, Emergency Equipment, Telecommunication / public address equipment, 
Safety Management. At last an overall score is compiled based on a weighted sum of 
the individual scores.  
 
SAFETY ATTITUDES DATA 
Risø, the Danish Maritime Institute (DMI), and the University of Texas (NASA/FAA) 
Aerospace Crew Research Project developed the Ship Management Attitudes 
Questionnaire (SMAQ) as a joint project. This questionnaire is part of a study aimed at 
understanding maritime operations attitudes and is derived from the Flight Management 
Attitudes Questionnaire (FMAQ), developed by the University of Texas. The FMAQ is 
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widely used in aviation to diagnose organisations in the areas of organisational culture, 
safety, and human factors practices. It contains items that relate to employees’ opinions 
and attitudes about management, morale, safety issues, automation and teamwork, as 
well as general work values.  
 
The FMAQ and the SMAQ questionnaires are instruments to assess organisational 
culture. In particular emphasis is assigned to the perception by employee groups of their 
organisation’s safety values and system and their attitudes to and awareness of human 
factors issues.  In aviation, the data are used to determine what actions, if any, are 
needed to enhance the organisational structure and safety system and to define training 
needs. Findings from the survey are presented in confidential reports to individual 
companies, but published works, like this one, will describe results in anonymous form, 
de-identifying the participating companies. A questionnaire survey has already been 
carried out among seafaring personnel in several shipping companies. The SMAQ 
questionnaire was distributed to seafaring personnel in five shipping companies during 
1997 (four Scandinavian companies and one Asian company). The database has later 
been expanded with data from an American company, and two more Asian companies. 
 
MANAGEMENT VARIABLES 
This is a difficult are to obtain larger datasets for this area. Compared to other domains 
it is however some possibilities. The management decisions related to the type and age 
of their ship and the uniformity of their fleet is obtainable. Also the decided flag of 
registry is known to be of significant relevance and is a factor representing concentrated 
insight into the management strategies. Flags of convenience are often used to relax 
control of crews and ship standards in additions to the pure economical rationality. Also 
the membership of associations, applied classification society and insurance company 
may be of relevance. There have been three main sources for information about the 
organisations behind individual ships. These are the Internet interface to the LMIS 
database (http://www.sea-web.org), the Equasis database (http://www.equasis.org) and 
annual reports. In the Sea-Web portal it is possible to get an understanding of the 
ownerships of a vessel, the ship manager and who manages the ship in a larger fleet and 
at last the holding company of the vessels. In addition it is possible to get and overview 
of the ships technical features, and the history of the managers, owners and Flags of 
registry and Classification Societies.  
 
ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES 
Also this area has scare data. In a historical perspective however, data from the freight 
market, technological evolution, changes in regulation among some of the data that is 
available. Annual reports from individual companies have been collected to get a deeper 
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understanding of these companies strategies, economical performance and changes to 
the organisations. In some cases the economical performance is supported with stock 
values that have been downloaded from the relevant stock market. Also data on freight 
rates have been applied from various sources (Fernley’s, 1985) 
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WHAT ARE THE CAUSES OF SHIP ACCIDENTS? 
 
Torkel Soma 
Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Department of Marine System Design, Norway 
 
ABSTRACT 
Maritime safety work has for a century been dominated by two conflicting principles. 
The first is the higher frequency of operator errors relative to technical failures. The 
second principle is then emphasis of improving safety through technical upgrading, 
such as incorporating double hulls. This study addresses this inconsistency, and 
describes the general evolution of insight into the causes of maritime accidents. While 
the main cause of accidents in the early 1900s were recorded as being unavoidable and 
of external character, it is concluded that today’s typical ship collision, grounding, 
foundering or extensive fire is a result of an organizational failure. Relevant empiric 
evidence and theory is outlined. Factors, which may describe some of the variance in 
accident rates, such as flag of registry and ship age, are also described in an historical 
perspective. It will be demonstrated that the ship age do not describe the vessels’ 
intrinsic technically accident risk, as earlier assumed. Small, relatively inexperienced 
management companies have significantly higher age of their fleets. Their policy and 
inexperience is therefore most likely the real cause behind the significance of ship age. 
 
KEYWORDS : Ship safety, properties of maritime accidents, business strategies and 
policies 
 
1. ARE WE MAKING ANY PROGRESS?  
During a newspaper search for information about maritime safety, it was evident that 
the main focus was aimed at old tonnage and poor maintenance. Ship detentions were 
proclaimed as one measure to cope with these problems, as well as banning of vessels 
older than 20 years. It was further suggested to improve regulation, build experience, 
improve competence and incorporate organizational redundancy into the shipping 
organizations. Human errors and adequacy of resources was pointed out as important 
factors. This mind-set could probably be compiled from today’s newspapers, especially 
subsequent to the Erika and the Prestige accidents. The surveyed newspapers were 
however about 100 years old [1], [2].  
 
Even though the socio-technical understanding of maritime safety commenced at least a 
decade prior to the historical Titanic accident, today’s safety efforts are apparently 
struggling with the same level of detail. If the applied safety improving strategy is 
effective is therefore a matter of discussion. On a theoretical level the most important 
innovation is the concept of safety culture. Although knowledge on safety cultures still 
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not is fully developed, this concept may at least be seen as one step forward. Insight into 
human and organizational safety has also increased significantly. Potential hazards have 
been introduced by the increased size and complexity of ships and the significant 
decrease in crew size. During the last 50 years the Flags Of Convenience (FOC) have 
hampered the motivation for improving ship safety. It is however expected that our 
current modern society has resulted in more than marginal improvements in ship safety 
in a 100-year perspective.  
 
It is possible to roughly evaluate the last century’s safety improving process. In 1891 
about 0.9 % of the British seamen were killed on duty each year [2]. This percentage 
was reduced to the half about 15 years later, and the British fleet was considered as the 
safest of the world. A century later we are experiencing about 0.62 fatalities per 1000 
workers year (Norwegian figures for 1990-94) indicating a yearly improvement of about 
2.6%. The average yearly improvement in the world’s total loss ratio is 2.4% [3]. Figure 
1 shows, however, that these improvements have been sporadic [4]. Apparently, the 
total loss ratio dropped about 30% during a few years around 1930, and the period from 
mid 1930s until the late 1970s seems to vacillate around a loss ratio of 0.65%. From the 
late 1970s until 1990 the yearly improvement again speeded up to nearly 10% each 
year.  
There may be several reasons for these short lasting, but drastic improvements. The 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) was established in 1948, but its regulative 
influence did not take effect before the late 1970s. Det Norske Veritas’s classification 
rules for new building projects were of 12 pages in 1865, and it expanded to 356 pages 
in 1955, and the year later it was of 400 pages [5]. In 2003 the new building rules are 
defined on 1550 pages, in addition to the rule-guides of about the same volume. The 
development of these regimes and their prescriptive rules does however not implicitly 
explain the decrease in accident frequencies.  
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2. CAUSAL FACTORS OF SHIP ACCIDENTS  
Defining the causes of an accident is difficult. In a philosophical perspective the 
definitions of causes have been an issue of discussion all the way back to Aristotle’s 
“doctrine of the four causes”. In strict terms it is common to describe individual causal 
events as insufficient but necessary parts of unnecessary but sufficient conditions that 
result in losses. Hence, an event is a cause of an accident, if the elimination of the event 
would have prevented the accident from occurring. Causes of ship accidents have been 
recorded for the last hundred years by maritime authorities. In contrast to the earlier 
referred newspapers, these early recordings describe inevitable factors as the 
dominating causes of ship accidents (Figure 2). As recording of causes proceeded, it 
was soon recognised that every accident had a unique character with a multiple of 
potential causes and numerous of possible combinations. Because recording of causes is 
carried out to learn and prevent reoccurrence, this characteristic had to be addressed. 
Therefore two simplifying principles have been formed. 
 
The first principle is to generalize failures. Division between operator and technical 
failure is one example. According to the recorded causes of accidents on Norwegian 
vessels [6] the dominance of operator failure relative over technical failure has been 
clear for considerable time. The most apparent trend is the reduction of causes 
considered to be external of the ship (e.g. other ships or foreign pilot) and unavoidable 
(e.g. storms, sea, ice, self ignition or misfortune). In 1911 to 1913 the navigational 
operator failures on Norwegian vessels were defined as (translated) Careless navigation, 
Reckless navigation, Wrong navigation, Incompetent navigation, Lacking experience 
with fairway, Wrong interpretation, Drunk on watch and Fell asleep. The descriptions 
varied somewhat from each year and the difference between some of these causes is 
difficult to understand. Today we have generalized operator failures to be either as slip, 
lapse, a violation or a knowledge- or rule based mistake [7]. These disjunctive and 
complete set of operator failures aids both the safety manager [8] and the accident 
investigator [9]. In 1959 Heinrich [10] estimated that 88% of industrial accidents were 
caused primarily by dangerous operator acts. Several independent studies demonstrate 
that operator failure counts for at least 80 to 90 percent of today’s maritime accidents, 
while technical factors accounts for the remaining part [11], [12], [13], [14] (Figure 2).  
 
During the 1930s an organisational researcher, Heinrich, proposed an iceberg model to 
understand how accidents occur. This model implies that there are a certain number of 
non-injury incidents behind the more serious ones. The frequency of these incidents 
increases as their criticality decrease. Although this philosophy has been criticised, it is 
also well recognised within safety management [15]. In figure 3 empirical data are 
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compiled to obtain a simple iceberg model for various years. The figures demonstrate 
that for each ship accident causing human losses there are a certain number of totally 
lost ships (black), a certain and a somewhat larger number of serious ship accidents 
(dark grey). For the four most resent time categories, the estimated number of ships 
with reasons for Port State Control (PSC) detention and deficiencies are included [16]. 
These figures are based on ParisMOU statistics aggregated to be representative for the 
world fleet. The figure illustrates that while the number of accidents behind each fatality 
is reduced, the number of reasons for detention and deficiency increases. The increasing 
number of ships having reasons for PSC deficiencies may imply that the subjective 
general acceptance of risk is lowered, which in term increases the inspectors’ 
awareness. A similar tendency can be observed when comparing iceberg models from 
various industries and moment in time (1996:[17], 1993:[18], 1975:[19], 1969:[20] and 
1930:[21]) presented in figure 4. 
 
The most ad-hoc interpretation of the iceberg model is to consider pyramid shape only 
as statistical relationships. In this interpretation the fatal accident is causally 
independent of the less critical incidents and deficiencies. The accident is then typically 
called component- or individual accidents. The individual failures are caused by one 
single isolated event or condition e.g. a slip by a navigational officer. In some cases, 
however, it seems narrow minded to consider the accident as causally independent of 
the more latent deficiencies in the organisation. The accident is then typically described 
as a system- or organizational accident, assuming that the less critical injuries and 
conditions may cause graver accidents. While the individual accidents are characterized 
by victimizing the single or few persons that caused it to happen, the organisational 
accident involves several systems or individuals that prior to the accident were assumed 
to be independent. In contrast, the organizational accidents have a catastrophic outcome 
that affects uninvolved populations, assets and the environment [22]. In order to learn 
from the organisational accidents it is most effective to understand how the most basic 
deficiencies took place. Besides calling these failures for system or organizational 
failures, they are also referred to as parent-, distal-, indirect-, basic-, common-, root- or 
1 10 100 1000 10000 100000
Reason for deficiency Reason for detention Serious accidents Total loss of vessel
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2002
1 10 100 1000
Near Miss incident Non-injury incident First aid incident Minor injuries
1996
1975
1993
1969
1930
Figure 3: Progress of maritime iceberg models Figure 4: The general progress of iceberg models
29 
latent failure. One of these failures may cause a range of more directly or proximal 
failures. Both Reason [22] and Perrow [23] assumes that organizational- or system 
accidents are rare but have large damage potential. In 1987 Wagenaar [12] published the 
findings of his investigations of 100 ship accidents, all heard by the Dutch Shipping 
Council between 1982 and 1985. This study indicates that the system or organizational 
aspects are evident for the causal chain of maritime accidents. The typical ship accident 
has more than 20 causes, whereof several have an independent nature. Wagenaar stated 
that the root causes of operator errors are dependent of the activity’s work environment, 
rather than personal and situational related factors. The major types of operator errors 
contributing to the occurrence of accidents are wrong habits, wrong diagnoses, lack of 
attention, lacking training and unsuitable personality. A study conducted by Karlsen and 
Kristiansen [24] concluded that the external conditions, relating to weather and sea are 
contributing factors to navigational accidents. Technical problems, on the other hand, 
are not important, especially compared to the problems related to work conditions, 
human performance and neglect. Failure or deviation is often related to normal activities 
in contrast to abnormal situations, which are rare as a triggering factor. The accident 
process is therefore typically initiated long before the more dramatic scene appears.  
 
3. DIAGNOSTIC SAFETY INDICATORS  
A few years ago it was revealed that an insurance company had introduced higher 
premiums for sports cars with a red colour. This caused some debate, because the colour 
of a car does not seem to have an intrinsic relation to safety. The insurance company did 
however base their decision upon compilation of several years of data and experience. A 
proposed explanation was that those referring red cars generally were higher risk takers. 
This example seems simple, but testing of any statistical relationship introduces 
uncertainties about its real meaning.  
 
For about one hundred years ago, three statistical findings dominated to debate about 
maritime safety. This was the vessels flag of registry, the age of the vessel and the ship 
type. Sail ships had in general two to three times higher accident frequency compared to 
steam and motor ships. Later the hazardous ship types changed to Liberty ships and 
fishing vessels while bulk carriers, single hull tankers and old passenger ships are 
currently being explicitly monitored. During the 1930s it was also proved that smaller 
vessels had a relative higher loss frequency. In 1974 it was however proven that ships 
flying under a FOC, were generally smaller in size [25]. Nearly 90 years ago, the 
significance of a ships’ age caused the Norwegian Ship Owner Association to ban 
investments in foreign ships older than 20 years [2]. Even though the causal 
explanations at that time were addressed to the management policies of the companies, a 
widespread interpretation today attributes technical issues. Therefore, old ships are now 
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being discriminated regarding freight rates, targeted for PSC inspections and banned by 
the EU, irrespective of its owners and managers. To illustrate the age’s statistical 
significance the accident rate for various age categories is plotted in figure 5. It is 
obvious that the loss ratio (ships being totally lost due to an accident scenario) have a 
linear relationship to age, while the serious accident rate also seems to increase as the 
vessel ages. Serious accidents are those ship accidents requiring assistance or repair in a 
yard [4]. A sample of 2225 randomly selected vessels was collected from the Equasis 
database [26] to estimate the relationship between age of vessel and number of 
deficiencies revealed through safety inspections (Figure 6). The PSC have a large focus 
on technical conditions and seek conformance with IMO’s regulative. Represented on 
the same categorical axes, all the three independent types of data indicate that safety 
performance decline as a ship ages.  
 
Figure 5: accident statistics of age categories  Figure 6: various characteristics of different age groups 
 
In figure 6 there are two curves representing claim statistics for ships insured by 
Norwegian companies [26].  Only hull insurance claims excess of the own-risk limit for 
1985 to 2002 are included. These data cover roughly 62000 ships and 21000 claims. In 
1990 the own-risk limit was increased. This caused the total frequency of claims to be 
reduced, and eliminated the higher claim frequency for the 15 to 19 year age category. 
This may either imply that this group have a higher frequency of small claims, or that 
the change in own-risk limit scared off the most sub-standard ships to other, less 
selective insurance companies. The plots demonstrate that the claim frequency seems 
relatively independent of age, and that old ships may even be safer then their younger 
sisters (Figure 6). On a world fleet level, it is common knowledge that the portion of old 
ships increase each year, while the loss ratio is continuously decreasing [4]. At last but 
most significantly it is earlier in this study demonstrated that at most 20% of the causes 
of ship accidents are related to technical factors. There is in average a nine-year age 
difference [3] between the world fleet and the totally lost vessels. This high difference 
in age can impossibly be explained by the 20% of technical related accidents. 
Consequently, it has to be non-technical aspects that especially make old vessels more 
risky.  
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Apart from slope of the regression lines, the plots in figure 5 and PSC deficiencies 
plotted in figure 6 have another common characteristic. The three first and the three last 
age categories seem to form two identical concave shapes. Because the residuals have 
equal likelihood of being above or under the regression line, it is highly unlikely that the 
same shapes spuriously appear on three independent plots. It can be calculated that there 
is a dependency between the patterns (significance level of 1%). If we consider the 
safety performance along the life cycle of a ship, it seems as if something happens when 
it reaches an age over 15 years. The graphs show that the accident and deficiency rate 
escalates at this age. As the vessel continuous to age the safety performance follow a 
slope similar to it’s youth, but on a poorer absolute level. 
  
The task is then to understand what happens with a vessel when it reaches an age over 
15 years. Some might pinpoint that they are designed differently. The double hull ships 
are for instance mainly represented in the three youngest age categories, while the single 
hull ships are dominating the last ones. Others may indicate that vessels are typically 
built for an age of twenty years causing the rate to escalate when reaching this age. But 
again, these explanations are inconsistent with the human and organisational emphasis. 
It is therefore interesting to consider the management company behind the various age 
categories. Figure 7 shows that the five largest management companies have in average 
been in businesses about ten times longer than the world’s single ship managers. They 
have also a significantly younger fleet and obtain significantly fewer deficiencies and 
detentions in port state control. A younger fleet implies that they sell off old ships and 
buy new ones directly from the yard. The ships being lost through accidents have 
managers that are far more similar to the small and young companies than the large and 
old companies. The shift identified in figure 5 and 6 may therefore be a reflection of 
change in ship management. 
 
It is obvious that there has to be a logical reason behind the differences in management 
companies illustrated in figure 7. This may be related to the business philosophy of the 
various companies. There are two stereotypes of business philosophies within shipping. 
The shipping industrialists have a long business horizon and attempt to avoid market 
risks through time-charter agreements. The opposing stereotype is the ship speculator 
who is specifically interested in the risks related to market fluctuations. The shipping 
industrialist’s time-charter agreements make it possible to build a new ship that has a 
determined earning the next few years. This reduces the risks related to new building 
projects, making it easier to get financial support. Because the freight rates from time to 
time are extremely high, the potential for large benefits is an eminent characteristic of 
shipping. This fluctuation attracts the speculators. Their strategy is to have ships 
available in the spot market not being tied up in agreements. When the freight market is 
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good they can cash out high earnings from both the freight market and the second hand 
ship market. The age of the vessel do not affect the obtained freight rates when the 
demand for transportation is high and the relative increase in second-hand values is 
better for old ships. Consequently, it is rational for a speculator to employ old ships.  
In an historical context the attribution to business philosophies within maritime safety 
seems valid. During the 1930s and the 1980s the two largest market depressions of the 
20th century took place. According to several sources the harsh market pushed the 
speculators out of the market [28], [29]. Also the early 1920s was unattractive for 
speculations, because there was a balance between shipping demand and transport [29]. 
It is already demonstrated in figure 1 that these periods precisely represent the few large 
drops in accident risk. The age of the ships may therefore be statistical related to safety 
performance because the ship speculators favour old ship and the industrialists 
considers newer ships to be more attractive. Any ship, independent of its age has to be 
related to an insurance company, classification society and flag of registry. Figure 8 
illustrates that the selection of these attributes also support the pattern revealed in figure 
5 and 6. It seems to be a shift in quality of flag, classification society and P&I insurance 
at the age of 15 years.  
 
4. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION  
This study reveals that human failures have dominated over technical failures for at last 
one hundred years. After the 2.W.W., the belief in accident prevention escalated. The 
typical ship accident of today has a causal chain with characteristics of system or 
organizational failures. In a historical perspective there are three factors that are reliable 
indicators of accident risk. These are the ship type, its age of the flag it is sailing under. 
While it is believed that the flags’ significance is a manifestation of the crew quality, 
working conditions and management quality, the age’s significance is typically believed 
to be a manifestation of the ships’ technical standard. This study rejects this 
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interpretation by illustrating that it is a specific type of shipping company that engross 
the older vessels. Young companies, typically operating few ships, seem to be the 
typical company behind old tonnage. Older and larger companies have a significant 
younger fleet. They buy ships directly from the yard and sell off old tonnage when it 
reaches a specific age. This indicates that the age-effect is a manifestation of an 
organizational aspects and not only technical degradation.  
 
There exist several safety management paradigms that are relevant for the 
understanding of organisational accidents. The most noticeable are the Risk 
Homeostasis Theory (RHT) fronted by Wilde [30], the Normal Accident Theory (NAT) 
proclaimed by Perrow [23], the High Reliability Organisation Theory (HROT) formed 
by LaPorte and Consolini [31], the Organisational Accident Theory (OAT) pedagogical 
described by Reason [22], and at last Rasmussen’s Proactive Risk Management Theory 
(PRMT)[32]. While the two first theories respectively address the human and the 
technical element the three remaining paradigms have an organisational perspective. 
The PRMT pinpoint that the influences from the regulative regimes have to be known in 
order to understand safety in an organisational perspective. Even though the NAT 
considers aspects of the technical systems to be most important, all these five core 
literatures accepts that safety culture is a key issue in improvements of organisational 
safety. If the culture makes the crew take safety as an implicit aspect of the job, this 
makes them take responsibility and autonomously incorporate safety values in their 
conduction.  
 
In the discussion of causes of ship accidents, aspects related to blame and politics have 
to be addressed. There are several extremely strong stakeholders that may influence the 
way accident knowledge is coded and interpreted. On an international and regional 
level, strong stakeholders such as the UN, the OECD and the EU have ship trade and 
transport on their political agenda. The ILO is strongly involved in securing the 
seamen’s work conditions. Traditionally, it has been easier to get insurance cover for 
technical failures and the classifications societies are mostly concerned with technical 
aspects. On a national level, juridical aspects and distribution of blame are likely to be 
reflected in the way investigations have been conducted. The traditional attribution to 
technical factors has to been seen in this context. Technology is easy to regulate. It does 
not interfere with common understandings of free trade and competition. The 
acceptance of safety as an organisational aspect increases the barrier for entering a 
market, and makes it difficult to accept that all companies should have the right to 
provide services. Technological enhancements secure labour at yards and keep the 
seamen, companies and regulators free from accident blame. Technical failures are 
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difficult to predict and manage, which makes the business easier for both the insurers 
and the classification societies. 
 
In summary this study sharpens the organisational perspective of ship accidents. It is 
demonstrated that opposing factors, such as the significance of the vessels’ age, in fact 
are related to organizational aspects. There are therefore three areas that have to be 
addressed to understand the accident risk within the maritime domain. First of all it is 
crucial to understand the safety culture of a shipping organisation. It should be possible 
to empirically demonstrate what distinguishes a sub-standard company from a blue-chip 
one, rooted in their respective safety cultures. The second area is to understand how a 
company’s policy and strategy influence on the safety culture and safety performance. 
What is it that specifically makes the small and young companies that operate old 
vessels more risky? The last and most important task is to understand how it is possible 
to relate characteristics of the freight market and influences from maritime stakeholders 
to the shipping company and the fleet in general. 
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ABSTRACT 
A critical challenge in prevention of losses is to understand how aspects of daily operation, 
organisational factors, management decisions and the society in general influence on the 
activity’s safety level. There exist several conceptual models describing such relationships, 
which are typically used in accident investigation, understanding of human performance 
and in safety management. This paper considers more than 30 of these conceptual models. 
Even though their purpose vary slightly, all describe how accidents occur and how they 
may be prevented. Until now the symbolism in these models has been a reflection of the 
developers’ individual experience and professional background, the scope of the research 
and limitations related to the application of the models e.g. availability of data. The idea is 
to develop a suitable safety performance model that is aggregated from the expert 
knowledge represented in exiting models. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Symbolic knowledge is a representation of the relationships between variables. These 
relationships may be cause-effect chains, processes or influences. The variables range from 
actual losses to human and organisational factors (HOF) and even aspects of society. One 
illustrative example is the Common Performance Model (Figure 1), which is part of 
Hollnagel’s [1] Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM). The 
understanding of why accidents happen and how they might be prevented is still not very 
well developed. This fact can partly be explained by the complexity of the accident 
sequences and the multitude of causal factors. Even the cause as a concept, is a source of 
confusion in the sense that it might be defined and analysed in different and often 
competing scientific perspectives [2]. The emphasis on conceptual models within safety 
management has prospered since Heinrich applied this approach in the 1930s [3]. During 
the 1980s the several new theories describing the basic causes of accidents commenced. 
There were, however, no available data to prove the importance of more distal or basic 
organisational causes. Consequently, the experts generalised their insight and presented 
them in conceptual or symbolic models. In lack of precise theoretical understanding and 
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variations in perceptual approaches, a multitude of conceptual or symbolic models 
describing safety performance have been developed.  
 
Figure 1: Common Performance Model in CREAM [3] 
 
  One of the models that have obtained significant attention in safety management is 
James Reason’s Swiss-Cheese model (Figure 2)[4]. This model describes how latent 
failures in the organisation reduce the resistance against losses. Another model that is 
widely recognised is Jens Rasmussen’s AcciMap model (Figure 3) [5]. In contrast to the 
Swiss-Cheese Model neither of these models directly describe the development of losses, 
but how hazardous situations can be related to organisational factors and even the society in 
general. 
Figure 2: Reason’s defence in depth model [4]   Figure 3: AcciMap Model [5] 
 
2. OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF STUDY 
This study outlines the state-of-the art in symbolic representation of safety performance 
models. First the structural relationships of 33 models are considered. These models 
describe the accident process, operator performance and organizational performance. 
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Because some of the available knowledge is not represented in the sampled models, an 
additional literature study supports the model development. The objective is to aggregate 
knowledge from these models in order to develop a symbolic model that has the potential 
of describing the safety performance of shipping organisations during normal operation. 
This model should attempt to unify operator performance considerations of various 
established theories e.g. cognitive and behavioral aspects, organizational influences and 
cultural elements. Because the model emphasize on the operational phase, accidents at the 
yard or during demolition are not considered. Latent failures from design and assembling 
that may affect the performance of the operation are however included.  
 
3. PRESENTATION OF SAFETY PERFORMANCE MODELS 
3.1 Set of safety performance models 
A sample of 33 different models relevant for safety assessments is collected from a 
literature review. The models are also selected in the view of new advances within this 
area, and are selected because of their ability to relate operational factors to the 
organisational. Their area of validity is generally defined through their purpose. As a 
consequence even similar models varies slightly with respect to differences in validity 
approach. In order to perform a comparison between the models, they are arranged into 
three groups based on their area of purpose. The purpose of the Accident Process Models’ 
(table 1) is to guide the accident investigation to obtain a satisfactory understanding of the 
accident’s progress. In contrast to these models more or less general considerations of 
losses the Operator Performance Models (table 2) focus specifically on the human element. 
The last group of models labelled Organizational Performance Models (table 3) is used for 
management and control of organizations. The boundaries between the three groups of 
models are vague. Some attempts have been made to apply a model outside its area of 
validity. Waagenaar [6] argued for that Tripod Delta (model 27, table 3) should be used as 
an Accident Process Model. Another example is the duality in the name of Kjellén’s [7] 
Safety Management and Organisational Review Technique (SMORT) indicating something 
more than its real diagnostic purpose (Table 1, model 6). It is outside the scope of this study 
to review each validity process for the different models in detail. Consequently the three 
areas are threaded separately. A detailed assessment of each of the 33 models is above the 
scope of this study.  
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Table 1: Accident Process Models (Accident Causation and Investigation Models)  
1. Social Environment →  Fault of Person → Unsafe Action →  Accident → Injury           (Domino model [7]) 
2. Presence of Hazards (Energy Source) →  Broken barriers (Release of Energy) → Presence of target victims 
(Unintended energy transformation)                       (Gibson, [8], Haddon [9]) 
3. Upper Management → Projects → Daily operation → Sequence of events / Risk situation                   
(SMORT [7]) 
4. Source failure types →  Functional failure types → Condition tokens → Unsafe acts → Accident and Incident              
(Reason [4]) 
5. Lack of control → Basic causes → Immediate causes → Incidents →  Loss                  (Loss Causation 
Model [10]) 
6. Organizational factors →  Local workplace factors → Unsafe acts                                 (Reason [11]) 
7. Basic casual factors relating to Management and allocation of Resources →  Basic casual factors relating to Daily 
operation on board → Accident Event → Casualty event                                                (CASMET [12]) 
8. Root Cause → Causal Chain →  Critical event → Accidental flow of effects → Target Victims        (Rasmussen [5]) 
 
Table 2: Operator Performance Models( Decision, Human Behavior and Performance Models) 
9. Social Context  → Information and Experience → Attitudes → Behavior               (Staw  [13]), (Martin [14]) 
10. Strain(Rules, Subject, Instrument, Community, Division of labour) →Object (Outcome) (Human Activity Model [15]) 
11. Operator, Interface to Organization, to Equipment, to Procedures and/or to Surroundings → Operator Error    
(SHEL-model [16]) 
12. Interpretation → Selection of actions → Action Execution → Result Observation                   (Pyy [17]) 
13. Observation → Interpretation → Planning /Choice → Action / Execution                     (Model of Cognition [1]) 
14. Adequacy of Organization, Working Conditions → Adequacy of training, collaboration, communication, availability 
of procedures etc. → Number of Goals, Available Time → Human performance         (Common 
Performance Model in CREAM [1]) 
15. Intention → Actions → Consequences                                      (Reason [11]) 
16. HF root causes  → HF mediating indicators across multiple ship hazards → HF involvement in specific ship 
hazards                                                                                    (Neumann [18]) 
17. Organizational standards and objectives → Behavior prescribed by rules and procedures → Human Performance 
→Process being controlled → Occasional incidents & accidents                  (Reason  [11]) 
18. Target level of accepted risk > perceived level of risk → more risky behaviour    (and vice versa)   (Wilde [19]) 
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Table 3: Management, Strategy and Organizational Performance Models  
19. Management(Principles, Goals, Criteria)  → Organization and Information System (Resources, Information, 
Control) → Production (Interaction between Technical system and Operating procedures)            (Soukas [20]) 
20. Society (Economy market, laws and regulation, authorities) → Industrial Organization (management, Policy and 
resources, Structure, cultural patterns ) → Safety System (management, goals, structure, motivation, measures) 
→ Safety Level, Productivity and profits                  (Saari 
et al [21]) 
21. System Climate → Organization & Management → Communication & Control → Operator Reliability → 
Engineering Reliability                    (HSE – mode [22]) 
22. External Environment → Leadership (↔ )Mission and strategy (↔) Organizational culture → Factors influencing 
lower organizational levels                                (Model of organizational Performance and change [23]) 
23. Policy level → Regulatory level → Organizational level →  Direct level → Failure level → Abnormal event / 
accident    (IMO, [24]) 
24. Planning Process (Strategy) → Information and Communication Process (Structure) → Business Process 
(Process) → Control and Reward Process (Performance) → Culture       (Strategic Management Framework [25]) 
25. Input, Resources, Controls → Action transformation (Activity) → Output (Structured Analysis and Design 
Technique [26]) 
26. Specification → Design → Construction → Commissioning → Operation → Maintenance & Modification → 
Decommissioning → Dismantling                  (Life Cycle Model [27]) 
27. Statement of goals → Organisation → Management → Design → Build → Operate → Maintain                    (Tripod 
delta [11 28]) 
28. Pressures(Economy, Work Load relative to Safety)   → Degree of resistance against errors       (Space of 
possibilities [29]) 
29. Governmental Judgement → Judgement of Laws → Judgement of Regulations → Judgement of Company Policy 
→ Judgement of Plans → Actions                                    (AcciMap,  [5]) 
30. Policy level → Implementation → Performance influencing factor level → Influencing factor level     (Influence 
Diagram Appr.  [4]) 
31. Environment → Management → Implementation → Operation                                 (Markov model [30]) 
32. Quality Planning (Goals, Policies, Resources) → Control → Improvement                                  (TQM [20]) 
33. New Design Control → Incoming Material Control → Product Control                    (TQM [20]) 
 
4. AGGREGATION OF KNOWLEDGE  
A conceptual model is a manifestation of the developer’s understanding of a real world 
phenomenon. The real phenomenon may however not be properly understood by the 
developer. For example, it is statistically proved that old ships are more frequently involved 
in accidents. Therefore, models used for targeting of hazardous ships emphasise on 
degradation of technical standard. This interpretation is widely accepted by maritime 
authorities, insurance companies and classification societies. As a result one of the safety 
measures issued by the European Union after the Erika, Prestige and Express Samina 
accidents are age-limits on ships sailing within European territory. In an earlier study [31] it 
was demonstrated that this interpretation contradicts other statistical evidence and 
organisational insight. It was also demonstrated that there were a different type of managers 
behind old ships that have a shorter business perspective and a higher attribution to ship 
speculations. This illustrates that models based solely on statistical evidence might be 
invalid. Another approach is therefore to consider causes of real accidents, like a 
substandard safety culture. During the late 1970s and 1980s a series of investigations it was 
perceived that the common safety attitudes of the organisation were of an immature quality. 
Therefore, safety culture was segregated out as an individual research area. The results of 
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20 years of research into safety culture are however limited to improved insight with little 
practical utility [32]. During the model’s four-decade age range new insight has been 
achieved into behaviour control and management of risks. An overview of these advances 
is summarised in the following text. 
 
4.1 Theory of basic safety modelling approaches 
There is a multitude of possible modelling approaches to safety management [33]. 
Experience has showed that some modelling approaches are more correct than others. 
Rasmussen [29] describes the changes from normative models emphasizing on control by 
rational instructions, to descriptive models focusing on deviations from the norms 
(descriptive-dev). A third evolutionary step also applies descriptive models, but in terms of 
actual behaviour (descriptive-act). The trend of modelling scopes seems to converge against 
models of behavioural shaping features and criteria. Hence the approach has advanced from 
models describing ideal behaviour to models that describe how correct behaviour is shaped. 
As an example the Normative approach focus on the task procedures, the descriptive-dev 
approach focus on less than adequate job conduction and the descriptive-act approach focus 
on the context of the task that makes the operators able to carry out the job safely. The 
presented version of the model of cognition (Model 13) and the Structured Analysis and 
Design Technique (model 25) are examples on an example of Normative models. Most 
models belong to the group of Descriptive models focusing on deviations. “Lack of…” 
variables are typical for this kind of models (model 5). The CREAM model (model 14) may 
be considered as a descriptive-act model. Model 18 and 21 may also fall under this 
category. Reason [11] makes similar considerations by giving extensive support to 
William’s [34] Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART). HEART is a 
technique for predicting the human error probability by modelling elements of the context 
of the task, in contrast to the task itself. This evolution is also evident in Jersin’s [35] 
reflections of the management concepts. He describes the evolution from a rule–based 
bureaucratic approach after the Second World War to a value-oriented approach today 
empathizing on values and ethical motives.  
 
The models are based on two different reasoning logics. The Diagnostic logics focus on 
known unwanted events, e.g. accident, and base the models on diagnostic reasoning to 
identify the path to the root causes of these events. This reasoning is evident in the 
Accident Process Models, which are based on experience from accidents and typically 
culminate in a loss or unwanted event. The alternative is the Causal logic that focuses on 
how to maintain an un-failed state and implicit how to avoid the causes of accidents. Both 
the Operator – and Organizational Performance models have a mix of these two reasoning 
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logics. It is difficult to state if either the Diagnostic or the Causal reasoning backgrounds 
are better than the other. The examples of the age-limit measures and the belief in safety 
culture are two examples indicating that Diagnostic insight alone is insufficient. It is not 
difficult to imagine the difficulties related to pure causal models. The normative models are 
for instance based on a causal reasoning. It does not consider how the actual work 
conduction is, but rather on how is should be. The descriptive–dev approach is of a more 
diagnostic nature, as it focuses on deviation from norms based on insight from actual 
incidents and events. The descriptive-act approach is again more associated to a causal 
logic, as it attempts to represent actual behaviour that may be hazardous. These models are 
based on conceptual understanding of cognition and organisational processes and not on 
accident insight. If it is correct that the models converge against models that shape 
behaviour, it seems as the causal reasoning is most appropriate logics of the two. Even 
though, the diagnostic reasoning is crucial for validation of the causal models.  
 
4.3 Outline of schematic model  
Aside for the diagnostic and causal reasoning, there are also a variety of applied variables. 
These are the basic environmental conditions, the responsible parties, organisational 
functions and outcomes e.g. goals. These distinctions are important to be aware of. For a 
given collision accident, it is important to focus on the responsibilities of the officer on 
watch, the navigational function, the outcomes e.g. speed and courses, or the context of the 
navigators themselves? Each of the variable has its important aspect and it is difficult to 
state which is the better. In the earlier discussion about normative and deceptive models, it 
was assumed that it was a need to consider the context of the tasks. In this sense the basic 
environmental conditions are most important. It is possible to apply all types of variables as 
described in the following model. For a shipping company the organizational structure is 
relatively explicit. Responsibly of the top-level management, the line-management and the 
crews have not only different responsibilities. They may also have different professional 
background and be located at different parts of the world. Hence, a first suggestion of the 
model is to apply organizational structure as a main dimension. The strategic level 
administers funds, defines objectives, develops policies and strategies, as well as the 
organizational structure. The tactical level manages and control necessary resources. They 
implement operational criteria and priorities in instructions, take decisions related to 
personnel recruitments, manning standards, cargo logistics, safety management etc. The 
operational level is onboard the ship. They operate the shipboard functions based on the 
developed standards and requirements form the external environment.  
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Figure 4. Schematic representation of aggregated symbolic knowledge 
 
The scope of the models also varies between the models. The scope has to be broad enough 
to include all the important features. Model 19 and 28 includes elements of the environment 
outside the organization itself. These may be considered as the lower Basic conditions in 
figure 4. Most models start at a management or organizational level, while some of the 
operator model start at the environment of the operators. It is natural to include the 
conditions embracing the organisation, but it is outside the scope of this study to map this 
environment in detail. One weakness with the model outlined in figure 4 is lacking direct 
influence the environment has on the tactical decision level. Another weakness is the biased 
model structure relative to present state knowledge and obtainable data. Relatively much of 
the model describes what happens on the managerial levels. An enhanced version of the 
model is therefore developed outlined in Figure 5. This model is more pragmatic as it fits 
the available data and knowledge to a better degree.  
 
         OPERATIONAL LEVEL   Output     →   Safety 
performance Transformation or Info. 
processing  
Basic conditions     
Transformation or Info. Processing → Output  → Basic conditions →Transformation or Info. processing → 
Output                           
Basic conditions   STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL LEVEL 
                                                
Figure 5: Pragmatic representation of aggregated symbolic knowledge. 
 
The model presented in figure 5 can be simplified and assessed in more detail. Safety 
performance is a relatively undefined concept. Some relates inspection findings and 
observations in addition to core loss avoidance to this concept. In a strict term safety is 
related to the prevention of accidents. In this context safety performance is interpreted with 
reference to actual objective losses (Level 1 figure 6). Hence, the proactive efforts taken by 
the crew is more related to details the process and not an output in itself. Proactive efforts 
taken by the crew and aspects of the daily operation are included in the Level 2 of figure 6. 
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Near misses, inspection findings, audit non-conformities and observations are some 
examples of data collection techniques at this area. The basic conditions produced by the 
strategic and tactical level in figure 5, is more commonly understood as organizational 
factors (Level 3). Safety culture and competence are examples of organizational factors. As 
figure 5 indicates this is a result of the output from the strategic and tactical levels. These 
levels can be considered as higher management (Level 4). In shipping this is the land-based 
organization. At the contiguous level it is assumed that the environment of the company, 
especially the business environment have a relevant influence on the management (Level 
5). 
Figure 6:  Aggregated symbolic model 
 
5. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS AND FURTHER WORK 
This paper has showed how knowledge from 33 models describing the occurrence of 
accidents, operator and organizational performance can be aggregated to form a new 
conceptual model. This model constitutes a framework for implementation of information 
related to safety performance of a maritime organization. This model is not controversial in 
itself. It is however aggregated from a set of existing models and therefore has evidence 
that justifies its relevance. The model structure is developed to represent levels of 
organisational responsibility, the functionality within each level and the impact one level 
has on the others. Even though the model it outlined, details of the variables are not 
outlined in detail. Even so, the assessment of the models in the battery indicates that the 
content should be focus on actual behaviour. Potential content is outlined in Table 4. The 
content of the two first rows are of an outdated nature. The first Normative content based 
on Causal logics describes how the ideal work conduction should be accomplished. 
Because the real world not is of an ideal character, and especially because it is the factors 
that deviate from the ideal that causes accidents, the Normative models are abandoned.  
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Level 4: Management factors 
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Table 4: Examples of content for various approaches 
 Level 5 Level 4 Level 3 Level 2 Level 1 
Normative 
Causal 
Develop 
comprehensive 
regulations 
Produce detailed 
task procedures 
Educate the crew in the 
job content 
Make all required 
resources available 
Avoided Loss 
Descriptive-Dev 
Diagnostic 
Insufficient 
regulation 
 Lack of 
management control 
Less than adequate 
motivation 
Deviation from 
navigational 
procedures 
Collision 
Descriptive-act 
Diagnostic 
Poor economy 
Low commitment to 
safety. Re-
organization and 
outsourcing. 
Fatigue, stress, low work 
moral, high absenteeism. 
Deficiencies on safety 
features 
Accident 
Descriptive-act 
Causal 
Regulations, 
economic cycles and 
competitive pressure 
The commitment to 
safety and human 
resources in general 
The resources, 
responsibility and 
attitudes to safety and 
the job in general.  
Conduction quality of 
operation and 
maintenance 
Likelihood of 
losses 
 
Although the next row of table 4 is of an improved version, still the content refers to norms. 
A common description of the content of the higher level is ”Latent failures” [1]. In order to 
define something as a failure it is necessary to know what the norm for an un-failed 
condition is like. As this knowledge is not yet available the version of the swiss-cheese 
model (Figure 1) is a hybrid between the two higher rows. The newer version of this model 
[11] enhances it to a Descriptive-act model as it describes actual behaviour and violations 
based in a diagnostic view. The two lowest rows are examples of potential content that 
makes. It would be favourable to know the content of these rows in more detail and to 
provide some quantified prove that the aggregated model and the suggested content are 
valid.  
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ABSTRACT 
 
In a risk analysis the probability of accidents is estimated, typically at a planning stage, through a 
structured analysis of the involved systems. It is however widely accepted that when the system 
reach an operational stage, the risk is significantly influenced by the quality of management, 
maintenance and operation. In spite of this, there exist few risk assessments techniques that 
efficiently take into consideration the quality of the organisation. Therefore, this study develops a 
statistical framework that estimates the risk of accident at an operational stage. The framework 
has similarities with the traditional test framework applied within psychology e.g. an IQ tests 
framework. First, a statistical distribution of the accident rate is estimated for the world fleet in 
analogy to the Gausian distribution’s description of the variance in IQ within a population. While 
IQ test scores together with the gausian distribution is used to estimate a person’s real IQ, safety 
performance data together with the estimated distribution of accident rate is used to estimate a 
ship’s real safety standard. The applied safety performance variables are experienced accidents 
and safety inspection findings. Based on these two variables it is possible to extract characteristics 
of the 25% safest ships (class A), the 50 % middle standard ships (class B) and the 25 % most 
substandard ships (class C). The distribution shows that the class A vessels only cause 7% of the 
world accidents, while the corresponding value for class B and C vessels are respectively 42% 
and 51%. The analysis also indicates that the sub-standard ships not only to a greater extent 
disobey international safety regulations, but also have a generally lower compliance with the most 
central safety requirements.  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The focus on organisational and 
cultural safety has increased since the 
early 1980s. Even though experts have 
been addressing related issues for nearly 
a century [1], they were now 
conceptualised and generally accepted. 
Naturally this shift had extensive effects 
upon the perception of what 
distinguished safe from hazardous. 
Earlier the risk acceptance of a prudent 
ship owner represented a norm for 
assessment of a vessel’s seaworthiness 
[2]. After the 2.W.W. the volume of the 
regulations increased and the norm shifted 
towards regulative compliance. During the 
two latest decades the term sub-standard is 
as labels of ships and shipping companies 
that are considered to be unsafe [3]. This 
term refers to a norm that in fact is 
undetermined. Some norms have also 
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been adopted from other industrial 
domains like de-minimis, e.g. likelihood 
of accident is less than 10-4, or as low as 
reasonable practically (ALARP). While 
all these norms refers to the lowest 
acceptable risks on a dichotomous scale 
(acceptable or not), the concept of High 
Reliability Organisations [4] and Safety 
Culture Maturity Model [5] indicates 
that the safety standard of organisations 
vary on a finer scale from the poorest to 
the safest [6].  
Simultaneous as the emphasis on 
organisational and cultural safety has 
enhanced, the available data on safety 
performance has increased [7]. Loads of 
data from safety audits, inspections, near 
misses, observations and incidents are 
systematically recorded. This may 
provide the managers with an extensive 
insight into the potential of safety 
improvements. Even though it is known 
that the various performance data may 
reveal latent dangers [8], there exist few 
statistical norms that make it possible to 
assess the safety performance or risk in 
an absolute context, or relative to other 
organisations. Many are sceptical to the 
comparison or benchmarking of 
companies based on these performance 
data. The frequency of near-misses may 
say more of the reporting culture of the 
company than of its actual safety level 
[9]. Accidents are rare and therefore both 
the occurrence and absence of accidents 
might be explained away as bad luck or 
fortune. The number of non-conformities 
and deficiencies respectively identified 
through audits and inspection are 
influenced by the competence and 
motivation of the auditors and inspectors. 
This study accepts that these measuring 
difficulties exists and tries to develop a 
method that copes with them. Instead of 
using the involved uncertainties as 
arguments for not comparing the data, it is 
more constructive to try to quantify the 
uncertainties themselves. In order to do 
so, it is necessary to know something 
about how the safety standard varies 
within a fleet of ships or a population of 
organisations.  
Within psychology, ability and 
personality tests has been used for 
decades. These statistical approaches (e.g. 
IQ tests) first develops a norm distribution 
for the population (Gausian distribution), 
and then apply tests scores to measure an 
individual’s level of ability (IQ) or type of 
personality relative to this norm. As the 
norm distribution reflect the distribution 
of scores for the population, absolute 
scores of personality or ability can be 
calculated. This framework could in 
principle also be adopted within safety 
management. First the distribution of 
safety standard for the population of 
similar system or organisations has to be 
developed. Then test scores or 
experienced safety performance can be 
applied to indicate the risk of an accident 
for a specific system e.g. a ship or a fleet 
of ships (e.g. within a company). 
Within shipping there exist both 
accident data and safety inspection data on 
the world fleet of ships. If we accept that 
the individual ships in the world fleet have 
a varying likelihood of accident (λ) it 
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would be of interest to describe this 
variation. It is however impossible to 
observe or measure this variation 
directly and there exist several potential 
norm distributions (fig. 1). A symmetric 
distribution indicates that the incident 
rate of the various ships have a tendency 
to centre towards an average value. The 
average value may represent the accident 
likelihood governed by the regulation, 
competence and environment. 
Alternatively, one might argue for that 
some organizations try to minimise risks, 
while some are less concerned, resulting 
in a skewed or even a skewed-two peak 
distribution (fig. 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1: Potential incident distributions 
 
If it was possible to estimate the 
correct distribution of the real incident 
rate for the world fleet of ships, then this 
could in fact represent a norm that 
simplified the comparison of the safety 
performance data from various ships. 
The actual number of accidents within a 
given fleet of ships, within a defined 
duration of time, would be enough 
information to roughly classify its likely 
location on the theoretical distribution. 
For example, instead of stating that a 
fleet of ships has e.g. one accident in one 
year, it would be possible to state that it, 
with a specified uncertainty, is among the 
25% best. It would also be able to link 
other safety performance data to this 
theoretical incident rate distribution. This 
study tries to develop this method.  
 
2. OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF STUDY   
 
The objective of this study is to estimate 
the real distribution of accident rate for 
the world fleet. There are two sources of 
accident data that both are assumed to be 
reliable as they are recorded by a third 
party [10] (Lloyd’s Maritime Information 
Service - LMIS) and are difficult to 
conceal. Total Loss accidents are typically 
collisions, groundings, foundering, fires 
and explosions, which have such a 
devastating consequence that the ship is 
lost or scrapped. Serious accidents are 
breakdowns resulting in the ship being 
towed or requiring assistance from ashore, 
flooding, structural-, mechanical- or 
electrical damage that requires repairs 
before the ship can continue trading. The 
term incident is used to cover both total 
losses and serious accidents.  
When the incident rate distributions are 
estimated it should be straightforward to 
develop scoring technique for localization 
of a given ship or group of ships within 
the distribution, based on its incident 
statistics. It is also manageable to develop 
a link between records of safety 
inspections and the incident distribution. 
This link does off course assume that the 
scope of the safety inspections is of 
relevance for safety.  
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The source for safety inspection data 
is mainly the ParisMOU database [11] 
covering Port State Control (PSC) 
inspection records of ships visiting 
European and Canadian ports. In some 
cases it will be necessary to use the 
Equasis database [12] that also include 
inspections from the US coastguard and 
the TokyoMOU. The inspections try to 
find non-conformities with the 
international regulations and conventions 
held by International Maritime 
Organisation (IMO) and International 
Labour Organisation (ILO). 
 
3. ESTIMATION OF CANDIDATE 
DISTRIBUTIONS FOR THE INCIDENT 
RATE OF THE WORLD FLEET. 
 
It is impossible to directly observe or 
measure the theoretical incident 
distribution for the world fleet, ƒλ. 
Therefore, the estimation is divided into 
three tasks. First a discrimination 
variable is selected. This variable is 
selected based on its ability to describe 
the variance in the world fleet accident 
statistics. The assessed candidates were 
the ship type, size, age, flag of 
registration and class society. The most 
effective discriminating variable was 
found to be the ships flag, closely 
followed by the ships age. The suitability 
of the ships flag for description of safety 
variability has been well known for 
decades [13]. Some flags see the benefits 
of having large fleets and therefore 
attract shipping companies with low 
taxes, cheap labour and a relaxed attitude 
towards ensuring compliance with 
regulations. These flag are called Flags of 
Convenience (FOC). The average incident 
rate within each flag (λflag) was 
calculated. The next task is to describe the 
variation of incident rate within each flag 
of registration, (ƒλflag). This task involves 
a more heuristic approach that might 
involve more uncertainty. Therefore, 
several candidate distributions were 
assessed. When the distribution of 
accident rates within each flag is 
estimated, it is possible to aggregate these 
distributions to a world fleet level. This 
last task used stochastic simulation to 
sample incident rates (ships) from each 
flag to form a distribution for the full 
world fleet. If the three flags N,G and S 
were considered then the process would 
be as described in fig. 2.  
Fig. 2: Aggregation of world fleet distribution 
 
There are several techniques to represent 
the probability density (pdf) distributions 
ƒλflag at level 2 in fig. 2. Bar-charts are 
commonly used for this representation but 
that involves subjective assessment of the 
number and width of the bars. An 
alternative approach is to estimate the 
parameters of a continuous distribution 
e.g. Gausian distribution or Poisson 
distribution. The selection of the 
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distribution type does, however, also 
introduce uncertainties. A kernel density 
estimate [14] is a non-parametric 
alternative for representation of the pdf. 
Four relevant parametric distributions 
were assessed for representing the 
variation in accident rate within each 
flag. The three first are the Gamma-, 
Poisson- and Gausian distributions. The 
fourth distribution is a Gausian (Normal) 
distribution with a standard deviation 
that increases with its average value. It is 
known that flags having a higher 
accident rate have a larger variability in 
accident ratio from one year to another. 
It is also reasonable to assume that the 
variability in incident rate within a group 
of ships sailing under a specific FOC is 
higher compared to the flags having a 
lower frequency of accidents. It is also 
known that the minimum value of the 
incident rate is 0. The aggregated plots 
are showed in figs. 3 and 4.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3: Kernel estimated of the world fleet’s 
event rate distribution for total losses ƒλ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4: Kernel estimate of the world fleet’s event 
rate distribution for severe accidents, ƒλ 
 
4. SELECTION AND TESTING OF THE 
WORLD FLEET’S INCIDENT RATE 
DISTRIBUTION.  
 
The plots shows that the various 
distributions within each flag, ƒλflag, 
produce slightly different aggregated plots 
for the world fleet. When assuming that a 
gamma distribution describes the 
distribution of accident rate within the 
flags, there is a slight trace a two-peak 
distribution in fig. 3. When it is assumed 
that the Gausian distribution is appropriate 
several negative accident rates occurs. The 
Poisson distribution produce stable 
aggregations and is relatively similar to 
the aggregations from the Gamma 
distribution and the adjusted Gausian 
(Normal) distribution. Hence, it was 
decided that the Poisson aggregations 
should be used. In the following 
calculations only the average accident 
rates for the 25% safest ships (Class A), 
the 50% average ships (Class B) and the 
25% most substandard ships (Class C) 
were applied. These average values are 
labelledλA,λB andλC. Even though the 
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real distribution might differ slightly 
from the estimated, the plots 
demonstrate that the various 
aggregations have a relatively similar 
shape. Therefore these figures are 
relatively reliable.  
 
Table 1: Estimated norm values of  λk 
 λA λB λC 
Total losses 7.39e-4 0.0022 0.0054 
Severe accidents 0.0032 0.0081 0.0194 
 
It is now possible to test the estimated 
values presented in table 1. For a world 
fleet population of 88,455 ships the 
experienced number of accidents was 
obtained. The total losses are relatively 
rare. Therefore a four-year period (1998 
to 2001) was considered for this accident 
type while the values for 2001 was 
presented for serious accidents.  
 
Table 2: Comparison between estimated and actual 
number of total losses 
Class A      Class B          Class   C           All classes 
(7.39e-4⋅0.25+0.0022⋅0.5+0.0054⋅0.25)⋅88455= 
         16        +         97      +     119                   = 232 
      ( 7 %      +        42 %   +  51%                   =100%) 
 Experienced number of losses:                        = 244 
 
 
Table 3: Comparison between estimated and actual 
number of serious accidents 
   Class A Class B        Class   C        All classes 
(0.0032⋅0.25 + 0.0081⋅0.5+ 0.0192⋅0.25)⋅88455=  
         71        +     357       +     425              = 853                      
       (8 %      +     42 %     +      50%          =100%) 
Experienced number of losses:                 = 844 
     
   
The calculations in both table 2 and table 
3 seem to correspond to the actual 
values. Similar calculations on the 
average accident ratios resulted in 
0.0026 and 0.0097 for respectively total 
losses and serious accidents. The 
experienced values were 0.0028 and 
0.0096. The tables also demonstrate that 
the 25% most substandard ships of the 
world fleet are involved in approximately 
51% of all losses while the 25% of the 
highest quality vessels are involved in 
only about 7%. The same values for 
severe accidents are 50% and 8 %. This 
indicates that the 25% safest ship in 
general is seven times safer than the 25% 
most sub-standard.  
 
5. SCORING TECHNIQUE BASED ON 
ACCIDENT HISTORY 
 
The data presented in table 1 represents 
the conditional probability of accident 
frequency given class of safety standard. 
In a practical classification situation it is 
necessary to know the conditional 
probability of class given an experienced 
accident rate. This transformation can be 
calculated through Baye’s formula.  
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⋅ ⋅= = ⋅∑
(1) 
Where :  
P(Tk)     =  Probability of theoretical safety 
   standard Tk 
P(R)       = Probability of real safety perform. R 
P(R | Tk) = Probability of safety perfo. given Tk  
P(Tk | R) = Probability of Tk given safety perfor.  
 
It is common to assume a Poisson 
distribution [15] for calculation of number 
of accidents given a safety For a given 
accident history of a ship or a fleet the 
likelihood of belonging to a certain safety 
standard can be estimated by 
incorporating equation (2) into (1).  
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Where: 
τ = Time at risk per ship [Years ] 
n =  Number of ships  
ν = Number of accidents 
λk = Accident rate in table 1 (k=A,B 
 or C) 
P(R | Tk) = Likelihood of performance R  
Given that the ships belong to 
class Tk 
 
The discrete distribution P(Tk) is 
relatively rough compared to the nuance 
in the Poisson distribution. Therefore the 
real accident performance may have a 
low probability even for the most correct 
theoretical class Tk. Because it is 
interesting to find the most correct class 
the following weighting is performed to 
obtain a sum of 100%.  
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6. SCORING TECHNIQUE BASED ON 
SAFETY INSPECTIONS 
 
The classification of safety standard 
based on accident history is relatively 
straightforward because both the 
theoretical safety standard and 
performance variable is described in 
terms of accidents. It is more 
controversial to relate safety inspection 
findings to the norms for accident rates 
Tk. The task is to develop the discrete 
distribution P(R|Tk) where R is described 
in terms of inspection findings. There are 
several approaches to estimate this 
discrete distribution. Two approaches are 
applied in this study.  
  The most straightforward approach is to 
establish a representative sample of ships 
from the world fleet that is sorted 
according to the inspection performance. 
Then the pattern of performance that is 
typical for the 25% best, 50% average and 
25% poorest records can be extracted. 
About 3600 ships were randomly selected 
from the world fleet. Of these 2250 had 
been subject to port state control 
inspections available at the Equasis 
database. These ships were sorted 
according to their average number of 
deficiencies per inspection. A detention 
was considered to be equivalent with 30 
deficiencies. 
The second and more challenging 
approach is to extract the P(R|Tk) from the 
samples of accidents. First the inspection 
records for the accident vessels were 
collected. Then the sample was sorted 
according to their inspection performance. 
It has already been estimated that 
approximately 7% of this sample is of 
class A, 42% of class B, and 51% of class 
C. Hence the 7% best inspection 
performance should represent 25% bets 
performance of the world fleet. The next 
42% represents the performance of the 
50% average of the world fleet and son 
on. If the extracted performance in this 
approach roughly match the result of 
simpler approaches, this is indicates that 
the earlier calculations are correct. 
Because it is crucial to establish 
confidence to these calculations two 
independent accident samples are applied. 
First the earlier sample of total losses 
during the three-year period 1998 to 2000 
was considered. This sample was of 732 
ships and had been subject to a total of 
242 inspections (m). 52 vessel having 
experienced severe accidents and being 
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subject to 82 PSC inspections constitute 
a second sample.  
An obstacle is that the group 
characteristics of the ships inspected by 
PSC may be slightly biased compared to 
the world fleet population, mainly 
because these vessels are built and 
managed for international trade. The 
group of ships available for PSC controls 
may therefore a subset of the population 
behind the accident statistics. By using a 
sampling- rejection procedure this bias 
may be corrected for. Randomly selected 
candidate ships from the samples are 
only included into a corrected sample if 
they reduce the bias. The considered 
variables were ship type, age, size and 
flag. 
The two distributions of P(R|Tk), 
which were aggregated from the accident 
samples, were very similar. Even though 
the samples can be considered to be 
independent, the aggregated distributions 
were dependent. With exception from 
the distribution of class B, the chi-square 
test proves dependency between the 
distributions (P(R|TA)=1.0 for both, 
χ2B=0.44, χ2B=1.0). The strength of the 
dependency between the whole patterns 
is high (correlation of ρ=0.95). It is 
likely that the PSC pattern for total 
losses is more accurate than the pattern 
arising from severe accidents because it 
is based on a larger sample. Hence, a 
scaled average of the two patterns are 
calculated by giving 2/3 higher 
importance on the total loss pattern 
(table 4). The correlation between the 
resulting pattern from accident samples 
and the pattern extracted from the world 
fleet is 0.96. The chi-square tests 
demonstrates convincing results (χ2B=1.0, 
χ2B=1.0). 
 
Table 4: Conditional probabilities of inspection 
findings given class of safety standard, P(R|Tk).  
Def. = Deficiencies, Detet. = Detention, sh. = ships 
The correct probability distribution of 
deficiency findings, P(R) is known (table 
5) from the whole world fleet. The 
distribution of P(Tk) is also known (P(TA)= 
P(TC)=0.25, P(TB)=0.5). Therefore, when 
the correct conditional distribution, 
P(R|Tk) is known, equation (1) can be 
solved to estimate the discrete distribution 
of P(Tk|R). The law of probability also 
represents certain restrictions. The sum of 
the probabilities of safety standard given 
inspection findings has to equal 1, and 
now all probabilities have values between 
zero and one. Therefore, the average of 
the two patterns in table 4 form a basis for 
searching (Newton search applying 
forward derivatives and tangent estimates) 
for a pattern that satisfy these restrictions. 
The resulting discrete distribution of 
P(R|Tk) is presented in table 5. It is worth 
taking notice of, that the resulting pattern 
is more similar to the distributions 
extracted from the accident sample 
compared to the distribution extracted 
from the world fleet sample. Also the 
 World fleet (3600 sh.) Accidents (800 sh.) 
j 
PSC 
def. A B C A B C 
1 0 0.85 0.52 0.30 1.0 0.40 0.16 
2 1-2  0.15 0.22 0.17 0.00 0.25 0.14 
3 3-5 0.00 0.18 0.21 0.00 0.26 0.26 
4 6-15 0.00 0.08 0.26 0.00 0.09 0.33 
5 16-30  0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.07 
6 >30 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.05 
7 Detet. 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.26 
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calculated distribution of P(Tk|R) is 
presented in table 5. 
 
Table 5: Resulting conditional probabilities  
Def. = Deficiencies, Detet. = Detention 
 
The distribution of P(R|Tk) indicates 
that a master that know his vessel is in 
class C still has 13% chance that the 
inspectors do not find any deficiencies at 
all. The conditional probability 
distribution of theoretical safety 
standard, given a certain safety 
performance, P(Tk|R), is of practical 
importance. This distribution indicates 
that it in the inspectors view is a 7% 
chance that the vessel is of class C even 
he has not identified any deficiencies. If 
however the inspector identify a range of 
deficiencies it is highly unlikely that the 
ship is of class A. For a file of r 
inspections, the probable safety standard 
can be calculated according to equations 
(4). In order to directly compare the 
probability of the three classes, equation 
(3) is applied. 
 
..
( | ) ( | )k k i
i r
P T R P T R=∏  (4) 
Where :  
r  =  Number on inspections.  
P(Tk|Ri) = Probability of safety standard k given 
    Inspection i (table 5) 
P(Tk|R) = Probability of safety standard k whole  
   inspection file. 
 
It is reasonable that the distribution 
P(Tk|R) relies more on objective 
observations than absence of observations. 
Even a pedantic and motivated inspector 
may not find any deficiencies simply 
because they might be difficult identify. 
The nature of Port State Control 
inspections does however also involve 
another portion of uncertainty. For 
instance do detailed inspections by the 
Norwegian Maritime Authorities have a 
tendency to find considerably more 
deficiencies then in regular Port State 
Controls. The impact from this source of 
unreliability is not well known. It is 
however questionable to consider a 3-5 
deficiencies as a certain indication of that 
the ship is not in class A as equation (4) 
indicates. Therefore the calculations may 
be relaxed so that several deficiencies 
contribute to a higher likelihood of a 
poorer class, but do not eliminate the 
chance of classifying it as good safety 
standard if as long as the inspection file is 
dominated by no-deficiency inspections. 
Such an analysis can be performed by 
considering the correlation (ρ) between 
the real set of inspection findings and the 
various patterns P(R|Tk) for various 
classes of safety standard. The pattern of 
the safety standard that correlates highest 
with the experiences set of inspection 
findings is likely to be most correct. To 
make the correlation most efficient the 
pattern of experienced deficiencies per 
inspection should be considered relative to 
the general distributions of deficiencies 
(P(R)). Also these values are favourable to 
scale with equation 3. 
P(R | Tk) P(Tk | Ri) PSC 
def. P(R) A B C A B C 
0 0.48 0.94 0.42 0.13 0.49 0.44 0.07 
1-2  0.16 0.06 0.22 0.14 0.10 0.68 0.22 
3-5 0.17 0.00 0.22 0.24 0.00  0.65 0.35 
6-15 0.16 0.00 0.15 0.33 0.00 0.47 0.53 
16-30  0.03 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.00 1.0 
>30 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 1.0 
Detet. 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.00 1.0 
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 ( )( | ) , ( | )( )k kRP T R P R TP Rρ=   (5) 
Where :  
R  = Pattern of real inspections 
P(Tk|R) = Probability of safety standard k whole  
   inspection file (table 5). 
ρ = Pearson Correlation 
P(R)       = Probability of real safety performance 
R 
 
7. TESTING AND VALIDATION OF 
SCORING TECHNIQUES 
 
There exist a number of ways to test and 
validate the described scoring technique. 
The criterion validity of the scoring 
techniques is assessed for three 
criterions. The first criterion is to 
confirm that the scoring techniques 
actually distinguish the 25% safest and 
the 25% most hazardous ships from the 
50% average. Secondly, inspection 
statistics from the three groups are 
considered to see if the groups are of an 
independent nature. Afterwards both 
scoring techniques are applied on the 
same companies to assess conformity 
between the two classifications. The 
fourth criterion is to classify ships, 
companies and associations that are 
assumed to belong to a certain class. For 
instance is the tanker vessel Erika who 
foundered and causes severe oil spills on 
the French coast in 1999, believed to be 
substandard. In contrast the vessels 
having a membership in interest 
associations claiming to have a low 
accident risk. Also two passenger ship 
companies having experienced disasters 
are classified. The fifth criterion is to 
confirm that the dynamics of the scoring 
techniques are consistent. The 
performances of the Belizean and 
Norwegian flags of registries are assessed.  
 
7.1 Criterion 1: Agreement with class 
sizes 
Both the classification based on accident 
and the safety inspections are supposed to 
distinguish the 25% best and the 25% 
most substandard from the 50% average. 
It is favourable to control that the real 
scoring techniques has this ability. The 
results in Table 2 indicate that the incident 
rates produce reasonable unbiased results. 
Therefore the remaining task is to test the 
scoring technique for safety inspections. 
The random sample of 2250 ships from 
the world fleet that has been inspected by 
port state control (Equasis) is used for 
assessment of bias. A chi-square-test is 
used to assess the performance. Table 6 
illustrate that the results of equation (4) is 
biased. Too many ships were classified as 
substandard. This might be related to its 
discussed straightness. Equation 5 
calculates unbiased classifications. Hence, 
this equation is used in the later 
calculations.  
 
Table 6: Classification results [%] 
Class: A  B C Chi-test
Real distribution 25 50 25  
Equation (4) 29.8 22.8 47.5 0,803 
Equation (5) 21.3 52.7 26.0 0,996 
 
6.2 Criterion 2: Difference between 
classes 
In a multiple discriminate analysis on 936 
ship accidents Le Blanc and Rucks [16] 
concluded that the causes behind 51% of 
the navigational accidents were of a 
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special characterise.  The causal 
sequence behind these accidents was 
relatively simple and would therefore be 
easy to prevent. The content of the 
causes were related to poor onboard 
conditions. It might be that the content 
of the deficiencies also vary between the 
groups A, B and C assessed in this study. 
The most obvious difference is the 
magnitude of deficiencies per inspection. 
Class C vessels have in average 9 
deficiencies per inspection while the 
corresponding values for B and A 
vessels are 2 and 0 respectively. These 
averages are significant. Even though the 
difference in number and seriousness of 
the deficiencies have been of the major 
concern in this study, it is also 
interesting to consider the types of 
deficiencies. The distribution of the 
deficiency types for the ships of safety 
standard B and C is presented in table 7. 
This table also presents the distributions 
for all the considered total losses and 
Paris MOU’s yearly statistics for 2000. 
The statistics indicates that the 
deficiency types of class C vessels have 
stronger correlation with Paris MOU’s 
statistics then the deficiency types 
obtained from class B vessels. For the 
statistics obtained during year 2000 the 
types distribution of class C correlated 
with a coefficient of ρ=0.96 while the 
class B vessels obtained a coefficient of 
ρ=0.81. A chi-test on the partial sums also 
demonstrates dependency between the 
PSC data and the C distribution (χ2 
=0.999) while this hypothesis has to be 
rejected for the distribution of class B 
types (χ2 = 0.985) with a significance 
level of 1%. 
This was expected because the class C 
vessels obtains most deficiencies and 
therefore dominates the overall statistics. 
The independency of the two classes B 
and C can be demonstrated by a chi-test 
on the partial sums (χ2 = 0.980).  
    The most obvious differences between 
the content of deficiencies from ships of 
safety standard B and C, is that the class B 
vessels have reduced the relative 
percentage of some deficiency types down 
to zero. In more general terms the 
deficiencies related to core safety aspects 
(Accident prevention, ISM, Life saving 
appliances, Safety in general) are tuned 
Table 7: Comparison of deficiency content [%] 
 Accident prevention 
Work 
environment 
Cert-
ificates Operation and equipment Comparison of content 
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down relative to the deficiencies related 
to work environment (e.g. crew and 
accommodation and food and catering) 
for the vessels of class B safety standard.  
7.2 Criterion 2: Agreement between 
scoring techniques  
The accidents and PSC findings for 17 
shipping companies in the period 1998 
to 2001 are considered to assess 
agreements between the classifications 
based on accidents and safety 
inspections. Both scores from the 
accident statistics technique and the 
safety inspection techniques are assumed 
to be aspects of the company and not the 
ship. In reality it is known that there 
exist differences within the fleet of a 
company. In fact it can be demonstrated 
that the techniques can be used to 
identify sub-groups of ships within a 
company that has a significant higher 
accident risk. Anyhow, as the safety 
standard is a result of management 
decisions [1;3;8], it is expected to be a 
rough agreement between the 
classifications from the two scoring 
techniques. A chart indicating the 
classification results is plotted in fig. 5. 
The 17 companies are sorted according to 
their likelihood of being of an A class 
based on the inspection findings. The 
correlation between the different 
likelihood of being respectively an A 
Class, B class and C class are respectively 
0.64, 0.66 and 0.89. The average chi-
square value is 0.85 and only three of 
these values are less than 0.80. A single 
value measure may be the P(A)-P(C). This 
value has a correlation of 0.81 between 
the two classification results. 
 
7.3 Criterion 3: Agreement with domain 
insight 
Insight into the maritime domain gives 
some indications on which ships are safe 
and who are not. It is generally accepted 
that the disaster tankers Erika and Prestige 
were substandard. It is also widely 
accepted that the companies behind the 
disaster passenger vessels Express Samina 
(86 fatalities) and Sleipner (16 fatalities) 
were of a poor standard. In contrast it is 
believed that the vessels being members 
of certain industrial associations 
introducing safety systems and 
requirements are above average standard. 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17 A
Safety Inspection Classifications Accident Classifications
B C A B C
0 % 25% 50% 75% 25% 75%50%0%
Fig. 5: Agreements between classifications
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The considered associations are Green 
Award, Intertanko and ISMA 
(International Safety Management 
Association).  
   At the time of the Erika and Prestige 
accidents their inspection files were 
collected from the Internet interface of 
ParisMOU. These recordings showed the 
Erika had been subject for three 
inspections, where respectively zero, 
four and 13 deficiencies. Without the 
scoring techniques developed in this 
study, it would be difficult to relate these 
findings to safety standard. The 
corresponding figures for Prestige was 
one inspection where 3 deficiencies were 
identified. By using this scoring 
technique on Erika and Prestige it can be 
shown that these vessels were definitely 
not of class A. Erika was most likely 
substandard (class C) and the single 
inspection on prestige indicates that it 
most likely was of class B. More 
inspections would more precisely 
classify their standard. It has for instance 
been recognised that older inspections 
have detained Erika on several 
occasions.  
   The accident statistics for the 
companies behind Sleipner and Express 
Samina were assessed. The fleet size of 
the respective fleets was 32 and 86 ships. 
During the years 1998 to 2001 these 
fleets had experienced respectively 9 and 
10 serious accidents. The resulting 
classifications indicate that both 
companies are of a class C. The 
company behind Samina had some ships 
that had been subject to PSC. The 
classification based on these inspections is 
relatively vague, favouring a class B 
standard.  
   The inspection records of the whole 
Green Award fleet of 502 ships 
representing 685 inspections were 
considered. The sample of Intertanko and 
ISMA ships were collected from a random 
sample of the world fleet holding 76 
Intertanko ships and eight ISMA ships 
representing samples of respectively 408 
and 61 inspections. If the objectives of the 
organisation are effective this should 
results in a larger likelihood of belonging 
to class A compared to class C. This is 
conformed by the scoring technique. The 
classification illustrate that the ships from 
these associations are safer than the 
average (Table 8) 
 
Table 8:  Estimates of probable safety standard1 
7.4 Criterion 4: Sensibility to changes 
It is earlier assumed that it is monotone 
increasing relationship between safety 
inspection deficiencies and increased 
accident risk. If the assumption holds 
changes in the PSC findings for a specific 
fleet should have been reflected in the 
experienced accident rate. The two 
classifications measures are calculated for 
the fleets of the Belizean and Norwegian 
                                                 
1Classifications based on inspection findings (Insp.) and 
accident statistics (Acci).  
 P(class A) P(class B) P(class C) 
Erika Insp. 26 % 36 % 38 % 
Prestige Insp. 26 % 38 % 36 % 
Sleipner’s co. Acci. 0.0 % 0.3 % 99.7 % 
Samina’s co Acci. 0 % 2 % 98 % 
Samina’s co. Insp. 32 % 37 % 31 % 
Green Awards Insp. 41 % 42 % 16 % 
Intertanko Insp. 39 % 42 % 19 % 
ISMA Insp. 41 % 42 % 17 % 
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flags for the period 1998 to 1999 and 
2000 to 2001. It was found that the 
Norwegian loss ratio was stable and that 
the loss ratio for the Belizean fleet had 
been changed. Table 9 shows an 
analogue tendency in the PSC inspection 
finding material. The fact that the 
constant level of the Norwegian fleet and 
the changes in the Belizean fleet can be 
found in both accident statistics and PSC 
findings give credit to the assumed 
relationship between PSC performance 
and safety performance.  
 
Table 9: Relationship between loss ratio and PSC 
findings for the periods 1998-1999 and 2000-2001 
 Norway Belize 
Loss ratio Unchanged (95% 
confidence level) 
Changed (95% 
confidence level) 
PSC 
pattern 
Unchanged (95% 
confidence level) 
Changed (95% 
confidence level) 
 
8. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study has developed a new 
framework for reasoning about a ships’ 
safety standard by means of safety 
inspection findings and accidents. The 
basis for the techniques is an estimated 
density distributions, which describe the 
accident rate for the world fleet. Based 
on these distributions, simple 
calculations showed that the 25% of the 
ships having highest safety standard are 
involved in only approximately 7% of 
the total losses and severe accidents. In 
contrast, the 25% most substandard 
vessels cause approximately 51% of 
these accidents. The most significant 
result is the classification of safety 
standard based on PSC findings, where 
the information needed for the 
classification is available on existing 
updated web pages (Lloyd’s Register and 
ParisMOU or Equasis). This scoring 
technique has along with the scoring 
technique based on accidents, 
demonstrated to be valid and is suitable to 
proactively pinpoint substandard ships 
like Erika. 
An analysis of the types of PSC 
deficiencies demonstrates that the most 
substandard vessels have far more 
deficiencies per inspection then the two 
other classes. The 25 % most sub-standard 
vessels have in average 9 deficiencies per 
inspection and are detained in 26 % of the 
cases. The 50% average standard ships 
have in average 2 deficiencies per 
inspection and are relatively better on 
areas involving general safety like 
accident prevention, ISM and emergency 
preparedness.  
A critical aspect is for how long these 
scoring techniques are valid. The annual 
decrease in accident rates of 
approximately 2.4% should cause 
reductions in poor PSC files. 
Improvements of individual flags like 
Belize should according to Alderton [13] 
not be given significant attention in this 
context because there is a continuous 
dynamic introduction of new flags of 
convenience covering substandard 
shipping. Because there very few vessels 
lost in 1998 having a PSC file, the 
classification scoring technique presented 
in this study is most fit to the ships lost in 
year 2000. Consequently, the bias 
introduced by using the scoring technique 
due to limitation of durability should have 
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no practical implication until at least 
2004. 
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ABSTRACT  
Techniques from Artificial Intelligence and Knowledge Based Systems are well suited 
for analysis and diagnosis of complex relationships. Especially powerful are the Neural 
Networks (NN) that have the ability to identify any underlying functional relationships. 
This paper is based on a study of how management and organisational factors influence 
the safety performance in ship operation and illustrates how NN can be used in the 
search for deeper knowledge about organisational and other factors relevant for the 
safety. Such knowledge is expressed in terms by the importance of the factors’ 
descriptive ability on the safety level. These calculations also include the joint effects of 
heterogeneous sources of information e.g. ship design, yard experience, organizational 
factors and the quality of the classification societies. Different information sources are 
assessed: Accident reports, Port State Control findings and consumer organisation 
reports. 
KEYWORDS 
Safety Assessment, Safety Management, Neural Network, Shipping Company 
Organisation 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The control of safety at sea has traditionally focused on the technical standard of the 
vessel and the formal competence of the crew, and has mainly been enforced through 
Flag State Control and Ship Classification. The basis for this regime is IMO regulations, 
but also some coordination of classification requirements through IACS. Various 
industry standards, like INTERTANKO’s guidelines for operation of tankers, have also 
contributed to improved safety. The safety regime is now subject to important changes. 
The limited success of Flag State Control lead to the agreement of setting up Port State 
Control (Paris MOU), use of blacklisting and increasing use of unilateral legislation 
(OPA ’90, EU Directives). Another important step is the introduction of the ISM Code. 
It should also be pointed out that insurance, shippers and port authorities undertake their 
own inspections and audits. These initiatives have lead to an increased focus on the 
standard of the ship manager and not only the vessel and the crew. The term 
‘substandard owner’ is frequently used but one may question what this really means. It 
is on the other side some agreement on what is required to operate safely: Culture, top 
management attention, adequate resources, organisation, routines and competence. Very 
little systematic knowledge is available on the relationship between management style 
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and safety performance in commercial shipping. One source of information is accident 
and incident databases that contain information about causal mechanisms. The 
CASMET database approach [1] focused on operator behaviour through event 
modelling and management behaviour from basic causal factors. Management related 
factors are to some degree incorporated in risk analysis models [2], but the knowledge 
basis is still rather limited and the findings therefore also highly questionable. Therefore 
we are far from knowing the relative importance of these factors, or how top level 
decisions influence middle management and ultimately the safety behaviour onboard. 
 
2. INFORMATION REVIEW  
The maritime sector has suffered from a poor safety reporting culture. Hence it has been 
difficult to undertake credible safety assessments. The situation has however improved 
somewhat through the recent introduction of quality assurance, safety management, Port 
State Control (PSC) and independent consumer assessments. Some of the key sources of 
information are listed in Table 1.    
 
Table 1. Sources of information and possible content 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There are four especially promising sources of information, namely Near Miss Reports, 
Safety Audit findings, Port State Control reports and Consumer Assessments. Near 
misses are still underreported in most companies and are therefore not a reliable safety 
indicator. Safety audits are mainly undertaken in relation to ISM certification and 
generally not available for research purposes. The PSC is getting increased acceptance 
and is a key source for assessment of organisational safety [3].  
 
Three of the most serious accidents recently in European waters, namely the tanker 
Erika, high speed vehicle Sleipner and the ferry Express Samina may be used to 
illustrate both strong and weak aspects of present safety inspection approaches. A PSC 
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Accident Data (X) X X  X X 
Maritime Declarations  X X    
Insurance Data  X    X 
Near Miss Reporting  X X X   
Safety Auditing (X) X X X   
Class Survey Report  X     
Safety Inspections  X X    
Consumer Assessment  X X    
Attitude Measures X      
Behaviour Observation X X X    
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inspection in 1998 revealed 13 deficiencies on Erika, and thereby placing her among the 
substandard vessels. Another illustrative example is the consumer assessment of 
Express Samina that resulted in a warning to “Greek island hoppers” [4] about her poor 
condition. A more questionable PSC inspection of Erika was undertaken by the Italian 
maritime administration that found her to be in acceptable condition only seven months 
before her foundering. The Flag State inspection and safety audit of Sleipner also failed 
to find any serious deficiencies less than half a year before her fatal voyage. These 
examples reveal both the potential and the weaknesses of these inspections. They may 
target substandard ships and operators, but there is a need for better tools to enhance 
their use and improve the reliability of their results. This can be achieved by getting a 
better understanding of latent organisational deficiencies and non-conformities revealed 
through audits. 
 
3. ORGANISATIONAL MODEL  
The supporting organisation behind a ship may typically involve several managing 
companies. Secondly, the organisation may be seen as a hierarchy with at least three 
distinct decision levels [5]: Strategic (SL), tactical (TL) and operational (OL). Strategic 
decisions focus commercial objectives, allocation of resources and organisation. 
Tactical decisions are taken within the company’s functional areas e.g. safety 
management. Finally, operational decisions are related to daily operation of the vessel. 
Each level may further be modelled in terms of basic conditions (BC), qualifications (Q) 
and outcomes (O) [6] as outlined in Figure 2 of the operational level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Organisational levels 
 
The dimensions are selected to reflect the needs related to causal and diagnostic 
reasoning in safety management. The model assumes that the actions of one 
organisational level determine or at least strongly influence the context of the lower 
level. The model is assumed to explain all relevant cause-effect relations. This makes 
the model suitable for both causal and diagnostic reasoning. 
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Figure 2.  Processes on the operational level  
 
4. NEURAL NETWORK TECHNIQUE  
A NN consists of interconnected nodes constructed with some analogy to the principles 
in nervous systems. Neurons contacts and collects signals from other neurons, integrate 
signals and generate responses that are transmitted to other neurons. Biological neurons 
may be connected with several tens of thousand other neurons. In artificial NN more 
than 100 neighbour neurons are considered as relatively complex. In general the 
application of NN involves training of the network to obtain a desired output for a given 
input. In order to understand the application of NN the basic neural mechanism has to 
be discussed in some detail. 
 
 
                 xi            =             Input value i 
    wi = Weight to scale the input value 
     b = Bias 
 a = Output of the neuron 
 n = Weighted sum of inputs corrected for bias b 
                            
1..
i i
i R
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=
= + ⋅∑  
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Figure 3. Single neuron design 
 
A single neuron is presented in the Figure 3. The transfer calculates the output (a) from 
the weighted sum of inputs from other neurons (xi). The individual neurons are 
connected to each other in several layers. The Backpropagation network is the most 
common network structure. This kind of network is a layered feed forward network (i.e. 
w1  
 
wi 
                n        a 
wr  
             b 
  Σ 
x1   
: 
xi  
: 
:xr 
 
     
  
  Values  
 
OUTCOMES: DECISIONS, 
BEHAVIOUR  
QUALIFICATIONS: INFORMATION,  
EXPERIENCE AND ATTITUDES 
  
BASIC CONDITIONS:  
?
INFLUENCE ON THE SAFETY PERFORMANCE DIRECTLY, OR 
THROUGH A LOWER ORGANISATIONAL LEVEL 
Goals
Human Resources
Equipment Documentation
Physical Work 
Environment 
Experience
Motivation
Knowledge 
Communication
Priorities
Commitment
Decision Making Stress
Practice
?
?
69 
has no cycles like e.g. recurrent networks). It is trained by adjusting the weights and 
biases as a function of the difference between the calculated output and a predefined 
target value (d). Figure 4 shows a simplified description of a Backpropagation network 
[8]. 
 
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Backpropagation neural network 
 
The ability to learn is one of the most important characteristics of NN. There are several 
approaches to learn the network to produce the desired output. The learning of the NN is 
performed in principle by adjusting the weights (and biases) of the neurons in the view 
of new data. There are typically two different approaches to update weights. These are 
global- and local learning. The global learning updates the weights in the view of the 
output (a) of the network. The weights are adjusted to minimize the difference (ε) 
between the target value, which is desired output (d), and the obtained output (a). The 
alternative local approach updates the weights only by considering the input to each 
individual neuron. Back-propagation applies the global learning and some key 
characteristics that will be outlined. The most common learning technique is referred to 
as the Gradient Descent method, which updates the weights by considering the partial 
derivatives of the NN’s error (ε). In the following calculations the bias is not included 
(b=0). 
X = Matrix of inputs 
W =Matrix of weights 
s   = X ⋅ W 
 
The derivation of the obtained output with respect to the dot product is the last unknown 
variable in the equation. In summary the weights are changed to describe the 
relationship between the input variables and the target value and approximated by: 
     
η     =     Learning rate (0..2)  
d     =     Desired output 
a     =     Obtained output 
 
In order to calculate the parameter δa/δs as a function of the dot product (s) a transfer 
function a(s) has to be selected (where n = s when b=0). When the transfer functions are 
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selected the degree of freedom (DOF) of the NN (the sum of the total number of 
weights in the network and the number of biases) has to be considered in the NN design.  
If the DOF equals the number of training sets (M) it is possible to find an optimal set of 
weight values. For complex problems it is, however, difficult to establish that many 
training sets. In such cases the NN is said to overfit the weights to the input, i.e. the 
weights are optimised to the training sets presented to it, but may have a moderate or 
high error when presented to new data sets. If the DOF is smaller then the number of 
training sets (most favourable in the area when M ≈ 10⋅DOF) the network is underfitted. 
An underfitted network has the ability to generalise. In this situation the network is able 
to calculate reasonable outputs based on input never presented to it before. The DOF 
governs the practical application of NN to complex problems with little available data 
unless some initiatives are taken to reduce it.  
 
 
 
 
ε    =   Error 
d    =   Desired output 
a    =   Obtained output 
M   =   Size of training sets 
 
The error of the network is typically measured as the Sum of Squared Error (SSE) 
between the desired output, d, and the obtained output a (alternatively Mean Squared 
Error (MSE) or the Root Mean Squared (RMS)). 
 
5. DATA ASSESSMENT  
In this study four dependent target variables were assessed for a group of Ro-Ro 
passenger ships (M=100 cases) that had been subject to a kind of consumer assessment 
by the German automobile association - ADAC (Allgemeiner Deutscher Automobil 
Club) [9].  ADAC’s safety assessments are performed with a five-point scale in six 
areas (safety information, construction and stability, fire protection, emergency 
equipment, public address and telecommunication, and safety management). The score 
based on these areas was on a scale from one to five with five as best. The second and 
third target variables were the average number of PSC deficiencies [3] and the number 
of immaculate PSC inspections (no deficiencies found) respectively. The PSC 
inspections are performed by the administration of the individual Paris MOU member 
states [3] while guidelines shall ensure a uniform approach by the different states. These 
inspections have a broader scope the ADAC inspections and have also a more detailed 
character. The last target variable is the number of accident reports for each vessel [10]. 
2 2
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This variable is measured on a three-point scale (zero accidents - one accident - more 
than one accident). The correlation between these measures are presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2.  Correlation between safety perform. measures for Ro-Ro passenger vessels in 
European waters 
 # ACCIDENTS (M = 100) # DEF PSC  (M = 51) # IMMAC PSC (M = 51) 
  ADAC Score  ρ = 0.15 ρ = 0.10 ρ = 0.15 
  # ACCIDENTS   ρ = 0.36 ρ = -0.08 
  # DEF PSC   ρ = -0.63 
 
The low correlation between the ADAC score and the number of accidents can be 
explained by a few outliers. Hence it can be proved by hypothesis testing (significance 
level α = 0.1) that the average number of accidents is larger for the vessels assessed to 
be sub-standard by ADAC in contrast to the vessels with a satisfactory standard. The 
average number of Immaculate PSC inspections is higher for the group of vessels 
assessed to have satisfactory ADAC score but the difference is however not statistically 
significant. When considering the group of vessels that has had one or more accidents it 
can be proved that they had a higher average number of deficiencies per PSC inspection 
than the group with no accidents (α=0.15). The same groups had no significant 
difference in the average number immaculate PSC inspections. By considering the 
occurrence of accidents as a ‘real’ safety performance indicator, the number of 
deficiencies per PSC inspection is found to be the best proactive safety performance 
indicator of those considered in this study.  
 
The input variables (x) were selected to reflect the range of potential organisational 
factors. Because the NN can implement and assess the importance of any quantified 
input, the insight and creativity of the researcher and the availability of data were the 
real limitations in the design of the NN model. The variables applied in this preliminary 
study are presented in Figure 5. The data was collected from Lloyds Register [10], IMO 
[11] and ILO [12]. The target values were collected for the period 1998 to 2001 and the 
input variables were collected in the spring of 2001.  
 
6. NETWORK CONSTRUCTION AND ANALYSIS  
In this study the number of input vectors (M=100) is relatively small in a NN context.  
Hence the NN has to be designed as efficient as possible to allocate its calculative 
power where it is most needed. By implementing a priori knowledge (Figure 1 and 2) 
into the network the DOF can be reduced and thereby allowing the network to use a 
smaller data set [13]. The simplest NN design that makes use of this knowledge is 
illustrated in Figure 5. Based on experience from several NN training sessions on the 
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same data, the variables of minor importance could be removed from the data set giving 
further reduction the DOF. The analysis included three different approaches: 
 
1. Analysis of each organisational level (strategic, tactical and operational 
level) separately to assess whether the input of the level could describe 
the target values. 
2. Analysis of the all organisational factors (Figure 5) to assess which 
variables that were important for the target value. 
3. Simultaneous analysis of the three organisational levels allowing 
competition among all factors meaning that the links between the 
organisational levels in Figure 5 were removed. 
 
 
The NNs were trained on the different target values with various numbers of neurons in 
layer 1 to 6. The most suitable learning rate, η, was in the area 0.05- 0.15. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Neural network of organizational influence on safety performance 
 
7. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS AND FURTHER WORK  
A trained NN could in 90 –100% of the instances estimate the vessel’s true performance 
based on the input variables (MSE = 0.04..0.7). In general the Outcome variables gave 
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better characterisation of the safety standard of the ship than the Basic Conditions and 
Qualifications. Another interesting finding was the fact that the Strategic Level gave 
almost equally good description of the safety standard as the Operative Level despite 
being a set of inputs of a more general and top-level nature. The relative importance of 
each input variable (x) with respect to describing the safety performance (d) were 
calculated for each performance variable (ADAC score, number of accidents, number of 
deficiencies per PSC inspection and number of immaculate PSC inspections). It was 
found that the same factors were the most effective ones for describing all four 
performance variables. They gave a correlation in the order of : ρ = 0.61 - 0.75. The 
most and least effective variables are presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Most and least important description variables (x) 
 
MOST IMPORTANT VARIABLES   LEAST IMPORTANT VARIABLES 
Number of ILO conventions adopted by vessel flag (BCOL) 
Estimated availability of propulsion system (BCOL) 
Main flag of the Strategic Level’s fleet (ASL) 
Uses c/o ownership (and/or adapted the companies 
country of register) (ASL) 
Strategic Level uses class. societies outside IACS (ASL) 
Mean age of Strategic Level’s fleet (ASL) 
The vessel’s ship type (Admirality Coefficient) (BCOL) 
The vessel’s flag (QOL) 
 Government Control (or owned by) (BCSL) 
Vessel has got its class changed out of IACS (BCOL) 
Has non-classed ships in Strategic Level’s fleet (ASL) 
Size of Strategic Level’s fleet (QSL) 
Tactical Level operates ships not classed by IACS 
(ASM) 
Size of Strategic Level’s fleet (QSL) 
 
 
As in any quantitative analysis the selection and interpretation of the variables, scales 
and obtained values should be carefully validated. The Admirality Coefficient is for 
instance likely to reflect the company’s market orientation in terms of speed and ship 
type (Ro-Ro ferry, cruise ship, etc.). The estimated availability of the propulsion system 
may reflect the complexity of the vessel and even its age or size. Another fundamental 
implication of using a NN to describe these complex relationships is that it is difficult to 
decide whether an isolated variable has a general positive or negative effect on the 
safety level. By considering the influence of marginal changes in the Uses of co- 
ownership variable the effect may either be positive or negative depending of the 
condition of other variables like organisational structure and nationality at the Strategic 
Level. This fact may reduce the possibility to define robust research conclusions. On the 
other hand it may be argued that the NN approach has shed some light on how the 
complex interactions in a real organisation work. Another important implication is 
related to the objective to find the most efficient way to give an overall assessment of 
the ships safety standard. Hence the apparent low importance of the variable Vessel has 
got its class changed out of IACS may be explained by the low number of vessels  
having this characteristic (only 3) and the fact that several ships are substandard even 
without this characteristic.   
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Because the number of input variables is relatively small in the obtained NN it is over-
fitted and not able to be used on vessels not included in the input. In order to improve 
the general validity of the model, a common approach called early stopping was used in 
a cross-validation procedure (MSEgoal limit of 0.4). Hence 100 different NN were 
generated on the basis of 100 minus 1 (99) sets and the NN was validated against the 
data set left out. As 100 different data sets could be left out this procedure gave 100 NN 
alternatives. This cross-validation showed that the NN could calculate the correct 
ADAC score (on a five point scale) in 43 % of the cases and the correct accident level 
(on a three point scale) in 61 % of the cases.  These preliminary results may be 
improved even more by experimenting with different values of the MSEgoal limit. This 
study will at a later stage use a larger input set (M = 2 - 5000) selected to reflect a 
broader range of ship types and organisations. It is also the ambition to supplement the 
study with other knowledge sources such as questionnaire responses on detailed 
organisational matters and tests on safety culture to mention a few. 
 
8. CONCLUSION  
By entering knowledge about organisational solutions into a Neural Network (NN) this 
study has showed how the network can generate models of sufficient simplicity for 
practical applications in safety assessments. The study also provide some interesting 
results related to the relative importance of both the organisational levels and the 
individual input variables. Information about the Strategic Level of the organisation may 
be as significant as for the Operational Level in describing the safety standard of a ship, 
despite the apparent organisational distance and its general character.  
 
The NN was trained on four different target values. These were consumer assessment 
score, accident rate, number of immaculate Port State Control (PSC) inspections and 
average number of deficiencies found by PSC Inspections. This pre-study found the 
latter of these parameters to be the most efficient proactive safety performance 
indicator. By comparing the importance of the various organisational variables it was 
found that the same set gave the best result for all target values and correlation in the 
order of ρ=0.61- 0.75. This study has also showed that the Neural Networks (N) have 
the potential to give reasonable good proactive safety assessments of Ro-Ro passenger 
ships based on organisational variables. The validity of the assessment can be controlled 
by the error of the network (MSE), cross-validation and content validity of the input 
vectors.  
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ABSTRACT 
Safety culture has been considered as a core aspect of organizational safety for the last two 
decades. Even though considerable research has been conducted, the relationship between 
organizational culture and safety performance has not yet been determined. Consequently, 
traditional analysis approaches fail to capture the essence of complex cultural patters. Joseph 
Fragola [1] has suggested that analysis of complex pattern should be analysed through data 
interrogation, implying that the data are considered with relative to established knowledge. This 
study first ranks a set of shipping companies according to their safety standard. The ranking is 
based both on accident statistics and safety inspection findings. Secondly, the responses on the 
Safety Management Attitude Questionnaire (SMAQ) are interrogated with various perspectives 
(Leadership Style [2], Continuous Improvement [3], Competing Values Framework [4] and 
Normal Accident theory [5]) to find the cause behind the variance in safety standard. At last the 
patterns are explored through a principal component analysis. The study demonstrates that the 
companies having a good safety performance have critical employees that take more 
responsibility. They have an internal focus on the organisational processes and dynamic 
organisational process. It is also demonstrated that representation of safety culture based on 
scores on Principal components is invalid. At last attitudes towards safety commitment is a 
result of attitudes towards Job Satisfactions, Safety Rehearse and Communication. At last it is 
shown that attitudes towards the management’s genuine interests in safety have a central 
position in the extracted cultural patterns.  
 
 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Even though the concept of “safety 
culture” has been explored for nearly 20 
years it is still ongoing academic debate 
concerning its definition, measurability 
and utility [6]. A range of conflicting 
definitions of safety culture has been 
formed [7]. Hale [8] describes it as 
“Culture’s confusion”. The critical 
problems are however related to the 
measurement of safety culture. A state-
of-the-art work written by Sorensen [9] 
says: “no performance indicators to 
gauge safety culture and its impact on 
safety of operation appear to have been 
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identified and validated”. Intuitively, if 
safety culture is as important as it is 
assumed to be, it should be relatively 
explicit and easy to identify. 
When attempting to measure the 
maturity of the safety culture, it is 
important to understand the impact of the 
environment [6]. Because culture is a 
shared pattern of attitudes, beliefs and 
values that are formed from feedback and 
experience, several professionals have 
started to consider it as impossible to 
directly compare the safety culture of one 
organisation with another [8]. The 
difficulties of identifying cultural patterns 
may be related to the applied experimental 
context. Two organisations may 
theoretically develop different safety 
cultures that both are effective in 
controlling the risks of their respective 
environment. Therefore, in an ideal 
experiment, several organisations should 
be allowed to work in the same 
environment. They should be exposed to 
the same hazards, operate in the same 
business setting, apply the same 
equipment, being exposed to the same 
requirements and have equivalent formal 
competence. In addition the experiment 
should run a considerable time until the 
cultural patterns within each organisation 
had the opportunity to converge. Then, if 
the organisations experienced 
significantly different safety performances 
it should be possible to more precisely 
distinguish the patterns of mature safety 
cultures from the less mature.  
The world of shipping is one of the 
few domains that have these 
characteristics. The 25% most hazardous 
ships have a seven times higher accident 
rate compared to the 25% safest ships 
[10]. All ships comply with international 
regulation and manage the same hazards 
with the same technology. There are few 
differences related to professional 
culture and different impacts from 
national cultures can be taken account 
for. Hence, the maritime domain might 
have the potential to empirically break 
the code for measurement of safety 
cultural maturity. This study takes the 
assumption, that the environmental 
context of various shipping organisations 
is similar. If this assumption holds, the 
cultural patterns should be able to 
explain the difference in safety 
performance.  
 
2. OBJECTIVES AND APPROACH 
 
The objective of this study is to explain 
the differences in safety standard of 
shipping companies based on their 
shared pattern of values, attitudes and 
beliefs i.e. safety culture. Because earlier 
research has experienced difficulties in 
meeting similar objectives, this study 
applies another analytical approach 
outlined by Fragola [1] under the title 
“Emerging Failure Phenomena in 
Complex Systems”.  He states that “In 
these cases, .. , the underlying system is 
neither orderly enough to be considered 
regular, nor disorderly enough to be 
considered random, and can therefore 
be defines as being “complex” because 
it will succumb to neither deterministic 
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analysis nor probabilistic analysis”. In 
these cases he suggest that data 
interrogation is more suitable.  
 
3. DATA INTERROGATION 
 
“Data “interrogation” is the process of 
data collection and investigation from a 
variety of perspectives, alternatively 
dissecting it into its underlying (yet often 
unknown) patterns” [1]. A data 
interrogation typically involves one of the 
four listed approaches (I, II, III, IV).   
 
Table 1: The data interrogation approaches 
I 
Consider parts of the datasets according to 
known underlying variables 
II 
Consider parts of the datasets relative to an 
overlaying data gathered from different 
perspectives. 
III 
Consider data relative to previously 
established logical or phenomenological 
structures. 
IV 
Allow a computerised heuristic search to 
reveal possible patterns. 
 
In this study, first a set of shipping 
companies are selected and then assessed 
according to their safety standard 
(approach II). Then questionnaire 
responses from shipping companies are 
considered relative to previously 
established perspectives towards 
organisational and safety management 
(approach III). These perspectives are 
towards the Leadership Styles [2], 
Continuous Improvement [3], Competing 
Values [4] and Normal Accident theory 
[5]. At last the earlier described approach 
II is combined with approach IV. In this 
heuristic search both Principal Component 
analysis and Learning Bayesian 
Networks are applied.  
The interrogated data material is 
responses on the Ship Management 
Attitudes Questionnaire (SMAQ). The 
SMAQ was developed as a joint project 
by Risø, the Danish Maritime Institute 
(now Force Technology), and the 
University of Texas  (NASA/FAA) 
Aerospace Crew Research Project from 
the Flight Management Attitudes 
Questionnaire (FMAQ). The FMAQ is 
widely used in aviation to diagnose 
organisations in the areas of 
organisational culture, safety, and human 
factors practices. It contains items that 
relate to employees’ opinions and 
attitudes about management, morale, 
safety issues, automation and teamwork, 
as well as general work values. Findings 
from the survey are presented in 
confidential reports to individual 
companies, but published works, like 
this one, will describe results in 
anonymous form, de-identifying the 
participating companies. The SMAQ 
questionnaire was distributed to 
seafaring personnel in five shipping 
companies during 1997 (four 
Scandinavian companies and one Asian 
company). The database has later been 
expanded with data from an American 
company, two more Asian companies 
and two Norwegian companies. This 
study includes eight companies. 
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4. SAFETY STANDARD: THE OVERLYING 
DATA. 
 
Approach II implies that the data are 
interrogated with respect to an overlying 
data variable. When interrogating safety 
attitudes it is natural to use the safety 
standard of the organisation as an 
overlying data variable. Based on a newly 
developed classification technique eight 
companies are assessed based on their 
accident statistics and safety inspection 
findings [5]. Both approaches provides the 
likelihood of a ships’ safety standard to be 
among the 25% most quality ships (A), 
the 50% average standard (B) or the 25% 
most substandard vessels (C) of the world 
fleet. These values are presented in fig. 1 
for all companies.  They are ranked 
according to the average of the two 
techniques and the company having the 
highest safety standard is Z1 while Z8 is 
the most substandard. 
Fig. 1. Classification of safety standard based on 
safety inspections and accident statistics 
 
The classification based on accidents in 
Fig. 1 applies the number of serious 
accidents per ship year the last four years. 
Serious accidents are breakdowns 
resulting in the ship being towed or 
requiring assistance from ashore, 
flooding, structural-, mechanical- or 
electrical damage that requires repairs 
before the ship can continue trading. 
These accidents are collected from a 
database held by the Lloyd’s Maritime 
Information Service (LMIS) [11].  
The main source for safety 
inspection data is the ParisMOU 
database [12] covering Port State 
Control (PSC) inspection records of 
ships visiting European and Canadian 
ports. In some cases it will be necessary 
to use the Equasis database [13] that also 
include inspections from the US 
coastguard and the TokyoMOU. The 
inspections try to find non-conformities 
with the international regulations and 
conventions held by International 
Maritime Organisation (IMO) and 
International Labour Organisation (ILO). 
While as the classification based on 
accidents statistics discriminates 
relatively strict among the three safety 
standards, the classification technique 
considering PSC findings is more 
relaxed because of the lower reliability 
of this data source. Anyhow, although 
the more relaxed classifications the 
tendency of the safety inspection 
classification corresponds to the 
classifications based on the accident 
statistics (Fig. 1). The correlation 
between the two performance variables 
is 0.67.  It would be favourable to keep 
all eight companies in the analysis of 
their cultural factors. There is however 
one obstacle that makes this difficult. 
The companies have crews from 
A
Safety Inspection Classifications Accident Classifications
B C A B C
0 % 25% 50% 75% 25% 75%50%0%
Z1
Z8
Z7
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different nations. To avoid that the 
differences in questionnaire response 
between the companies are related to 
national cultures four of the companies  
(Z3, Z6, Z7, Z8) are analysed in detail. 
These have all a Scandinavian national 
culture and reflect the range of safety 
standard from the most substandard to the 
highest quality. The two described 
indicators ranks the four companies in the 
equivalent order with respect to safety 
standard.  
 
5. A PERSPECTIVE ON LEADERSHIP 
 
It has earlier been suggested that 
management decisions have a crucial 
impact on safety [14]. Therefore is it of 
interest to see if various leadership styles 
also are important. The crews of the four 
companies were first asked what 
leadership style they preferred to work 
under and then how the actual leadership 
style was. The scale consisted of four 
styles ranging from extreme authoritarian 
to extreme democratic. The four styles 
were described as in table 2.  
  The response on this item is presented in 
fig. 2. It can be seen that Z3 respond that 
they have a slightly more autocratic 
leadership compared to the others (Style 
1 and 2). The most preferred leadership 
style is the third one that represents some 
degree of involvement. It seems 
however, that Z8 prefers to work under 
the two first styles. 
  A natural question is to ask why this 
difference exists. Therefore attributions 
related to relationships to the superiors 
are presented in Fig. 3. This chart 
0% 25% 50% 75%
Prefered Leadership
4Style 2 Style 31
Z8
Z7
Z6
Z3
0% 25% 50% 75% 0
Actual Leadership
Style 1 Style 2 St. 3
Z8
Z7
Z6
Z3
Fig. 2: Actual and prefers leadership style
Style Description 
1 Usually makes his decisions promptly and 
communicates them to his subordinates clearly 
and firmly. Expect them to carry out the 
decisions loyally without raising difficulties. 
2 Usually makes his decisions promptly, but, 
before going ahead, tries to explain them fully to 
his subordinates. Gives them the reason for the 
decisions and answers whatever question they 
may have. 
3 Usually consults with his subordinates before he 
reaches his decisions. Listens to their advice, 
considers it, and then announces his decision. He 
then expects all to work loyally to implement it 
whether or not it was in accordance with the 
advice they gave. 
4 Usually calls a meeting of his subordinates when 
there is an important decision to be made. Puts 
the problem before the group and invites 
discussion. Accepts the majority viewpoint as 
the decision. 
 
Table 2: Description of Leadership styles 
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indicates that there is a strict hieratical 
level in Z8, where relationships are 
perceived as little importance.  
 
Fig. 3: Relationships to superior in ideal job 
 
6. A PERSPECTIVE ON CONTINUOUS 
IMPROVEMENT  
 
During the 1990s the focus on continuous 
improvement increased. The application 
of Deming’s [3] plan-do-check-act loop 
prospered. An effective safety 
management system has to rely upon 
certain plans arranged in the safety 
manuals. Because the governing regime of 
safety audits actually force the employees 
to act in accordance with these manuals, 
their quality is important. Fig. 4 show 
that the most substandard company Z8 
distinguishes itself by its low portion of 
very satisfied responses. The same 
questions were asked for the operational 
manuals and the current checklists, 
which gave the same answers as for the 
safety manuals (ρ > 0.9). These 
responses show that the most 
substandard companies are less satisfied 
with the formal safety plans.  
The lower right corner of fig. 4 
indicates that also the procedures are 
followed to a lower degree for the most 
substandard company. The tendency 
demonstrated in this chart corresponds to 
other questions designed to measure 
fulfilment of the procedures. An item 
representing the degree of fulfilment of 
checklists is presented in fig. 4’s lower 
left corner. This item demonstrate that 
the degree of fulfilling a checklist follow 
increasing relationship to safety 
standard. At last the upper left corner of 
fig. 4 illustrate that the crew of Z8 
   
Act  Plan 
 
 
 Check   Do 
    
0 % 20 % 40 % 60 % 80 % 100 %
Z8
Z7
Z6
Z3
disagree strongly - slightly neutral agree slightly - strongly
Emergency drills are conducted as prescribed.
0 % 20 % 40 % 60 % 80 % 100 %
Z8
Z7
Z6
Z3
0 til 20% 21% til 40% 41% til 60% 61% til 80% 81% til 100%
How often are checklists omitted?
0 % 20 % 40 % 60 % 80 % 100 %
Z8
Z7
Z6
Z3
disagree strongly - slightly neutral agree slightly - strong
My suggestions about safety will be acted upon if I express 
them to management on shore
0 % 20 % 40 % 60 % 80 % 100 %
Z8
Z7
Z6
Z3
Very Low Low Adequate High Very High
Please indicate how satisfied you yourself are with … 
Safety Manuals.
Fig. 4: Questions arranged in a continuous improvement loop perspective 
0 % 20 % 40 % 60 % 80 % 100 %
Z8
Z7
Z6
Z3
Very little- Little- Moderate- Very- Utmost Important
In choosing an ideal job, how important would it be to you to 
have a warm relationship with your direct superior?
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perceives that the shore-based 
management is less willing to take actions 
on feedback. The same question was 
given with reference to onboard 
management, which gave responses 
corresponding to the presented but with 
slightly lower agreement scores. Hence 
the crews of all companies have most 
positive experience with the shore-based 
management.  
 
 
7. A PERSPECTIVE ON COMPETING 
VALUES  
 
Schein [15] deified culture as “… a 
pattern of basic assumptions, invented, 
discovered or developed by a given group, 
as it learn to cope with its problems of 
external adaptation and integral 
integration, that has worked well enough 
to be considered valid and, therefore, is to 
be taught to new members as the correct 
way to perceive, think and feel in relation 
to those problems.” If the group is defined 
by the organizational boundaries it is 
considered as the organizational or 
corporate culture. As Schein indicates in 
his definition, culture can be explained 
based on the external and internal focus 
and on how the cultural pattern fit 
(adaptation / integration) with the 
environment. This idea has lead to a 
framework that measures the internal 
versus external orientation of the 
organizational focus and its stable versus 
flexible processes. The same framework is 
used within psychology to measure a 
person’s locus of control. The theoretical 
model is entitled Competing Values 
Framework (CVF) and is widely used 
within organizational analyses [4, 16]. 
Covin and Slevin [17] describes the 
stable organizational process as 
mechanistic while the flexible were 
labelled organic. Based on their research 
they relate these attributes to how well 
they are suited for changes; “”organic” 
structures permit rapid organizational 
responses to changing external  
environments, while ‘mechanistic’ 
structures are better suited to 
predictable environments where rapid 
organizational responses are not 
typically required”. The idea is therefore 
to consider items of the SMAQ that can 
be related to organisational orientation 
and processes. Normally these features 
are measured from a management 
perspective. As the SMAQ takes an 
employee perspective the questions 
addressing organisational orientation is 
somewhat different.  
First two questions related to the 
process were selected. The responses on 
these items indicate that the flexibility 
seems to be strongly related to safety 
standard (Fig. 5). The crew of Z3 have 
higher attributions to dynamic processes, 
and this attribution decrease with the 
safety standard. Organisational 
orientation is a more ambitious scale 
because there are so many levels that 
may be considered. The crew of Z3 have 
a more intense individual desire to feel 
personal sense of accomplishment (Fig. 
6), while the crew of Z8 felt a greater 
need to obtain good cooperation. 
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Attitudes towards totally external aspects 
such as prestige showed a falling trend for 
the three best companies, while the crew 
of the most substandard company felt this 
as very important.   
 
8. A NORMAL ACCIDENT PERSPECTIVE 
 
Charles Perrow [15] has developed a 
paradigm within safety management that 
address aspects of modern system design. 
A special feature about this theory is that 
it tune down the importance of 
organisational culture, stating that it is the 
tight system couplings and complex 
system interactions is the core contributor 
to risks. It is accepted that a good culture 
has a positive effect, but that it never can 
balance the risks introduced by the 
system. Automatic or “cybernetic” control 
is exemplified as a source for hidden 
interactions between systems. It is 
difficult to fully understand how an 
automatic system responds to a given 
0 % 20 % 40 % 60 % 80 % 100 %
Z8
Z7
Z6
Z3
In choosing an ideal job, how important would it be to you to 
work with people who co-operate well with one another?
0 % 20 % 40 % 60 % 80 % 100 %
Z8
Z7
Z6
Z3
Very little- Little- Moderate- Very- Utmost Important
In choosing an ideal job, how important would it be to you to 
have a job or career that will bring you prestige and 
recognition from others?
0 % 20 % 40 % 60 % 80 % 100 %
Z8
Z7
Z6
Z3
In choosing an ideal job, how important would it be to you to 
have challenging tasks to do, from which you get a personal 
sense of accomplishment?
Fig. 6. Distribution of responses related to 
internal versus external focus 
 
0 % 20 % 40 % 60 % 80 % 100 %
Z8
Z7
Z6
Z3
disagree strongly - slightly neutral agree slightly - strongly
I am concerned that the use of automation will lead to diminished 
general competence.
0 % 20 % 40 % 60 % 80 % 100 %
Z8
Z7
Z6
Z3
I prefer working on highly automated vessels.
Fig. 7: Distribution of responses related to 
automation 
0 % 20 % 40 % 60 % 80 % 100 %
Z8
Z7
Z6
Z3
Very little- Little- Moderate- Very- Utmost Important
In choosing an ideal job, how important would it be to you to 
have a changing work routine with new, unfamiliar tasks?
0 % 20 % 40 % 60 % 80 % 100 %
Z8
Z7
Z6
Z3
In choosing an ideal job, how important would it be to you to 
know everything about the job, to have no surprises?
Fig. 5: Distributions of responses related to 
stable versus dynamic organizational processes. 
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input or how it interacts with other 
systems. It is then natural to ask if some 
cultures have a higher attribution to 
automatic controls.  
 
9. A PRINCIPAL COMPONENT 
PERSPECTIVE 
 
A principal component analysis reduces 
the number of variables by merging 
correlated variables into principal 
components. A principal component 
analysis was performed on 32 questions, 
which have identical assessment scales. 
Based on a Scree-plot it was decided to 
extract seven principal components. The 
KMO test and Bartlett’s test of sphericity 
showed satisfactory results (0.85 and 
0.000 respectively). The items that 
constituted the principal components are 
presented in Table 3. Based on the 
characteristics of these items, each 
principal component was given a name. 
The table also includes factor loads (fl) 
and the communalities (indicated by c). 
The communalities are the proportion of 
variance in that variable that is explained 
by the common factors. 
The principal components that 
explained the most variance was Safety 
Rehearse, including items related to the 
daily conduction of safety issues. On 
second place was Job Satisfaction, which 
focused on items related to general 
satisfaction of the workplace. The next 
component is called Acknowledgement of 
Personal Limitation and includes items 
describing the attribution the 
crewmembers have towards their own and 
their colleagues’ performance under 
extreme situations. The fourth 
component is called Communication and 
includes both communication that 
specifically address job issues and 
communication of a more social level.  
The fifth component is of a similar 
character, but is aimed at the context of 
the communication i.e. how colleagues 
and management tackle requests for help 
and suggestions for improvement. 
Therefore this component is called 
Commitment. The sixth principal 
component is called Work Integrity and 
address attitudes towards abuse of 
alcohol and drugs. The last principal 
component is called Power and Dignity 
and includes items that address attitudes 
threatening professional roles and 
personal image.  
In data analysis of questionnaire 
surveys it has become common to not 
only apply the principal components for 
reduction of data size, but also use the 
responses to calculate a score on each 
principal component. In this practice it is 
assumed that the quality can be reflected 
in how positive the responses are [18] 
i.e. the responses on questionnaire 
follow a monotone increasing 
relationship to quality (Rule 1). The 
average scores of each component are 
plotted in fig. 8 for each of the four 
companies. If Rule 1 is valid, then the 
average score of the components should 
reflect the ranking of the companies. It 
can for instance be seen that the 
company Z8 has significantly lower 
average score on the Communication 
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component. It can also be seen that the 
Power and Dignity component roughly 
represents the ranking of the companies. If 
however Rule 1 holds on an item level, it 
should also hold on a component level. 
Because the principal components per 
definition are linearly independent, there 
are no linear dependencies between the 
components. Therefore the safety standard 
of the organisation should be calculated 
from a weighted sum of the scores on the 
principal components (Safety Standard = 
w1⋅Xs.r.+ w2⋅Xj.s.+ w3⋅Xa.p.l.+ w4⋅Xcu. + 
w5⋅Xct+ w6⋅Xw.i.+ w7⋅Xp.d. + b). Because, 
there are only four companies in this 
study, the exact values of the eight 
variables (w1, .., w7, b) can not be 
estimated. It is still possible to apply a 
more relaxed consideration. If the scores 
on the Communication component (fig. 8) 
is considered relative to the safety 
standard (fig.1) it is seen that the score of 
Z8 in unreasonable low. This low value 
has to be outweighed by the score of other 
components, implying that either the 
importance of the Communication 
components is zero (wcu=0) or that the 
importance of the Acknowledgement of 
Personal Limitation component is 
relatively high (wcu<< wapl). Both 
solutions seem to be inadequate. In both 
cases the low score of the 
Communication is a poor indicator of 
safety standard. These characteristics are 
crucial to understand, because they 
indicate that Rule 1 in fact is invalid for 
assessment of the quality of safety 
culture.  
 
10. SOME ALTERNATIVE 
INTERPRETATIONS OF PRINCIPAL 
COMPONENTS 
Despite use of average scores (Rule 1) 
has become a common approach to 
interpret principal components, it is not 
certain that this approach is the most 
correct. If we use average scores to 
present the results we assumes that each 
variable can be measured on a 
monotonically increasing scale from 
poor to good. To assess whether there 
are other differences than the ones 
related to the score’s central tendency 
the distribution for the principal 
components were represented by kernel 
estimates (fig. 9). Differences in average 
value and variance were tested. These 
tests took into account the varying 
-1,2
-1
-0,8
-0,6
-0,4
-0,2
0
0,2
0,4
Safety Rehearse Job Satisfaction
Acknowledgement
of Personal
Limitation Communication Commitment Work Integrity Power and Dignity
Z3 Z6 Z7 Z8
Z3 Z6 Z7 Z8Z3 Z6 Z7 Z8
Z3 Z6 Z7 Z8
Z3 Z6 Z7 Z8
Z3 Z6 Z7 Z8
Z3 Z6 Z7 Z8
Fig. 8: Average scores on principal components 
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number of responses from the different 
companies.  
It was found that the most substandard 
company, Z8, had relatively high scores 
on the Acknowledgement of Personal 
Limitation (Fig. 8). Because it should be 
expected that the cultures of the most 
substandard company has more a poorer 
Acknowledgement of Personal Limitation, 
the distribution of the scores are presented 
in fig. 9. This distribution illustrates that 
the crew of Z8 actually have a poorer 
Acknowledgement of Personal Limitation 
except from a subgroup that has extremely 
high values.  
 
Fig. 9: Acknowledgement of personal limitations 
 
An alternative to the consideration of 
average scores is to consider the pattern of 
items constituting the components. A 
Learning Bayesian Network search for 
dependencies between variables and 
presents the results in a directed acyclic 
graph (DAG). In the graph arrows indicate 
it can be read that the values of one 
variable determine the values of other 
variables. Arrows represent these 
relationships. The knowledge of 
relationships between items may 
represent new insight into the attitude 
patterns of safety culture. Therefore, first 
the Bayesian Learning Network searches 
for the optimum DAG of the items 
within each principal component. It is 
recognised that certain items are 
common for different principal 
components. Therefore, it is possible to 
combine the DAG’s of some principal 
component into a larger graph. The 
graph that includes the Commitment, 
Communication, Job Satisfaction and 
Safety Rehearse components is 
presented in fig. 10.   
The DAG presented in fig. 10 
should be interpreted in the following 
manner. A responded value on the root 
item in the Safety Rehearse component 
(Our training has prepared the crew…) 
give certain dependencies in the 
responded values of its three child items. 
If the DAG of items within the Safety 
Rehearse component is considered these 
demonstrate that arrows follow a time 
perspective. The root node indicates 
what has been done. The next six items 
describe how the current condition is. At 
last the four lowest items represents 
attitudes towards a potential future 
situation. It is also worth interesting to 
consider the relationship between the 
items “I am sure management will never 
compromise safety for profitability” and 
the item “My suggestions about safety 
will be acted upon if I express them to 
management on shore”. This relationship 
is a junction for three of the principal 
components. This structural 
Z3 
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characteristic indicates that it is vital for 
the completion of the whole pattern. Its 
content does also address aspects of the 
management’s genuine interests in safety. 
The whole graph indicates that attitudes 
towards commitment are a core aspect of 
the cultural pattern, because it is a child 
feature of the other three components.  
 
11. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION OF 
FINDINGS 
 
This study has considered various ways to 
represent the relationship between the 
safety culture of maritime companies and 
their safety standard. First eight shipping 
companies were ranked according to their 
safety standard. This ranking was based 
on safety performance findings both from 
accident statistics and safety inspections. 
Then four companies all having a 
Scandinavian national culture was 
analysed in more detail.  
In a leadership perspective it was 
found that the leadership styles of the 
various companies were relative similar 
and can be described as authoritarian. 
The crew of all companies wished to be 
more involved in decision-making, but 
the most substandard company was most 
satisfied. In this context is should be 
recognised that the crew of the most 
substandard company have various 
national backgrounds. Even though only 
the Scandinavian crewmembers are 
analysed, these may have higher 
hierarchal positions in the crew, 
typically officers.  
The attitudes were considered in a 
continuous improvement perspective. 
Items that reflected the commonly 
known Plan-Do-Check-Act loop were 
considered. It was found that the 
company having the highest safety 
Our training has prepared  
the crew to work as a well  
coordinated team in an 
emergency Emergency drills are 
conducted as prescribed 
When I enter a new ship 
I always receive a 
proper hand-over 
Senior ship’s 
management ensures full 
cooperation between all 
onboard departments 
My colleagues are 
adequately trained in 
emergency procedures
Accidents and near-misses are 
always reported according to 
company orders
My suggestions about safety will 
be acted upon if I express them 
to management on shore I am encouraged by my seniors 
to report any unsafe conditions I 
may observe 
My suggestions about safety will 
be acted upon if I express them 
to senior officers on board
Task assignments are 
always cross-checked 
and verified 
I am sure management will 
never compromise safety for 
profitability
Socializing among the 
crew can help reduce 
stress 
On board, open 
discussion is a common 
way of solving problems Asking for assistance 
makes one appear 
incompetent
This company practices 
the highest maintenance 
standards 
Morale in the 
company is good 
I am proud to work for 
this company 
Task assignments are 
always cross-checked 
and verified 
A debriefing and critique of 
procedures and decisions after 
critical situations is an important 
part of safety 
Leaders make sure that relevant 
operational intentions and actions 
are understood 
Effective team co-ordination 
requires team members to take 
into account the personalities of 
the others participants 
SAFETY REHEARSE
COMMITMENT
JOB 
SATISFACTION 
COMMUNICATION 
Fig. 10: Combined DAG of four principal components 
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standard was somewhat more critical to 
the safety and operational manuals. The 
responses indicated, however, that the best 
company to a higher degree followed the 
plans. Also the omission of checklists 
could follow the companies’ safety 
standard. At last the attitudes towards the 
management’s willingness to act upon 
suggestions were better followed the 
ranking of their safety standard.  
Then items representing aspect of 
the Competing Values Framework were 
considered. The competing values 
framework measures organisational 
culture on two scales. One scale 
represents dynamic versus stable 
processes and the other represents internal 
versus external focus. The charts indicated 
that the ideal job involved more stable 
processes for the more substandard 
companies. Also the focus was different 
for the various companies. The crew of 
the company having the highest safety 
standard had a more intense individual 
wish to do a good job, while the crew of 
the most substandard company felt a 
greater need to obtain good cooperation. 
Attitudes towards totally external aspects 
such as prestige showed a falling trend for 
the three best companies, while the crew 
of the most substandard company felt this 
as very important. In sum the company 
that had the highest safety standard had 
higher attributions towards dynamic 
processes with an internal focus. The 
lower the safety standard was, higher 
attributions were for the more external 
processes and stable focus. Even though 
the response explicitly follow the safety 
standard it is not known how the actual 
jobs are for the various companies. It 
might be that the crew of companies 
being extremely strict and clean has 
higher attributions towards more loose 
circumstances, and that the crew of 
companies of a more chaotic character 
have high attributions towards stability.  
One of the theories within safety 
management that is most critical towards 
the belief in cultural development is the 
Normal Accident Theory developed by 
Charles Perrow [5]. He, pinpoint features 
of the complex and tight coupled 
systems as the most important 
contributor to high risks. In particular are 
automatic control system criticised 
because they are difficult to understand 
and undermines the importance of 
system insight. Therefore attitudes 
towards automation were considered. It 
was found the company having a high 
safety standard was most critical towards 
automation. This rise the question of 
what is the most important. Do, for 
instance, cultures having an immature 
organisational culture apply more 
automation, or are they substandard 
because they are not sufficiently critical 
to automation? 
The last part of the study address 
analysis based on Principal component 
analysis. The rule that the responses on 
questionnaire follow a monotone 
increasing relationship to quality (Rule 
1) is assessed. Three examples justify 
that this rule is invalid. First the average 
scores on principal components 
demonstrate that the rule contradicts a 
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relationship to safety standard. Secondly it 
fails to meet the definitions of safety 
culture. High average scores do not 
necessarily imply that the values, attitudes 
and beliefs are shared. It was then 
empirically demonstrated that high scores 
might be related to inhomogeneous in 
responses. Third, empirical evidence from 
Rundmo et.al. [19] shows that when safety 
commitment tend to decrease with 
improved standards.  
In order to find an enhanced technique 
the dependencies between the items 
within each component were found by a 
Learning Bayesian Network technique. A 
Learning Bayesian Network search for 
dependencies between the items and 
represent these dependencies as arrows in 
a graph. It was also known that various 
principal components had some items in 
common. Therefore an outline of the 
relationship between principal 
components could be developed. This 
graph indicated that Commitment was a 
result of attitudes towards Safety 
Rehearse, Communication and Job 
satisfaction. In specific the relationship 
between the items “I am sure management 
will never compromise safety for 
profitability” and the item “My 
suggestions about safety will be acted 
upon if I express them to management on 
shore” represented a link between the 
three of the components. The content of 
these items address the management’s 
genuine interests in safety. Therefore, the 
management interests in safety have both 
a high logical and a structural importance.   
In summary the explorations 
accomplished in this study indicates that 
it is important to have a dynamic and 
internal focus in order to obtain a high 
safety standard. This should be verified 
in later studies.  Crews that are critical to 
leadership and automation also seem to 
have a better performance. Also the 
content of the principal components 
should be inspected in more detail. If it 
is true that the safety cultures of different 
companies have similar characters, then 
the characteristics of the similarities and 
the differences may give more insight 
into what is important for developing a 
mature safety culture. 
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Table 2: Content of principal components 
Principal components  (Minimum factor load ≈ 0.40, Total variance explained 49.1 %) Co. Load ρ 
Safety Rehearse 12.0 % 
Our training has prepared the crew to work as a well co-ordinated team in an emergency 
Emergency drills are conducted as prescribed 
When I enter a new ship I always receive a proper hand-over 
Senior ship’s management ensures full cooperation between all onboard departments 
My colleagues are adequately trained in emergency procedures 
Accidents and near-misses are always reported according to company orders 
My suggestions about safety will be acted upon if I express them to management on shore 
I am encouraged by my seniors to report any unsafe conditions I may observe 
My suggestions about safety will be acted upon if I express them to senior officers on board 
Task assignments are always cross-checked and verified 
I am sure management will never compromise safety for profitability 
 
0.56 
0.50 
0.41 
0.41 
0.39 
0.36 
0.63 
0.43 
0.62 
0.44 
0.48 
 
0.72 
0.70 
0.62 
0.55 
0.54 
0.52 
0.52 
0.51 
0.45 
0.44 
0.42 
 
0.86
0.81
0.80
0.49
0.59
0.62
0.95
0.95
0.94
0.77
0.72
Job Satisfaction 8.1 % 
Morale in the company is good 
I am proud to work for this company 
This company practices the highest maintenance standards 
I am sure management will never compromise safety for profitability 
Task assignments are always cross-checked and verified 
More attention should be paid to sleep and sleeping possibilities on board 
 
0.61 
0.58 
0.56 
0.48 
0.44 
0.35 
 
0.72 
0.69 
0.67 
0.54 
0.46 
0.42 
 
0.83
0.69
0.42
0.08
0.93
0.27
Acknowledgement of Personal Limitation 6.6 % 
Even when fatigued, I perform effectively during critical times of operation 
I am less effective when stressed or fatigued 
I am more likely to make errors in an emergency 
My decision making ability is as good in emergencies as in routine conditions 
A truly professional crewmember can forget personal problems while on duty 
Crewmembers are well trained to cope with fatigue 
 
0.55 
0.51 
0.49 
0.49 
0.35 
0.49 
 
0.68 
-0.64 
-0.61 
0.53 
0.44 
0.44 
 
0.80
0.56
0.84
0.27
0.56
0.08
Communication 5.6/% 
Leaders make sure that relevant operational intentions and actions are understood 
Effective team coordination requires team to take into account the personali. of the others particip. 
A debriefing and critique of proced. and decisions after critical situ. is an important part of safety 
Socializing among the crew can help reduce stress 
 
0.50 
0.46 
0.45 
0.48 
 
0.67 
0.66 
0.65 
0.44 
 
0.99
0.87
0.96
0.96
Commitment 5.6% 
My suggestions about safety will be acted upon if I express them to senior officers on board 
My suggestions about safety will be acted upon if I express them to management on shore 
On board, open discussion is a common way of solving problems 
Asking for assistance makes one appear incompetent 
Socializing among the crew can help reduce stress 
 
0.62 
0.63 
0.39 
0.50 
0.48 
 
0.58 
0.53 
0.51 
-0.49 
0.45 
 
0.99
0.97
0.91
-0.80
-0.79
Work Integrity 5.5 % 
Drugs present a safety problem in my company 
Alcohol presents a safety problem in my company 
Leaders who encourage suggestions from crew members are weak 
 
0.73 
0.71 
0.42 
 
0.85 
0.83 
0.33 
 
0.97
0.99
0.95
Power and Dignity 5.2 % 
I am reluctant to disagree with my superiors 
I am ashamed when I make a mistake in front of other crewmembers 
Asking for assistance makes one appear incompetent 
A truly professional crewmember can forget personal problems while on duty 
Leaders who encourage suggestions from crew members are weak 
 
0.50 
0.50 
0.50 
0.35 
0.42 
 
0.69 
0.68 
0.43 
0.36 
0.35 
 
0.78
0.63
0.94
0.48
0.92
Co.: Communality,   Load: Factor load on rotated solution,    ρ: Correlation with standard chart 
93 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper describes a new general method for measuring the safety standard of an organization. 
It is assumed that a high safety standard is a result of systematic management and control.  The 
principal idea is therefore to focus on the systematic pattern of safety performance variables in 
the measurement calculations, which is in sharp contrast to common measuring techniques. The 
paper focuses on description of the principal idea and some examples for calculations. The most 
important finding is the methods’ efficiency in measuring the safety culture maturity of eight 
shipping companies. The method uses a database of nearly 3000 responses on the Ship 
Management Attitude Questionnaire (SMAQ) held by Risø National Laboratories. The analysis 
show that the maturity of the safety culture can describe about 50% of the variation in a accident 
performance indicator and more than 60% of the variation of a Port State Control performance 
indicator. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
The term substandard and blue chip 
organizations have become frequently 
used labels of companies being 
respectively very poor and extremely 
good in safety issues. It has also become 
common practice to conceptually 
distinguish between an organizations’ 
experienced safety performance and its 
safety standard, which focus on its 
resistance against accidents. This shift in 
focus is caused by a need for more 
efficient prevention of losses. The safety 
standard of an organization is commonly 
measured through rating schemes or 
similar methods. This paper describes a 
new general method for measuring the 
safety standard of an organization. It is 
assumed that a high safety standard is a 
result of systematic management and 
control. The principal idea is therefore to 
focus on the systematic pattern of safety 
performance variables in the 
measurement calculations. Focus on 
pattern is in sharp contrast to common 
measuring techniques like ranking 
scheme, regression analysis and factor 
scores, which all threat individual 
variables independent of each other. Even 
artificial neural networks, which is 
commonly used in pattern recognition, 
does not efficiently capture the 
dependency between pairs of variables 
(Soma & Kristiansen, 2001). However, 
most conceptual models used in safety 
management, accident investigation and 
human error and reliability analysis agree 
upon that there is a dependency between 
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some distal core safety factors and the 
performance variables commonly used in 
measuring techniques e.g. incidents, audit 
and inspection findings.  
Several authors have realized that we 
have serious measuring problems within 
safety management, safety research and 
safety analysis. The uncertainties 
involved in measuring safety 
performance.  There has been a shift 
towards more proactive methods 
attempting to measure safety standard of 
an organization Incident happens too rear 
within an organization to be a basis for 
common statistical inference. It is also 
realized that the statistics drawn from 
investigation reports are unreliable due to 
subjective interpretations and 
questionable scope (Pedrali et.al. 2002) 
(Wagenaar et.al.,1997) (Reason, 1987). 
Hence the importance of near miss 
reporting has been emphasized. The 
reporting frequency of near-misses is 
however too unreliable to form a basis for 
evaluation of performance (Scaaf et.al., 
1991). Expert judgment is assumed to 
have a large measuring potential, but has 
also been staggered due to lacking 
reliability (Skjong & Wenthworth,). We 
have diagnosed a number of accidents as 
being a result of poor safety culture. 
Therefore the importance of a mature 
safety culture is stressed. No technique 
has however yet been able to measure the 
maturity of an organizations’ safety 
culture (Cox &, Flin, 1998) (Sorensen, 
2002). We know that the majority of the 
accidents are caused by operator errors 
(Wagenaar & Groeneweg, 1987,). 
Quantitative analyses of human factors 
have probably stronger influence on 
safety through their ensuing discussions 
and disputes (Fragola, 2000) (Hollnagel, 
2000) than their quantitative results. 
Within maritime transport rating 
techniques has become popular for 
targeting and screening purposes. This 
reaction on accidents like Erika is 
unlikely to have any effect over longer 
periods as they only emphasize on the 
present general characteristics of 
substandard managers and not their 
essential safety management problems. 
We also know that the techniques fail to 
pinpoint catastrophe vessels such as 
Estonia and Exxon Valdez.  
Despite of the problems, the situation is 
not too pessimistic. The public focus on 
safety has forced more safety information 
to be generated, collected and made 
public available. Today safety inspection 
findings, accident history and ship 
characteristics are available on the 
Internet even for individual ships. When 
we still are unsatisfied with the applied 
quantitative safety measurements it might 
seem reasonable to take two steps back 
and critically consider the applied 
measuring techniques. It might bee that 
the problems are related to very essence 
of the used computations. 
2. PRINCIPAL IDEA 
Commonly used quantitative approaches 
apply a linear (Y=wi⋅xi) model for 
evaluation of the safety characteristic. 
These models treat the variables (xi) 
independent. In a rating scheme like 
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International Marine Safety Rating 
System (DNV, 1995) the weights (wi) 
may be estimated through approaches like 
statistical inference or expert judgment. 
By regression analysis the weights (w) 
are typically optimized on the basis of 
minimal least squared sum of the 
residuals. In factor analysis the scores on 
each factor is a weighted sum of 
responded values within each principal 
factor. Also neural networks apply 
independent calculations of the input (xi).  
The lack of consistency related to the 
independent evaluation of variables may 
be described through an example. The 
German magazine ADAC Motorwelt 
(ADAC, 1998-2001) performs an annual 
safety assessment of ro-ro passenger 
ferries sailing in European waters. This 
assessment is carried out through a six-
item rating scheme. Typical items are the 
quality of Safety Management (X1), the 
quality of the Emergency Equipment (X2) 
and the quality of the Fire Protection 
system (X3). Imagine two ships A and B 
with the following scores. Ship A is 
judged to have an extremely poor quality 
of safety management, but has extremely 
good quality of the emergency 
equipment. Ship B on the contrary, is 
judged to have extremely good safety 
management, but defective emergency 
equipment. Both ships have a satisfying 
fire protection. What is then the likely 
safety standard of these two ships? Lay 
people might consider the three items to 
have equal importance (w1=w2=w3), 
whereas more experienced safety analysts 
may consider safety management to have 
higher importance (w1>w2,,w1>w3). Both 
evaluations however, miss the crucial fact 
that neither of the ships demonstrates 
control of safety management. Because 
the efficiency of the Emergency 
Equipment is highly dependent of the 
quality of the Safety Management is 
might seem unreasonable to assess these 
factors independently. Despite ship B is 
judged to have extremely good Safety 
Management the contradicting scores for 
Emergency Equipment is not reflected in 
the obtained for safety management. 
Another example can be drawn from 
the world fleet accident statistics. A 
scatter diagram of the world fleets loss 
ratio due to collisions versus wreckings is 
showed in Figure 1 (Lloyd's Register of 
Shipping, 1970 to 1993). Letting each 
year from 1939 to 1996 (excluding 2. 
World War figures) be one point in a 
scatter diagram, the relation between the 
two loss categories can be computed. The 
diagram shows that there were no linear 
relationships between these events prior 
to 1971. In the 1970s, after about 20 years 
of existence, the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) started to 
demonstrate some regulative power. 
Among other achievement it developed a 
set of traffic regulations for prevention of 
collisions named COLREG. It is evident 
that the accident rates decreased after 
implementation. However, most 
importantly, the dependency between 
these two incidents raised from zero to 
very high (0.90). Navigation has 
traditionally been very focused on 
keeping control of the ships’ position 
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relative to land.  The new regulations may 
have reduced this bias in focus, causing 
the same mechanisms to influence on 
these two aspects of navigational control. 
Figure 1: Scatter diagram of the world fleet loss 
ratio due to Collision and Wrecking (Grounding, 
Stranding and Contact) before, during and after 
COLREG 72 implementation 
 
This example indicates that there are two 
ways of measuring improvements in risk 
control. The common technique uses 
independent absolute values, while the 
dependency between the values may 
provide additional knowledge, namely 
that they are controlled by a joint core 
factor. In order to develop a measuring 
technique that also evaluates the 
dependency between the variables a 
deeper understanding of organizational 
safety is necessary. 
3. CONCEPTUAL BASIS 
Reason (1997) presents a framework for 
understanding organizational accidents. 
His models have one important similarity 
with the large majority of models used 
within safety management, accident 
investigation and human error and 
reliability analysis. This common 
characteristic is the dependency between 
the incident chain of events, and a more 
basic element of the organizational 
system. A survey of more than 30 
conceptual models (Soma, to be 
published a) shows that the root casual 
factors in these models are either 
Organizational Factors or Culture, 
External or Social Environment, Lack of 
Control, Upper Management, Working 
Conditions, Statements of Goals and 
Objectives etc. The variation in the 
definition of these Core Safety Factors 
(CSF) may be related to the specific 
purpose of the various models. However, 
the consensus of the idea that there is one, 
or at least a few, CSFs that influence or 
determines the safety performance of the 
lower level of the organization is 
interesting in itself. If this understanding 
of organizational safety is correct, these 
CFSs should influence the lower level of 
the organization and even the unsafe acts 
(Figure 2). Despite the dependency of the 
CFSs seems to be accepted by most 
professional domains involved in safety 
management, research and analysis it is 
not reflected in the commonly applied 
measuring techniques. 
Figure 2: Conceptual model for safety influence 
 
According to the graph outlined in figure 
2 the organizations’ CSFs influence the 
Incidents
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safety variables used in measuring 
techniques. In principle an organization 
having a high safety standard should have 
strong dependencies between the CSFs 
and the variables. Strong dependencies 
are therefore an indication of control. On 
the contrary, if the organization is sub-
standard the CSFs are weak. Therefore is 
the safety level of substandard shipping 
organizations more dependent of other 
governing ship characteristics like its age, 
type or size and external factors like 
classification society or flag of 
registration. 
4. QUANTIFICATION OF SCORES  
When developing a measurement tool for 
safety standard it is extremely important 
to have some basic understanding of 
measurement theory. This chapter 
describes general measuring principles 
used in item analysis and neural 
networks. The two last sections describe 
how the new methods’ relationship to this 
theory.  
THEORY OF MEASUREMENT  
Successful questionnaires or rating 
schemes can be developed through 
selection of suitable items, variables and 
scales. For inspections the formal 
requirements are the basis for selection of 
items, variables and questions while the 
scales are typically dichotomous 
(compliance or not). In an analysis each 
questionnaire response, inspection result 
or audit finding is considered as a case 
(Table 1).   
 
 
Table 1: Examples of cases, variables and values 
In order to optimize the set of selected 
items, variables and values it is common 
to carry out an item and discrimination 
analysis (Anastasi & Urbina, 1997). In 
this way the most suitable items can be 
selected and their scales can be optimized 
for the measuring purpose. Artificial 
neural networks also use this, although 
this process is automatically learned 
through network training. Both in item 
analysis and in neural network sigmoid 
functions (I and II in Figure 3) are 
considered to be powerful for this 
purpose. These continuous functions 
effectively divide the low from the high 
(passing) values. The most effective way 
to measure the performance through a test 
is to select items that only 50% of the 
respondents pass. However, if we want to 
disguise the very few best or the very few 
worst from the group other functions may 
be effective. The convex and concave 
exponential functions (III and IV) are for 
instance used to distinguish the few worst 
and the few very best respectively. After 
collection of data a measurement tool has 
to be validated to confirm it measures 
what it is supposed to do. Also the 
Cases Measurement variable Scale 
Core Safety 
Factor 
Different 
time series 
Safety 
inspections 
Complianc
e or not 
Compliance to 
requirements 
Different 
respondents 
Questionnaire 
items/ 
variables 
Degree of 
agreement Safety culture 
Different 
time series 
Audit 
findings 
Practice 
according 
to plans 
Safety 
practice / 
plans 
System 
availability 
Operates 
or not 
Maintenance 
management Different 
years Incidents Happens or not 
Safety 
management 
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reliability has to be considered in order to 
assess the how accurate the tool is.  
Figure 3: Examples of Item discrimination 
functions 
 
There are several ways to quantify 
indicators of the safety standard of an 
organization. The number of deficiencies 
of a safety inspection, the number of non-
conformities identified through a safety 
audit or the number of fulfilled items of a 
check-list are some examples. In contrast 
to incidents these indicators are a result of 
a more or less formalized test with a 
specific and often restricted purpose. 
Therefore, the obtained correlation 
coefficients from such data also include 
the reliability and the different scope of 
these approaches. The correlation 
coefficients should therefore be 
interpreted with care.  
Two indicators are used to validate the 
results of this study (Soma, in review). 
One indicator is based on severe 
accidents collected in a Lloyds Register 
database. The other is based on Port State 
Control findings collected in Paris 
MOU’s database and the Equasis 
database. The PSC regime is a measure to 
counteract the relaxed attitude towards 
fulfillment of international regulations of 
some flag states. Both indicators provides 
the likelihood of a ships’ safety standard 
to be among the 25% highest quality, the 
50% average standard or the 25% most 
substandard vessels of the world fleet. 
These figures are combined into a single 
safety performance measure Pd. Pd has 
values from –100 to 100 where 100 
reflects a probability of one for being 
among the 25% highest standard vessels 
and vice versa.  
LINEAR DEPENDENCIES  
In theory dependencies can take many 
forms. Linear dependencies are 
considered most feasible when describing 
the dependency between variables and the 
computation is straightforward. The 
measuring method outlined in this paper 
uses a two-stage dependency calculation. 
The first stage is to calculate the 
organization’s pattern of dependencies 
between variables. This is the first level 
in Figure 2. This pattern of dependency 
has certain linear characteristics to 
variables of similar scope and similar 
influence from the CSFs. The next stage 
is to assess the safety effects of this 
dependency pattern. Therefore the 
similarity between the organizations’ 
dependency pattern and a pre-established 
norm pattern is calculated. This norm 
pattern reflects how efficient CSFs should 
influence on safety variables. This 
similarity is also expressed through a 
linear model. The dependency to safety 
performance may however be non-linear. 
The correlation coefficient expresses 
the degree of linear correspondence, or 
relationship between the values of two 
variables. Because the correlation 
coefficient varies from –1 to 1, it can be 
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used to compare the strength of the linear 
relationship between the variables. Two 
variables with a correlation of either –1.0 
or +1.0 are highly correlated because 
knowledge of one variable provides 
precise knowledge of the other. 
Independent variables have a correlation 
of zero. There are several ways to 
calculate the correlation. The two most 
common types are the Pearson’s 
correlation, ρP, for variables having 
values on an interval or ratio scale and 
Spearman’s correlation, ρS, for ordinal 
value. The correlation coefficients are 
defined as: 
 
 
 
Where :  
σxy = Covariance of the variables x and y 
σx,   = Standard deviation of the variables x 
  and y respectively 
n = Number of data points  
d =Difference between the most     
discriminating ranking of the variables 
when each have a sum of n(n+1)/2 
 
An example of the estimated linear 
dependencies between safety variables for 
a large tanker company is outlined in 
table 2. The cases are taken from different 
ship management departments and years. 
The accident history and port state control 
findings for this specific company 
indicates that its fleet is among the worlds 
25% highest safety standard.  
  Table 2 is an example of the dependency 
pattern developed through the first stage 
of the measuring technique (level 1 in 
Figure 2). The table shows that the 
incidents related to operational aspects 
(LTI and oil pollution) are dependent of 
the number of audit non-conformities. 
The incidents related to more technical 
aspects (Process availability) are more 
dependent of the number of inspection 
findings. The norm pattern, which could 
be used to assess if this organization is a 
good safety performer or not, is however 
not yet developed (Level 2 in Figure 2). 
The similarity or correlation between a 
norm pattern would provide estimates of 
the companies’ absolute safety standard.  
This second stage is later carried out for 
incident patterns and safety culture 
survey results. More detailed assessments 
of the individual dependencies are 
however considered first. The objective is 
                  INCIDENTS                  INSPECTIONS       SAFETY AUDIT 
Oil 
Pollution 
Property 
loss freq.
Process 
availab. 
Vetting PSC 
In 
house
External Internal 
LTIF -0.30 0.22 0.30 -0.04 -0.01 -0.69 0.88 0.94 
Oil pollution incident  0.01 -0.37 0.48 0.01 -0.07 -0.75 -0.78 
Property loss frequ.   0.04 0.55 0.21 -0.38 0.17 0.31 
Process availability    -0.68 -0.64 -0.26 -0.02 0.11 
Vetting     0.75 0.61 -0.12 0.22 
PSC      0.30 -0.01 0.04 
External Audit        0.97 
Table 2: Example of dependencies between variables 
100 
now to start the next dependency level. In 
such an analysis knowledge of how the 
dependencies are for high standard and 
sub-standard organizations has to be 
developed.  
 
5. INCIDENT CORRELATIONS  
Within the ship management as for 
aviation and train transport, offshore and 
land based industry there is today 
regulative requirements for continuous 
safety improvement activities. A 
stochastic process governs the occurrence 
of incidents. It is for instance common to 
describe the occurrence of accidents 
through a Poisson process. A Poisson 
process can be described as a counting 
process where the occurrence accidents is 
dependent of an accident rate, λ, and a 
time window.  Within an organization 
there are several stochastic processes that 
may be of relevance for the safety. A 
graph demonstrating the relationships 
between two incident processes, namely 
Lost Time Incidents and Process 
disturbance incidents is shown in Figure 
4. The first 63 weeks the safety 
management is only involved in reducing 
the lost time incidents. Consequently, the 
process disturbances are independent of 
the CFSs and also independent of the LTI 
-rate. However, because the organization 
has no control over process incidents it is 
not having a satisfactory safety 
management.  
  After 63 weeks, however, the safety 
management’s scope is increased and a 
risk control measure is implemented to 
also handle the process disturbances. 
From this stage both risks are under 
improvement. This results in higher 
correlation between the time series. After 
a period the process disturbance rate has 
been reduced considerable and they 
experience weeks with no events of either 
kind. The correlation is now reduced 
again because the time window is too 
small relative to the event rate (λ⋅t < 3).  
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Figure 4: Principles of incident correlations 
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Hence both the uncontrolled and 
controlled states have low correlation. 
A relatively new discriminating function 
used in neural network analysis is the 
bell-shaped function (V in figure 2). 
When applying a bell-shaped function 
only the average pass the item. On a 
single item this may seem ridiculous 
because it do not distinguish the best 
from the worst. However, in combination 
with other items, it is possible to 
distinguish between the three groups 
instead of two. Experience in neural 
networks show that this is more effective 
because fewer neurons (items) are 
required. From figure 3 it can be seen that 
the correlation between incidents have a 
similar nature. Both the most substandard 
and the highest standard level have in fact 
correlation coefficient of zero (see table 
3).  
 
Table 3: Logics of σP in figure 4 
Low: at least one uncontrolled OR at least one 
controlled 
Moderate: one under perfection AND one under 
improvement 
High: both under improvement 
 
6. INCIDENT CORRELATIONS REASONING 
The incident statistics for the fleets of 
twelve different flags of registration is 
presented to describe the measuring 
principle.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 Incident dependencies. 
 
σS LOGICS 
Low     Dissimilar regulative pattern 
Moderate   Some similarities in regulative pattern 
High     Similar regulative patterns 
 
The numbers is the average correlation 
between the time series from 1970 to 
1996 for the flags ratio of losses due to 
collision, foundering, wrecking and fire. 
A high correlation indicates that both 
flags are under improvement (figure 4). A 
low correlation is as shown earlier an 
indication of at least one is uncontrolled 
or both controlled. In order to perform a 
complete evaluation the flags have to be 
discriminated. For this purpose the 
correlation between the accepted safety 
resolutions adopted by the IMO is used. 
High values indicate that the pair of flags 
has accepted a similar pattern of 
resolutions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Cs Gr Ja Li Ne No Pa SK Uk US De Sp
Cyprus 0,6 0,6 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,4 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,3 0,3
Greece 0,6 0,5 0,5 0,3 0,2 0,4 0,4 0,6 0,4 0,2 0,5
Japan 0,6 0,5 0,5 0,6 0,4 0,5 0,4 0,4 0,5 0,5 0,5
Liberia 0,3 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,3 0,3 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,3 0,7
Netherl. 0,4 0,3 0,6 0,5 0,6 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,6 0,7 0,4
Norway 0,5 0,2 0,4 0,3 0,6  0,2 0,2 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,2
Panama 0,4 0,4 0,5 0,3 0,3 0,2  0,5 0,4 0,4 0,3 0,4
S. Korea 0,3 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,3 0,2 0,5  0,3 0,5 0,3 0,4
UK 0,4 0,6 0,4 0,4 0,3 0,4 0,4 0,3  0,6 0,4 0,3
USA 0,5 0,4 0,5 0,4 0,6 0,5 0,4 0,5 0,6  0,5 0,4
Denmark 0,3 0,2 0,5 0,3 0,7 0,6 0,3 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,4
Spain 0,3 0,5 0,5 0,7 0,4 0,2 0,4 0,4 0,3 0,4 0,4
 Average 0,4 0,4 0,5 0,4 0,5 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,5 0,4 0,4
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Table 5 Regulative dependencies. 
 
σP LOGICS 
Negative:  Low  σP  - High σs ,  
  AND Low σP  - High σs 
Positive  High  σP  - High σs ,  
 AND Low σP  - Low σs 
 
The complete ranking of the flags is then 
the correlation between the patterns of the 
two matrixes (table 6). This value is a 
measure of the flags’ safety performance. 
Negative values indicate that the flags 
having similar regulative pattern has low 
incident correlations and those with 
moderate or high incident correlations 
have dissimilar regulative patterns. 
According to the logical tables this 
indicate a flag within a Perfecting or 
Controlling phase (Figure 4). Similar 
argumentation can be used to identify 
those having positive values as being 
under Improvement. The estimated 
performance measurements are in 
correspondence with other performance 
measures. The correlation with the Flag 
State Conformity Index (FLASCI) Score 
(Alderton, 2001) is 0.82 and the 
correlation with the flags total loss ratio 
for 1998-2001 is 0.61. 
 
Table 6: Correlation between dependency patterns 
Cyprus:  0.67 
Greece:  -0.04 
Japan:  0.27 
Liberia:  0.29 
Netherlands: -0.45 
Norway: -0.29 
Panama:  0.21 
South Korea: 0.19 
United Kingdom: -0.15 
United States  -0.56 
Denmark -0.21 
Spain:  0.33 
 
7. ANALYSIS OF CSF INFLUENCE 
The dependency between the CSFs and 
the safety level illustrated in figure 2 
could be assessed through another 
approach. As already described a 
substandard organization is assumed to 
have weak CSFs. Therefore the safety 
performance are dependent of other 
factors, like the age of the ship. In order 
to assess this hypothesis a sample of 1700 
ships selected randomly from the fleet 
having class society within the 
International Association of 
Classification Societies (IACS) covering 
more than 90% of the world tonnage. 
These ships were assessed according to 
their PSC findings. The correlation 
between the PSC indicator and various 
measurable characteristics of the ship is 
estimated.  
 
 
 
 
 
 Cs Gr Ja Li Ne No Pa SK Uk US De Sp
Cyprus 0,6 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,3 0,4 0,4 0,3
Greece 0,6  0,3 0,3 0,4 0,4 0,6 0,5 0,2 0,5 0,4 0,3
Japan 0,5 0,3  0,4 0,5 0,4 0,6 0,3 0,2 0,2 0,4 0,3
Liberia 0,5 0,3 0,4  0,3 0,4 0,4 0,3 0,2 0,3 0,2 0,5
Netherl. 0,5 0,4 0,5 0,3  0,2 0,5 0,2 0,3 0,1 0,1 0,2
Norway 0,5 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,2  0,4 0,4 0,0 0,4 0,4 0,4
Panama 0,5 0,6 0,6 0,4 0,5 0,4  0,3 0,2 0,4 0,4 0,4
S. Korea 0,5 0,5 0,3 0,3 0,2 0,4 0,3  0,5 0,5 0,2 0,4
UK 0,3 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,3 0,0 0,2 0,5  0,1 0,0 0,1
USA 0,4 0,5 0,2 0,3 0,1 0,4 0,4 0,5 0,1  0,3 0,3
Denmark 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,2 0,1 0,4 0,4 0,2 0,0 0,3  0,1
Spain 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,5 0,2 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,1 0,3 0,1  
 Average 0,5 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,3 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,2 0,3 0,3 0,3
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Table 6: Correlation between ship characteristics 
and PSC performance (Soma, to be published b) 
PSC Performance 
 25% 
best  
N=426 
50% 
average 
N=799 
25% worst 
N= 462 
Gross Tonnage -0.01 0.20 0.16 
Ship type 0.02 0.01 -0.04 
Age of ship 0.03 -0.21 -0.17 
Flag -0.04 0.05 0.09 
Classification Society -0.05 0.04 0.06 
P&I 0.00 0.05 0.06 
External membership -0.06 0.06 0.07 
Sum of abs. values 0.21 0.62 0.64 
 
Table 6 shows that there is a significant 
reduction in correlation for the most 
quality operators. Especially the 
correlations between the PSC indicator 
and age and ship size are significantly 
lower for the 25% best. Also the 
correlation between the indicator and the 
selected flag and Protection and 
Indemnity Insurer is lower for the most 
quality vessels. This means that factors 
like the ships age, flag and size may be 
suitable indicators for identification of the 
most substandard, but that these factors 
have little potential for identification of 
the best ships. More precisely, the 
commonly used age factor is statistical 
significant because it is relevant for 75% 
of the fleet (average and substandard). To 
asses whether the correlations described 
in table 6 also can be an indicator for 
individual companies seven organizations 
are selected for assessment. The sum of 
the absolute correlation values for the 
companies and their PSC indicator score 
are presented in figure 5. The scatter plot 
indicates that the dependency between the 
ship characteristics and the PSC indicator 
may be a suitable indicator for estimating 
the companies CSF quality. 
Figure 5: Relationship between the sum of 
absolute correlation values and the PSC indicator.  
8. SAFETY CULTURE PATTERNS  
There is a range of definitions of safety 
culture (Cox &, Flin, 1998) (Sorensen, 
2002). Their common characteristic is the 
involvement of a system or pattern of 
believes, values, symbols, attitudes, etc. 
that influence the way the members of the 
culture act and work with safety. The 
common attempt to measure safety 
culture is to perform a questionnaire 
survey. The responses are analyzed in a 
factor analysis to group correlated items 
into groups called factors, dimensions or 
principal components. If the analysis 
includes several groups, ships, 
departments or companies the score on 
each factor describes the cultural 
variation between these groups. Several 
authors (Zohar, 1980) (Itoh &, 
Andersen,1999) have attempted to 
quantify the relationship to the companies 
safety level but only with marginal 
success managed to quantify such factors 
(Cox &, Flin, 1998) (Sorensen, 2002). 
The trend in fighting this problem seems 
to be towards combining factors and 
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conceptual models (Cooper, 2002) 
(Alistair & Cox & Amparo & Tomas, 
1998). All these attempts seem to ignore 
the fact that safety culture only includes 
the common patterns of safety attitudes in 
contrast to individual safety attitudes 
independent of the others. In the majority 
of the approaches the scores of each 
factor are added together as a weighted 
sum. Hence, in principle, adding more 
individuals who give positive responses 
to the questionnaire items improves the 
score independent of the cultural 
influence. When using a questionnaire 
survey to measure safety culture we 
assume that the cultural pattern can be 
reflected into the way the respondents 
answer it.  
 
σP LOGICS 
Low:  non-common perception of at least one 
variable  
          OR independent variables  
          OR neutral responses to at least one vari. 
Moderate:  dependent variables AND portions of 
common perceptions  
High : common perception of the variables AND 
dependent variables 
 
 
                                     
 
Safety training is important              √                 
 
At the most basic level the pattern can be 
represented by the correlation between 
the variables in the questionnaire as a 
level 1 in figure 2. There is established 
some experience that makes us able to 
interpret the obtained correlation 
coefficients. Zohar (1980) has proved that 
high safety level imply that the 
respondents answer higher level of 
agreement on safety related questions 
compared to organizations having lower 
safety level. In a measuring context this is 
advantageous because values far from the 
average increase the vale of the 
correlations coefficient. It should be 
remembered that it is common to design 
both positive and negative questions. The 
item describe above is therefore followed 
up by a negatively stated question e.g.  
Training is not very important. Therefore, 
according to Zohars’s findings 
organizations having high safety standard 
should obtain higher correlations between 
dependent variables.  
A recent study on safety attitudes of 
four shipping companies having the same 
national culture has found that the 
organizations having lower safety 
performance not only give responses of 
lower absolute values but answer in a 
more neutral manner (Soma, to be 
published c). Hence, in principle when 
asked if safety training is important the 
respondents of a sub-standard 
organization may not only answer lower 
agreement but has also a tendency to be 
more neutral. A high portion of natural 
responses causes the correlation 
coefficient to be low because the 
difference between the individual scores 
and the average value is small. 
The correlation matrix alone does 
however not represent a measurement 
value because there is not any norm to 
measure it against (Level 2 figure 2). 
Therefore a norm is developed based on 
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inter-organizational correlation of the 
correlation matrix. This norm represents 
to which degree the pattern of attitudes 
towards safety issues correlates with 
other organizations. Some might disagree 
with this norm because they believe that 
there are several patterns describing a 
mature safety culture. That might be 
theoretically true, but experience show 
that the patterns drawn from the 
questionnaire surveys of blueprint 
organizations are similar for all domains. 
Safety commitment is for instance 
measured to be a significant factor within 
aviation, railway, nuclear- process- and 
offshore industry, medical institutions, 
and also within the maritime domain. 
Similarly are factors like communication, 
training etc. general factors. It would be 
methodological impossible to identify 
these in several companies, nor domains, 
if the correlation matrixes of the various 
companies or domains were different.  
To quantify the suitability of the 
technique the dependency between 39 
SMAQ variables were expressed by their 
correlation matrix. The obtained scores 
are expressed by the average correlation 
between the matrixes as shown on the 
abscissa of Figure 6 and 8. The critical 
95% confidence level of the correlation 
coefficient is 0.316. The ordinal values of 
figure 6 and figure 7 are the accident and 
PSC indicator respectively. As indicated 
in Figure 6, the safety culture indicator 
can explain 53% of the variance in the 
accident statistic indicator. The Pearson 
correlation between the two measures is 
0.73. Figure 7 shows that the dependency 
between the PSC indicator and the safety 
culture indicator is even higher. The 
inter-organizational safety culture score 
can explain 65% of the variance in the 
PSC indicator. The Pearson correlation is 
significantly 0.81. The sensitivity of 
national cultures is also calculated. The 
standard deviation of the score due to 
national variation was estimated to be 
0.04 and insignificant variations with a 
95% level confidence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Estimated linear dependency between 
accident statistics indicator and safety culture 
indicator. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Estimated linear dependency between 
PSC indicator and safety culture indicator.  
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9. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS  
This study has presented and validated a 
new general safety measuring principle. 
In contrast to existing techniques, which 
threat the variables independently, the 
new approach focus on the pattern of 
dependencies between variables. In 
addition to valid quantifications, it is 
stressed that the method is more in line 
with the conceptual understanding of 
organizational safety as well as 
definitions of safety culture.  
It is believed that this method can be 
used as an alternative to existing safety 
standard measuring techniques. It is 
especially fit for measuring safety culture 
maturity and aspects of safety 
management within organizations. 
 
REFERENCES 
ADAC, 1998 to 2001, ADAC Motorwelt, no. 6 (each year), 
B2706E, München 
Alderton, 2001, T., Winchester, N., Flag state conformance; a 
comparative global analysis, Globalisierung und seefahrt 
conference, University of Bremen, June 
Alistair, C., Cox, S., Amparo, O., Tomas, J.M., 1998, 
Modelling safety climate in the prediction of levels of 
safety activity, Work and stress, vol. 12, no. 3 
Anastasi, A., Urbina, S., 1997, Psychological Testing, Prentice 
Hall, New Jersey 
Cooper, D.,2002,  Safety Culture; A model for understanding 
& quantifying a difficult concept, Professional safety, 
June, 2002 
Cox, S., Flin, R., 1998, Safety culture: philosopher’s stone or 
man of straw?, Work and stress, vol. 12, no. 3 
DNV, 1995, International Marine Safety Rating System 
Working copy, International loss control institute, Atlanta, 
1995 
Itoh, K., Andersen, H., 1999, Motivation and Morale of Night 
Train Drivers Correlated with Accident Rates, CAES’ 99: 
International Conference on Computer –Aided 
Ergonomics and Safety, Barcelona, Spain 
Fragola, J., 2000, Focus, Strengths, and Weaknesses of HRA, 
Risk Management and human reliability in Social Context, 
18th ESReDA seminar, Sweden 
Hollnagel, E., 2000, On understanding risks: Is human 
reliability a red herring?, Risk Management and human 
reliability in Social Context, 18th ESReDA seminar, 
Sweden 
Lloyd's Register of Shipping, 1970 to 1993, Casualty Return, 
annual summary, London 
Pedrali, M., Andersen, B.H., Trucco, P., 2002, Are Maritime 
Accident Causation Taxonomies Reliable? An 
experimental study of the Human Factors classification of 
the IMO, MAIB and CASMET Systems, RINA conference 
Reason. J., 1987, Too little and too late: a Commentary on 
accident and incident reporting system, Department on 
Psychology, University of Manchester, UK 
Reason, J., 1997, Managing the Risk of Organisational 
Accidents, Ashgate, Hampshire, England 
Scaaf, I.W., Lucas, D.A., Hale, A.R. (eds), 1991, Near miss 
Reporting as a Safety Tool, Butterworth-Heinemann, 
Oxford 
Skjong, R., Wenthworth, B., Expert judgment and risk 
perception,  
Soma, T., Kristiansen, S., 2002, Safety assessment of ship 
operators – a neural network approach, Maritime 
Transport Conference, Barcelona 
Soma, in review, Ship safety standard classification based on 
accident history and port state control findings, 
Engineering reliability and safety science, Elsevier 
Science 
Soma, to be published a, working title: Modelling the safety 
performance of maritime operations– aggregation of 
symbolic knowledge 
Soma, to be published b, working title: Safety assessment 
through artificial neural networks integrated with 
symbolic knowledge  
Soma, to be published c, working title: The relationship 
between safety cultural factors and the safety standard of 
maritime operators 
Sorensen, J.N., 2002, Safety culture: a survey of the state of 
the art, article in press for Reliability Engineering and 
system safety, Elsevier Science Ltd., 2002 
 Wagenaar., W. and Groeneweg, J., 1987,  Accident at sea : 
Multiple Causes and Impossible Consequences, Int. 
Journal Man-Machine Studies, 1987 
Wagenaar., W. and Schrier, J., 1997, Accident analysis – The 
goal and How to get there, Safety Science, No. ½ 
Zohar, 1980, D., Safety Climate in Industrial Organisations: 
Theoretical and Applied Implications, Journal of Applied 
Psychology, Vol. 65, No.1, pp 96-102 
 
 
 
107 
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Abstract 
 
Although definitions of safety culture diverse considerably, it is a general agreement upon 
that it involves a shared pattern of attitudes, values and beliefs. There are however various ways 
to interpret what a patterns actually is. It is common to analyse safety culture based on 
considerations around isolated factors or principal components. Pattern does however also 
involve relationships between isolated factors, and the trend is to draw attention towards the 
common drivers of the culture. In this perspective, the target has shifted from observable 
behaviour towards the underlying pattern of core values. These advances require new analytical 
approaches. This study relaxes the analytical assumptions inherited from the analysis of safety 
climate, to develop and validates two techniques that target the advanced understanding of 
safety culture. The input for the maturity measurement was responses on the Ship Management 
Attitude Questionnaire (SMAQ). The results demonstrate that items related to normative 
behaviour were more explicitly descried by the underlying cultural pattern of organisations 
having an average safety standard. Such behaviour involves uncritical compliance to 
procedures, emphasis on hierarchal levels and disregarding of individual qualities. The 
companies having a high safety standard distinguished themselves on an underlying pattern that 
emphasised on handling of extraordinary situations, job satisfaction and commitment. These 
situations involve fatigue, emergencies and communication about errors and worries.  
 
Keywords: Safety culture maturity, analysis of patterns 
 
 
1. EXPLORING QUALITY OF SAFETY CULTURE IN SHIPPING 
The concept of safety culture commenced at the early and middle 1980s based on the 
insight into numerous disasters. A range of modern high-risk systems had during the 
late 1970s and early 1980s been put under more commercialized management which 
resulted in restricted resources and a high production pressure. Nuclear power plant 
accidents such as Three Mile Island (Kemeny, 1979) and Chernobyl (IAEA,1986) were 
investigated in detail. The Piper Alpha accident in 1989 was one of its time most well 
documented accidents (Cullen, 1990; Pat’e Cornell, 1993). Also other accidents on 
offshore installations pinpointed organisational features, such as the Bravo blowout in 
1977 (NOU, 1977). Within space shuttling the Challenger accident in 1986 (Vaughan, 
1996) was the worst of its kind, also being extensively investigated. The negative effect 
of the governing management ideology could also be found in more traditional domains 
such as shipping and rail e.g. the Clapham crash in 1988 (Hidden, 1989) and the King’s 
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Cross accident (Fennel, 1988). Examples from shipping are the capsizing of Herald of 
Free Enterprise in 1987 (Sheen, 1987) and the Scandinavian Star accident in 1990 
(NOU, 1991). The insight into this extensive series of accidents revealed that the 
availability of resources was unsatisfactory and that the organisations had been under 
serious commercial pressure manifested through cost saving, downsizing, outsourcing, 
contracting and reorganisation. Another characteristic was that the management and 
employees of these organisations had inadequate attitudes, beliefs, priorities and values 
related to safety issues. This latest feature was singled out as a separate concept called 
safety culture.  
A range of professional milieus within several domains acknowledged the 
importance of safety culture. Over time however, some difficulties have surfaced. First 
of all it is difficult to fully understand what safety culture really is. Different domains 
and professional milieus developed conflicting definitions of safety culture. Secondly, 
its distinction to the concept of safety climate is neither explicit nor fully accepted. 
These characters have led several to consider safety culture as a “catch-all” concept. 
The stressed importance of safety culture was also in conflict with more practical issues. 
If safety culture really is important it should be relatively easy to measure how good or 
how mature the safety culture of a specific organisation is. Regardless of this assumed 
high importance, the measuring practice has almost remained unchanged. Pioneer 
studies on organizational safety climate from the early 1980s (Zohar,1980) roughly 
match today’s best practice on measuring safety culture. This stagnation would be 
acceptable if the approach had demonstrated successful results. That is however not the 
case (Hale, 2000; Cox, Flin, 1998; Sorensen, 2002). It seems to be no measurements 
that confirm the assumed importance of safety culture. The obstacle for a breakthrough 
may be related to empirical difficulties. It is difficult to directly compare the cultures of 
different organisations. The characteristics of one safety culture may both be a 
reflection of its given environment and obtained experiences. Because the effect from 
differences in environment is unknown, it is difficult to assess the safety cultures’ 
isolated influence on safety performance.  
Shipping might however be an almost ideal field for experiments into safety 
culture maturity due to two reasons. The primary reason is the uniformity of the 
organizations’ environment. Even thought there are few fully identical ships, they are all 
relatively similar. The operation of different ship is also conducted in similar ways. The 
avoidance of water ingress, safeguarding of stability and manoeuvrability has to be 
ensured through proper maintenance, loading and navigation. The norms for technical 
standard is relatively uniform due to international new-building requirements and 
inspections throughout the ships’ lifetime. The required competence of the crew is equal 
for all ships. This uniformity is provided through certificates and international schools. 
Even the safety management systems have identical functional requirements. There also 
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exists common requirements for how and how often drills are to be performed and what 
kind of emergency equipment that should be available. All Individual ships are insured 
in clubs having uniform rules and being mutually liable for compensations.  
The second reason is related to empirical aspects. Within shipping there is a 
large variation in safety standard. Unlike domains like aviation, nuclear-, offshore- and 
chemical industries, where the variation in safety level seems to be relatively small 
between organisations, the variation in safety standard between shipping companies is 
large. The difference in accident rate is estimated to be about 1 to 7 for the 25% safest 
ships relative to the 25% most sub-standard ships (Soma, to be published 1). This 
significant variation justifies assumptions of large variations in safety culture maturity. 
Worldwide it is registered more than 90,000 vessels. At least one half of these ships are 
in commercial trade operated by about 10,000 companies. It is typical that each ship has 
more than 10 crewmembers, making them suitable for questionnaire surveys. The last 
and experimentally favourable characteristic is the availability of safety performance 
data. Safety inspection findings and accident statistics on both ship and company level 
is collected and stored by independent bodies and are available on the Internet.  
 
2. SCOPE OF STUDY  
Several authors have attempted to develop frameworks that describe the quality of 
safety culture. There are certain principles that govern the development of such 
measurements or tests. First, the scope of the test has to be defined according to the 
measuring purpose and relevant definitions. Then, an item analysis is performed in 
order to select the most suitable questionnaire items. Thirdly, the responses of the test 
have to be analysed in order to develop scores. At last the reliability and validity of the 
test has to be assessed. During a study exploring various measuring principles it was 
found that average scores on principal components neither is consistent with the 
definitions of safety culture nor provide reasonable scores (Soma, to be published 2). It 
was however found that the content of the principal components and the dependencies 
within and between components could form a more valid measuring basis. The 
objective in this study is therefore to explore this in more detail. Even though aspects of 
all four principles of the described process are addressed, emphasis is assigned to the 
measuring principles.  
The developed techniques attempt to specifically address the central aspects of 
definitions and state-of-the art knowledge. However, in order to validate the principles 
nine shipping companies are first ranked according to their safety standard. 
Subsequently the techniques are allowed to explain the variations in safety standard 
based on their responses on attitude questionnaires. The estimated safety standard is 
based on two scoring techniques that are respectively based on accident statistics and 
safety inspection findings (Soma, to be published b). Both techniques quantifies the 
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likelihood of the companies’ fleets being among the 25% safest ships of the world fleet, 
the 25% most hazardous ships or the 50% average. Because the ranking of the 
companies are based on two sources of data it is considered to be reasonably reliable. 
The safety culture characteristics are based on more than 2200 respondents of the 
acknowledged Ship Management Attitude Questionnaire (SMAQ). The study also 
address questions related to weather it is possible to directly compare the cultures of one 
shipping company with another.  
 
3. THE CONCEPT OF SAFETY CULTURE 
Schein (1990) defines culture as “…a pattern of basic assumptions, invented, discovered 
or developed by a given group, as it learns to cope with its problems of external 
adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered 
valid…”. This definition is to cover a range of cultural forms such as national-, 
organisational-, professional and safety culture. There are, however, several conflicting 
perspectives of safety culture in published literature. The functionalist perspective focus 
on targeted safety ambitions (Glendon and Stanton, 2000). This is an all-or-nothing 
approach, indicating that an organisation either has a safety culture or not. In this 
perspective safety culture is an ideal to which organisations should aspire. The 
interpretive perspective does on the other hand consider all organisations to have their 
particular variant of safety culture. This perspective considers the safety culture to be a 
shared pattern of meanings that have emerged through experience to its current unique 
blend. A few examples of applied definitions and explanations are presented in table 1. 
In summary, there are three characteristics that dominate safety culture definitions. 
These three characteristics will be referred to as constituent one, two and three. The first 
refers to the subject of the definitions. It seems to be common to consider safety culture 
as an attribute of a group of people, typically an organisation, in contrast to focus on 
individuals. It can be questioned what kind of group that it is reasonable to consider. 
While a safety manager is interested in understanding the safety culture in his 
organisation, a researcher might be more interested in groups having a shared pattern of 
attitudes irrespective of organisational boundaries (Hale, 2000). 
The safety culture definitions’ second constituent is the object. It seems to be an 
agreement upon that the group has a shared pattern of rudiments. The rudiments range 
from observable aspects such as behaviour and symbols down to the underlying 
assumptions and values. Some researchers (Glendon & Stanton, 2000; Guldenmund, 
2000) argues for that more emphasis has to be assigned to the underlying pattern of 
attitudes and values. Such a shift increases the distinction to safety climate. Irrespective 
of which rudiments that are included in the pattern, it is the shared pattern or system of 
it that matters. It is therefore invalid to base assessments of safety culture upon a 
particular isolated rudiments, such as an attitude towards a specific issue or artefact 
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independent of other attitudes. Similarly, it is invalid to assess a safety culture based on 
the attitudes of individuals independent of the attitudes of the other group members.  
 
Table 1: Examples of safety culture definitions and explanations 
Definitions and explanations of safety culture 
“The safety culture of an organisation is the product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, 
competencies and patters of behaviour that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an 
organisation’s health and safety management..”  Advisory Committee on safety in Nuclear Installations (ACSNI) 
(HSC, 1993) 
“The set of beliefs, norms, attitudes, roles and social and technical practices concerned with minimizing the 
exposure of employees, managers, customers and members of the public to conditions considered as dangerous or 
injurious” (Turner et.al. , 1989) 
“The assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organisations and individuals which establish that, as an 
overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance” International 
Atomic Energy Authority (1986) 
“In a total safety culture (TSC), everyone feels responsible for safety and pursues it on a daily basis” (Geller , 1994) 
“A high reliability culture supposedly involves autonomy of worker; a questioning, sceptical attitude; an emphasis 
on upon safety, professionalism; and skills”  (Perrow, 1999) 
“The concept that the organisation’s beliefs and attitudes, manifested in actions, policies, and procedures affect its 
safety performance” (Ostrom et al..,1993) 
“ the ideas and beliefs that all members of the organization share about risk, accidents and ill health”  The 
conference of British Industry () 
“constructed system of meanings through which a given worker, or group of workers understands the hazards of 
their world”  Pidgeon (1991) 
“the attitudes, beliefs and perceptions shared by natural groups as defining norms and values, which determine how 
they act and react in relation to risks and risk control systems” Hale (2000) 
“Safety culture reflects the attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, and values that employees share in relation to safety “ 
(Cox & Cox, 1991) 
“The collective mental programming towards safety of a group of organisation members” Berends (1996) 
 
The two described constituents are relatively typical characteristics for describing 
any culture such as national and organizational culture. The characteristic that 
distinguishes safety culture from the more general definitions of culture is the third 
constituent. The purpose of the group’s shared pattern is related to a target e.g. 
“overriding priority”, “minimizing exposure” and “commitment to”. Safety cultures that 
are believed to have a strong influence on a good safety performance are typically called 
positive, enriched or mature. This third constituent is the essential characteristics that 
make it possible to test or measure how mature the safety culture is. There exist 
alternative ways to describe levels of safety culture maturity (Westrum, 1995; Keil 
Center, 2001; James Reason, 1997; Topf, 1998). Some descriptions are compiled into 
figure 1.  
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Staff is uninterested in safety 
Desire to preserve status que 
Out-of-sight-Out-of-mind 
Accident are unavoidable 
Punish whistle blowers 
Safety is compliance 
Denial of signals 
Locks for scapegoats 
Plays with rules. Pass of 
incidents as untypical 
Limited scope of repairs 
and remedial actions. 
Accidents are 
preventable 
Safety is seen as 
business critical 
 
Concerned 
with safety 
goals and 
learning. 
 
Safety is a company value and 
is continuously improved. 
Safety is a critical aspect of the 
job. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Examples of descriptions of different degrees of maturity of safety cultures 
 
4. SETTING UP A SAFETY CULTURE SURVEY  
In a measurement context the functionalist and the interpretive perspectives imply 
different approaches. The task for a functionalist is to assess whether the group’s shared 
pattern really has a genuine interest in safety or that safety has a secondary status 
(Hudson, 1999). An interpretive devotee has a more ambitious task. In order to assess if 
the safety culture is mature, the characteristics of the culture have to bee seen in relation 
to the environment. If the group’s shared pattern of meanings is deficient in relation to 
the real nature and exposure of hazards it is immature. Because the questionnaires 
applied on safety culture and climate are indistinguishable, the most efficient way to 
identify this pattern on existing data is to modify the analysis techniques. Literature 
reveals that principal component analyses in different domains extract components that 
are surprisingly similar. Typically components are Management commitment, Safety 
communication, Importance of competence and training, Job satisfaction, Personal 
safety commitment, Perceived risk and Status of safety authorities. Even though these 
factors are relatively easy to pinpoint, they are independent by nature (Figure 2). There 
are various ways to interpret what a pattern or an underlying pattern is. What is certain 
is that patterns involve more than isolated and unrelated components. Therefore, a 
complete pattern has to also include the underlying relationships (Figure 2). As the input 
analysis and results of both safety culture and climate surveys are similar, the 
components can only reflect a superficies level. In this context the underlying 
relationships, whatever the rudiments it encompass is of a more core cultural character.   
 
 
Figure 2: Two levels of safety cultural patterns. 
 
. For simplifying the various approaches the real hidden patterns of cultural rudiments 
three simplified patterns are presented din figure 3. Even though there exist knowledge 
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about typical principal components, the real pattern of a specific organisation is 
assumed to be unknown (pattern 1,2 and 3). These attitudes can theoretically have 
variations in intensity (pattern 1 and 2), and variations in rudiments and variations in 
structure (pattern 1 relative to 3). If we assume that the features of the pattern determine 
the safety performance (constituent three) there are alternative ways to interpret the 
pattern aspect. Is it the contrast, the content or the structure of the patterns that 
determines performance, or is it a blend of all these features? In the following study it is 
assumed that the tool for collecting data of the hidden pattern of attitudes is a 
questionnaire survey (Figure 3). In reality there are other approaches, like interviews 
and observations. The remaining parts of the figure will be addressed later. 
Figure 3: Possible approaches in measurement of organisational patterns 
 
4.1 TYPE OF QUESTIONS IN QUESTIONNAIRE 
When measuring safety culture maturity it is necessary to be aware of the purpose of the 
questionnaire. To act in accordance with constituent one of the definitions the 
questionnaire has to be responded by a representative sample of the group. When the 
sample is used for development of a test, the samples have to reflect the population that 
the test is aimed for. A test developed to capture aspects of Pattern 1 and 2, is for 
instance invalid when applied on pattern 3 (Figure 3). Next, the items have to be 
developed to catch as much of the cultural pattern as possible. It might be that the 
characteristics of the patterns vary between different levels of maturity. In reality the 
patterns that are relevant for safety is one of a range of patterns and systems of 
understandings within a group. Therefore, nuances in types of questions and scales 
might cause the item to address patterns outside the scope of the survey. For example 
the two items presented in figure 4 seems to address similar issues. The charts illustrate 
the response distribution of respondents having the same national culture in four 
companies Z3, Z6, Z7 and Z8. Z3 is a company having a very high safety standard, 
while the standard decrease down to the standard of company Z8. It can be seen that the 
 
 
 
 
 
Pattern 2: Low contrast  
Pattern 1: high contrast  
Black 
Grey  
White 
 
Dark 
Bleak 
White  
Ex. 3: Average Scores 
on Principal components: 
            Pat. 1  Pat. 2   Pat.3 
Black     +0.6    -1.0     +0.4    
Grey      +0.1     0.0      -0.1 
White     +0.1   +0.1     -0.2 
Dotted    -1.0    -1.0     +2.0 
Principal 
components
 
Dark 
Grey  
White 
Dotted
Survey 
responses
Real hidden pattern 
Pattern 3: Different 
 
Black  
Dotted 
White  
Ex. 2: Inputs for models 
Maturity = f (Black, White) 
Examples of 
scoring principles
Ex. 1: Direct aggregation 
Maturity = Σ Darkness of spots 
Correlation 
matrixes  
16x16 
 
 
 
114 
responses of the left item is relatively stable, while the disagreement increase with 
falling standard in the right question. The fact that the responses of the left item are 
stable for respondents of the same national culture is taken advantage of by Hofstede 
(2000) in his descriptions of national cultures. It would be difficult to state that the two 
items addressed two different cultural patterns without empirical evidence.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Similar questions addressing different patterns 
 
4.2 TYPE OF SCALES IN QUESTIONNAIRE 
Another issue that cause some discussions is the applied ordinal scales. The two types 
of scales that are most applied are the Likert scale and the Ipsative scale. The Likert 
scales measure a group’s agreeability on an absolute scale i.e. if two different 
respondents answer equally, their absolute agreement on the statements can be assumed 
to be equal. The two items in figure 4 are examples of responses of Likert scales. The 
advantageous ability in comparing results from different individuals on absolute scales 
has given the Likert scales a strong endorsement within safety culture analysis. With 
reference to figure 4, the contrast of pattern 1 and 2 can be precisely measured. In 
ipsative scales the importance of different statements are directly assessed. The 
statements are typically arranged in pairs in which each statement is paired with all 
other statements. In this testing approach the importance of each statement is not 
expressed in absolute terms, but in relation to other statements. Hence, the groups 
having pattern 1 and 2 in figure 2 may obtain equal responses, which is different from 
the responses from the group having pattern 3. The frame of reference of is therefore the 
individual respondents. Two respondents that answer equally may still consider the 
statement’s importance different in absolute terms. 
The questionnaires addressing safety culture are of a similar character (MaTSU, 
2001), and the Likert scale seems to be mostly applied. In measurement of 
organisational culture, however, the ipsative scales are widely used. In a study trying to 
compare and collect questionnaires aimed at safety culture all applied Likert scales. One 
of the most known questionnaire applying ipsative scales is the Competing Values 
Framework (Cameron & Quinn, 1999). Items addressing aspects of the Competing 
Values Framework, but assessed on Likert scales, were found to efficiently distinguish 
between the four companies in figure 4 (Soma, to be published 2). This indicates that it 
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is possible to measure similar features on both types of scales. Anyhow, the difference 
between the scales should be assessed in more detail in relation to what features of the 
cultural pattern that actually determines safety performance. If the contrast is important, 
the use of Likert scales are most suitable, but if it is variations in pattern structure that is 
important Ipsative scales should be used. In order to search for patterns based on 
responses from Likert scales, the items has to be arranged in some sort of system that 
represents the characteristics of the hidden pattern. This system might be correlation 
between the items, typically represented through a principal component analysis. Other 
systems might be to conceptual models exemplified in (Soma, 2004; Soma , to be 
published 2). 
 
4.3 SELECTION OF QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS 
In a typical item analysis the items are selected based on their ability to distinguish 
between the good and poor responses. Regarding safety culture, however, what features 
that distinguish good or poor is unknown beyond the rough outline in figure 1. Instead 
of considering the items’ ability to distinguish good from poor responses, selection 
based on their internal consistency has been practiced. Through a cronbach–alpha 
technique it is possible to assess if an index (set) of similar items provide reliable 
measurements based on the internal consistency. If for example the responses of an 
index of questions related to communication has a high internal consistency it is 
assumed that this items actually measure the same thing e.g. quality of communication. 
Based on the cronbach-alpha values it is possible to select the indexes that are most 
reliable, knowing that it measures some isolated feature. For instance may an index of 
items measure how dark the black spots of the patterns in figure 3 are. Hence, analogous 
to the use of Likert scales the items effectiveness also focuses on the contrast of isolated 
rudiments. It should however be noticed that even precise knowledge about isolated 
features gives few hints about the structure of the whole pattern. At last, even though an 
index demonstrate that they measure safety communication, there are no evidence 
proving that it contribute to overriding priority of safety, commitment to or minimizing 
exposure of hazards which are core characteristics of the definitions of safety culture.   
 
5 SAFETY CULTURE MATURITY SCORE ANALYSIS: A SEARCH FOR PATTERNS 
In the James Reason book “Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents” (1997) 
there is a chapter called “Safety Culture: Far more than the Sum of its Parts”. In the 
following text various applied calculation techniques are demonstrated with reference to 
figure 3.  
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5.1 DIRECT AGGREGATION 
This first discussion address the approach outlines in example 1 in figure 3. To 
demonstrate how addition is used in measurements of safety culture maturity an index 
addressing “Belief in accident prevention” is presented in the following figure. The item 
consists of two questions, and a five point Likert scale with values from zero to four. 
The maximum score of each question is four, making it possible to obtain a highest 
score of eight. This scoring principle seems advantageous because of its simplicity. 
However, the relationship between the response to the first question and the overall 
safety culture maturity score is determined independent of what the same respondent 
answers to other questions, and more controversial, independent of what the other 
respondents of the group answer. This is in conflict with constituent one and especially 
constituent two of the safety culture definitions.  
 
Figure 5: Example of calculation of scores 
 
5.2 MODELLING OF FACTORS AND PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS 
The next example (example 2 of figure 3) applies models for the calculation of safety 
culture maturity. These models may typically apply factors obtained through a principal 
component analysis, expert judgement or both. Within safety climate there exist 
examples where first the principal component analysis is performed and then the 
components are incorporated in an expert judgement model (Cheyne et al., 1998). 
Within safety culture measurement Cooper (2002) has developed one proposal. This 
model is based mostly on the modelling on expert judgement. In the case of applying 
principal components or other independent factors into a common, model there are 
certain issues that have to be notified. A principal component analysis groups correlated 
items into principal components. Hence, the correlation between different principal 
components is close to zero. In a statistical point of view this indicates that it at least is 
no linear dependencies between principal components. The existence of principal 
components may be interpreted as evidence of their mutual independence. Therefore the 
model should not either have linear dependencies between the components, as attempted 
by some. This indicates that the knowledge represented on principal components have 
lost some possibilities to reflect the structure of the hidden patterns to the left in figure 
3.  
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5.2 SCORES ON PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS 
The last and relatively common approach is to first perform a principal component 
analysis, and then calculate the average scores on each component for various 
departments (Zohar, 1980; Itoh and Andersen, 1999), experiences (Lee, 1998) or 
organisations (Soma, 2004). The average scores are useful in understanding of 
variations between the groups. In some examples, however, there might be subcultures 
within a group that have totally different scores. Such, differences are not reflected in an 
average value. It has also been found that it in fact is questionable to directly assess 
good and poor average scores for determination of safety standard (). 
It is natural to ask why it has been widely accepted to apply the sum of responses. The 
pioneer research on safety climate performed by Zohar (1980) proved that the summing 
of responses gave some indication of the quality of the safety climate. Despite of the 
fact that safety climate is a slightly different concept than safety culture, the 
questionnaires claiming to measure these two concepts are indistinguishable (Flin, 
1998). Zohar (1980) verified that also the variance in the responses between different 
departments is differs by using a one-way analysis of variance. Therefore, the 
distribution of scores from the four companies in figure 4 is considered in more detail. 
The typical character of the two items that had the highest factor loads on each of seven 
principal components was extracted. These items should be the most important items in 
describing the variation in the dataset. The average responses of all these 14 items were 
lower for the most sub-standard company and therefore at first seem to confirm Zohar’s 
finding. However, the lower sum of responses was found to be caused by an almost 
three times as high portion of neutral responses. The fact that the crew of the most 
substandard company has no opinions regarding the item statements is different from 
assuming that they have a lower degree of agreement. For example, the minimum value 
of the score in figure 5 should not be for the “Fully Disagree” value, but rather on the 
“Neutral” value. Based on the descriptions in (Figure 1) it can also be imagined that 
some immature cultures want to present them selves as better then they actual are. 
Respondents of such an organization may easily replica such a false image by giving 
more positive responses to the questionnaire.  
 
6. ALTERNATIVE MEASURING APPROACHES 
The illustration presented in figure 4 indicates that a pattern consists of contrast, 
structure and content.  It seems as if most of the existing research has aimed at contrast, 
through a wide use of Likert scales, cronbach-alpha assessments and principal 
component analysis. Even though this uniformity is criticised, literature reveal few 
alternative approaches. There exist a range of possible alterative techniques that address 
the pattern structure. First, it might be interesting to consider the correlation between all 
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items in a questionnaire, typically presented in a matrix. This correlation matrix is the 
intermediate basis in a principal component analysis (Figure 3) and reflects the linear 
relationships between all items. Given that the questionnaire items are effective in 
addressing various features of the real cultural pattern, the correlation matrix might be a 
representation of it. Identical correlation matrixes produce identical principal 
components, which is close to what is experienced in reality (Figure 2). Further, given 
that the correlation matrixes from different questionnaires or groups of respondent are 
of a similar nature, it would be interesting to relate nuances of difference to safety 
performance. Because the environment in shipping is similar for all organisations, it 
might be expected that there are fewer cultural patterns structures that are effective than 
those who are not. Therefore, out of a sample of correlations matrixes representing the 
patterns from different organisations the ones that have most in common with the others 
might be the ones being most mature.  
While the described technique address the completeness of the superficial cultural 
level in figure 2, it is more interesting to directly measure aspect of the underlying 
relationships.  weaknesses of the Another approach is to pinpoint on the items that 
forms the glue between the principal components. Some items reoccur on several 
components, and thereby represent a link between them. There are two ways to find 
these items. The most pragmatic approach is to simply count the reoccurrence of items 
in various components. A more sophisticated approach is to consider the variations in 
communalities between the safe organisations and the hazardous ones. The 
communality of an item reflects the portion of its variance that is common with other 
items. High communality values indicate that the item is suited, together with the other 
items to form principal components. A low value indicates that the items variance is 
independent of the other items. Given that the correlation matrixes are of similar nature, 
differences in communalities may reflect what this difference is related to.  
 
6. EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF TEST THEORY; A RETROSPECTIVE APPROACH  
There are few retrospective studies into safety culture. The typical approach is to first 
perform a questionnaire survey, and present the scores on principal components. At last 
it is tempted to validate the scores by obtaining some safety performance data. This 
study takes the opposite approach. First a study is performed to have a fear idea about 
how good the companies’ safety standard is relative to each other, and then this 
variation is described based on their safety culture. Because the performance data have 
references to the world population of ships, it is possible to imagine the general 
variations of safety culture within the maritime domain.  
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6.1 RANKING OF ORGANISATIONS BASED ON SAFETY PERFORMANCE 
Based on a newly developed classification technique, nine shipping companies are 
ranked based on their accident statistics and safety inspection files (Soma, 2004). Both 
techniques estimate the fleet’s relative likelihood of belonging among the 25% safest 
ships of the world (A), 50% average (B) and the 25% most hazardous ships (C). In 
figure 5 the companies are plotted based on the excess likelihood of being in the safest 
class (P(A)-P(B)) for each indicator. The company Z1 is ranked as the safest company 
while Z9 is the most substandard. Earlier four of the companies that had the same 
national culture were compared. The advantages of applying two independent safety 
performance indictors are obvious because the reliability of a single indicator can easily 
be questioned. The two indicators are known to produce reasonable consistent ranking 
of the companies (Soma, ), which can be verified in figure 5. For the given companies 
their whole fleet is included in the search for accidents and inspection findings. The 
timeframe for both the inspections data and the accidents statistics are four years. The 
source for accident statistics is collected from a database held by Lloyds Maritime 
Information Service (LMIS). The database include those accidents which result in 
structural damage, rendering the ship unseaworthy, such as penetration of hull beneath 
sea surface, immobilization of main engines, extensive damage etc., electrical 
breakdown, the vessel being totally lost or any other undefined situation resulting in a 
damage or financial loss which is considered to be serious. The safety inspection 
findings are collected from an Internet database holding Port State Control (PSC) 
inspections. These inspections are carried through at ports onboard visiting vessels to 
verify compliance to international conventions issued by the UN body International 
Maritime Organisation (IMO) and the International Labour Associations (ILO). The 
data for the PSC findings are collected from the Equasis (website) and Paris MOU 
(website). Both the safety inspections and the accident statistics are collected, stored and 
made available by independent bodies. The ranking was based on the average of the two 
indicators and are supported by correlations of respectively 1.0 from the accident 
indicator and 0.75 from the inspection indicator. The values themselves have a 
correlation value of 0.62.  
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Figure 6: Relationship between indicators of safety inspection and accident history 
 
The applied questionnaire for the survey was the Ship Management Attitudes 
Questionnaire (SMAQ), which was developed by Risø National Laboratory, the Danish 
Maritime Institute (DMI), and the University of Texas (NASA/FAA) Aerospace Crew 
Research Project as a joint project. This questionnaire is part of a study aimed at 
understanding maritime operations attitudes and is derived from the Flight Management 
Attitudes Questionnaire (FMAQ), developed by the University of Texas. The FMAQ is 
widely used in aviation to diagnose organizations in the areas of organizational culture, 
safety, and human factors practices. It contains items that relate to employees’ opinions 
and attitudes about management, morale, safety issues, automation and teamwork, as 
well as general work values. The questionnaire consists of totally eight indexes. Of 
these only two are considered in this study. These indexes are called Degree of 
agreement with statements related to organizational issues and Degree of agreement 
with statements related to ship management. These two indexes both apply a Likert 
scale. Findings from the survey are presented in confidential reports to individual 
companies, but published works, like this one, will describe results in anonymous form, 
de-identifying the participating companies. Risø National Laboratory and DMI have 
already carried out a questionnaire survey among seafaring personnel in several 
shipping companies. The SMAQ questionnaire was distributed to seafaring personnel in 
five shipping companies during 1997 (four Scandinavian companies and one Asian 
company). The database has later been expanded with data from an American company, 
and two more Asian companies. In this study two additional Scandinavian companies 
are also included. In total, nearly 3000 questionnaires (out of 4700 distributed) have 
been returned. Since excess questionnaires were placed aboard ships, the response rate 
cannot be determined precisely; however, the rate of response is almost certainly above 
30%, and it appears to be well above 40% for deck and engine officers. The number of 
valid responses from the eight companies is presented in Table 4 (the American 
company is not included). 
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Table 2: Respondents included in the further analysis 
Company Nationality Number of Respondents Data collector 
Z1 Asian 114 Risø National Laboratory 
Z2 Asian 278 Risø National Laboratory 
Z3 Scandinavian 652 Risø National Laboratory 
Z4 Asian 653 Risø National Laboratory 
Z5 Scandinavian 364 Risø National Laboratory 
Z6 Scandinavian/ Asian 70 Soma / DNV 
Z7 Scandinavian  60 Risø National Laboratory 
Z8 Scandinavian 72 Risø National Laboratory 
Z9 Scandinavian / Asian 13 Soma / DNV 
Sum 2276  
 
6.2 SEARCH FOR CULTURAL PATTERNS IN CORRELATION MATRIXES 
When a questionnaire survey is applied to measure safety culture maturity it is assume 
that the respondents cultural context influence their answer and that this influence can 
be extracted in an analysis. In this study three analysis approaches are demonstrated. 
The first approach takes advantage of the fact that research in several domains find 
similar principal components that described their datasets e.g. Commitment, Job 
satisfaction and Communication. It is also recognised that the crew’s context onboard 
various ships are similar across company borders. Both these to observations indicates 
that there should be one type of cultural pattern that reoccurs in different organisations. 
Because the environment is relatively equivalent for various ships there might be some 
unique blend of this pattern that is more efficient. It is assumed that the cultural patterns 
that are effective in accident prevention are similar, relative to an indefinite number of 
cultural patterns that are not effective. Based on this argumentation the cultural pattern 
of the safest companies should be relatively similar relative to the cultural patterns of 
the most substandard companies. A suitable starting point for such an analysis is the 
correlation matrix of the responses. Identical correlation matrixes produce identical 
principal components in a principal component analysis. The correlation matrix of 56 
items, having equivalent Likert scales was compared relative to each other. The 
correlation matrix for each company was compared to all other companies. The 
comparison technique applied a spearman correlation between the matrixes.  This value 
varied from 0.135 to 0.820. Because the number of data point is large (56⋅55=3080), all 
these correlations were statistical significant with a 1% confidence level. This implies 
that there exists a common pattern of responses across company borders and national 
cultures. It is now assumed that having the cultural pattern that is most similar to the 
others have the most mature pattern. Hence, a score was given to each company based 
on the sum of the correlation values to all other companies. This indicator, plotted in 
scatter diagram with the indicators of safety standard is plotted in figure 4 and 5. The 
scatter diagrams seem to justify the assumption. The correlation coefficient between the 
correlation matrix indicator and the accident indicator was 0.61, and the same figure for 
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the safety inspection indicator was 0.65. Even though these values isolated are not 
statistical significant, it is unlikely that two independent analyses produce spurious 
correlations of this high value. If it is assumed that the coefficients are not spurious then 
it can be concluded that the safety culture maturity indicator can explain a significant 
share of the correlation between the two performance indicators.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Relationship between safety standard and correlation matrix indicator 
 
Figure 7 presents the regression line of the correlation between the correlation matrixes 
for all nine companies. It can be seen that all companies have higher correlations to the 
safer companies relative to the unsafe. The second analysis approach is performed on 
the results of a principal component analysis performed on each individual company. In 
all analyses seven components were extracted. The seven components were rotated with 
a Varimax method including Kaiser Normalization. The total variance explained by the 
principal components varied from 40 to 85%. One major finding was that the principal 
components across companies were very similar. The components were called Safety 
Rehearse, Commitment, Communication, Job Satisfaction, Acknowledgement of 
Personal Limitation, Work Integrity, Social Integration and Power and Dignity. Table 3 
presents the items in the principal component, Safety Rehears. This component was the 
one that described most of the variance. Even though there are some variations across 
company borders, there is a core of items that seems to be common. 
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Table 3: Items in Safety Rehearse components for different companies 
 Z1 Z2 Z3 Z4 Z5 Z6 Z7 Z8 Z9 
          
Task assignments are always crosschecked and verified 0,66 0,73 0,47 0,60 0,46 0,80 0,68 0,63 0,66 
Our training has prepared the crew to work as a well-coordinated team in 
an emergency 
0,67 0,72 0,63 0,65 0,60  0,49 0,67 0,80 
My colleagues are adequately trained in emergency procedures 0,64 0,49 0,45 0,74 0,59 0,73  0,62 0,77 
Emergency drills are conducted as prescribed 0,67 0,58 0,54 0,58 0,57 0,89 0,70 0,70  
When I enter a new ship I always receive a proper hand-over 0,63 0,58 0,46 0,53 0,46 0,78 0,42 0,65  
Accidents and near-misses are always reported according to company 
orders 
0,50 0,61 0,61 0,43 0,50  0,70 0,43  
My suggestions about safety will be acted upon if I express them to senior 
officers on board 
0,60 0,42 0,52 0,53 0,69  0,51   
My suggestions about safety will be acted upon if I express them to 
management on shore 
 0,50 0,63 0,49 0,78  0,61  0.85 
Senior ship’s management ensures full cooperation between all onboard 
departments 
 0,54 0,54   0,53 0.44 0,47 0,87 
The catering services for the crewmembers are good 0.52 0,45 0,42    0,51 0.64 0,59 
This company practices the highest maintenance standards 0.50 0,62  0.50 0,47  0.67 0.42  
I am proud to work for this company 0.58 0,52    0.58 0.70 0.58  
It is the practice to report colleagues who can not perform their duties due 
to alcohol or drugs 
 0,41 0,50   0,45 0,44  0,66 
I am encouraged by my seniors to report any unsafe conditions I may 
observe 
 0,62 0,66  0,65   0,60 0,66 
I am sure management will never compromise safety for profitability  0,42   0,51  0.70 0.44 0.48 
I am normally consulted on matters that affect the performance of my 
duties. 
 0,48   0,47  0,59 0.42 0.91 
I know the proper channels through which questions regar. Safety 
procedures should be routed 
  0,46 0.48 0,47 0.45    
I like my job 0.46     0.44 0.68  0.80 
Items in three companies  2  1   2 1  
Items in two companies 1  1 2   3  1 
Item in only one company 1 1    1 2 1 5 
1: Based on two factors in where one is in italic font. An additional commitment factor was identified but not included in the table 
 
6.2 SEARCH FOR CULTURAL PATTERNS IN COMMUNALITIES 
The regression lines of the correlation between the various matrixes are plotted in figure 
8. The lines indicate that all companies have higher correlations with the safer 
companies irrespective of variations in national cultures. This indicates, as assumed that 
there are more variations among culture of the less mature natures. A similar approach 
is presented in the right chart based on the correlation between the rankings of the 
communalities. The communality of an item reflects the portion of its variance that is 
common with other items. High communality values indicate that the item is suited, 
together with the other items to form principal components. A low value indicates that 
the items variance is independent of the other items. Items having communalities lower 
than 0.5 are removed in a typical principal component. In this study however, it is 
assumed that the communalities reflects the structure of the principal components. This 
indicates that the communalities of the less mature companies are more similar the other 
companies of low standard. Together the two charts illustrate that the variations among 
mature cultural patterns are less than the variation among immature cultural patterns. 
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However, there are also some common aspects of the variations in the immature 
cultures.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Relationships between different companies. 
 
Now the correlation between the rank order of the communalities for various companies 
and the ranking of the companies were calculated. High positive correlation values 
indicate that lower standard companies (Z9 is most unsafe) have higher communality 
ranking (rank order 1 is the smallest communality). Vice versa high but negative 
correlation values indicates that the communalities are higher for the safety companies. 
For some items their varying communalities seems to be stable across company borders. 
The item having an absolute correlation value larger than 0.3 is presented in table 4. It 
can be seen that six of the items in the left column describes operational aspects relative 
to prescribed procedures (row 1, 3, 7, 8, 13 and 14). In addition row 15 is related to 
checklists. Three items describe address aspects of hierarchal levels (row 5, 9 and 10). 
Two items are related to recognition of individual aspects (row 5 and 11). At the right 
column the content is of another character. While the items in the left column is related 
to normative behaviour in relation to procedures, the right column address descriptive 
aspects of the safety related to fatigue and tackling critical situations (row 1, 3, 4 and 
12) and communication (row 7, 10, 13 and 14). Items related to Job Satisfaction are 
explicit (Row 1, 2, 5, 11) In fact none of the items in the right column are addressing 
normative behaviour.  
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9Z1 Z4Z3Z2 Z5 Z9Z8Z6 Z7
Z9
Z8
Z7
Z6
Z5
Z4
Z3
Z2
Z1
0
0,05
0,1
0,15
0,2
0,25
0,3
0,35
0,4
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Z9
Z8
Z7
Z6
Z5
Z4
Z3
Z2
Z1
Z1 Z4Z3Z2 Z5 ZZZ6 Z7
125 
 
Table 4: Items distinguishing the lower safety standards and the higher safety standards 
 Higher communalities for lower safety standard  Higher communalities for higher safety standard  
1 
Accidents and near-misses are always reported
according to company orders -0,86
Crewmembers are well trained to cope with fatigue. 0,79
2 The catering services for the crewmembers are good -0,73 It makes no difference to me which company I sail for. 0,73
3 
My colleagues are adequately trained in emergency
procedures. 
-0,65
Even when fatigued, I perform effectively during critical 
times of operation. 
0,64
4 
People should be aware of and sensitive to the personal
problems of other crewmembers. 
-0,62
Our training has prepared the crew to work as a well co-
ordinated team in an emergency. 
0,63
5 
Many junior officers are reluctant to assume full
responsibility for their assigned tasks. 
-0,58 I am proud to work for this company. 0,56
6 
This company practices the highest maintenance
standards. 
-0,56
I support attempts to reduce the manning level on board 
ships. 
0,54
7 
The organization’s rules should not be broken - even 
when the crewmember thinks it is in the company's
best interest. 
-0,46 Briefings important for safety 0,52
8 
My colleagues frequently carry out secondary tasks
while on watch. 
-0,44 Drugs present a safety problem in my company. 0,48
9 I am reluctant to disagree with my superiors. -0,43 Alcohol presents a safety problem in my company. 0,47
10 
Seniors should delegate responsibilities to junior crews
as parts of their training. 
-0,37 Asking for assistance makes one appear incompetent. 0,40
11 
Effective team co-ordination requires team members to
take into account the personalities of the others
participants. 
-0,37 I like my job 0,39
12 
I am normally consulted on matters that affect the
performance of my duties. 
-0,35
I am ashamed when I make a mistake in front of other 
crewmembers. 
0,34
13 
During the nightwatch I stick strictly to written orders,
whether I agree with them or not 
-0,34
My suggestions about safety will be acted upon if I 
express them to management on shore 
0,33
14 Emergency drills are conducted as prescribed -0,34
I know the proper channels through which questions 
regarding safety procedures should be routed. 
0,31
15 Checklists are essential for safety -0,31   
 
Table 4 suggests that attitudes towards compliance have a stronger emphasis in the 
more substandard companies. In table y it can also be seen that the only item that is 
more frequent among the safer companies is “My suggestions about safety will be acted 
upon if I express them to senior officers on board”. The similar shore item aimed at 
shore-based management is seen in row 13 of table 4. Both these items are typical items 
reflecting the crew’s perceived commitment towards safety. The principal components 
were searched for the most explicit items related to compliance (row 7 and 13). The 
concentration of the two compliance items was significantly higher in the companies of 
lower safety standard as presented in table 5. 
 
Table 5. Occurrence of items in different principal components 
Company 
Concentration of compliance items  
Z1 Z2 Z3 Z4 Z5 Z6 Z7 Z8 Z9
The organization’s rules should not be broken - even when the crewmember thinks it is in 
the company's best interest 
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 2 2 
During the night watch I stick strictly to written orders, whether I agree with them or not 0 0 1 0 0 3 1 1 1 
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7. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS  
There are several aspects of this study that require discussion. It has been demonstrated 
that the principal components are similar for different companies having different 
nationalities and safety standards. The dependencies between the item correlation 
matrixes from different companies were all statistically significant. The most general 
components were called Safety Rehearse, Commitment, Communication, Job 
Satisfaction, Acknowledgement of Personal Limitation, Work Integrity, Social 
Integration and Power and Dignity. These principal components are also seen within 
organisations from other domains. This might in fact indicate that there exist a restricted 
number of universal components that can be found in most organisations. Taking this 
view the results of a principal component analysis may be restricted to confirm that the 
analysed group fits the universal norm. These traditional approaches may therefore bee 
seen as normative. This confirms Guldenmund’s (2000) point of view that it is needed 
to consider the underlying patterns in greater detail. Instead of asking what the principal 
factors of a dataset is, it might be more interesting to describe what actually differ from 
the universal norms. Such a shift makes the concept of safety culture more precise and 
makes the distinction to safety climate more explicit. It is then necessary to see what the 
effects of this shift are. It might imply a different type of questionnaires that includes 
items that are designed to address these underlying values. Another approach is to 
develop techniques that more specifically analyse underlying patterns. It would be 
strange if Spearmann’s Factor Analysis and Pearson’s Principal Component Analysis, 
developed more than 100 years ago, would precisely address the features of a concept 
we even today have problems of defining. Safety culture is a new concept that has its 
special and unique characteristics. Probably are both new questionnaires and techniques 
necessary to fully analyse the maturity of safety culture. It seems, however, as if there is 
a need for techniques that are tailor made for safety culture. This justifies the idea 
behind the techniques developed in this study, without claiming that they are optimal.  
The first of the developed techniques give attention to variations in the dependencies 
between items in a questionnaire. These dependencies are represented as correlation 
coefficients calculated from the item responses. It is first assumed that environment and 
governing hazards are universal for different shipping companies. In the long run it is 
probably one or a few cultural patterns that appear as efficient in handling this 
environment. Therefore, it is fear to imagine that the variations in the pattern of 
correlations between companies having a high cultural standard is smaller compared to 
the variation in pattern between companies having a low safety standard. If one 
company have more similarities to a range of other companies compared to another, this 
indicates that the first company has a more optimal pattern. Because the correlation 
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values have the possibility to reflect far more variations than the extracted principal 
components, they are considered to be of a raw or unrefined quality. This is necessary in 
order to detect underlying patterns. In a theoretical point of view this method may 
therefore seem to be more in line with definitions of safety culture compared to existing 
techniques. 
The techniques do however also need to demonstrate to be efficient in a real context in 
order to justify its validity. The scatter diagrams in figure 6 demonstrate that the 
resulting indicator has a relationship to safety performance. In order to be confident in 
these relationships alternative explanations has to be out ruled. Alternative explanations 
might be that the variation in samples size or national culture correlated with the 
ranking of safety standard. The national cultures are known to wary along the axis 
including Singaporean, Indonesian, Scandinavian and other national cultures in an 
unstructured order. It is known that different national cultures are known to influence 
the strength of response. The applied measurement does however not address the 
absolute values of responses, only the correlation between items. Further, if national 
cultures should explain the dependencies, the correlation between the companies of 
similar nationality would be even higher than the estimated ones. Even though such 
high dependencies would invalidate the indicator, it would also invalidate our present 
understanding of safety culture. Such high dependencies imply that the universal safety 
cultural pattern have almost no variations across company borders. Such a universal 
pattern can not explain variations in performance between companies and safety culture 
would then be unimportant. If the indicator is invalid it is therefore more likely that the 
dependencies are related to variations in sample sizes.  
The correlation value should always be seen in relation to the applied scales and 
the number of data points. As the number of data points increase, both the coefficient 
and criterion for significance is reduced. It is known that the significant value of 
correlation coefficients reaches an elbow at 50 to 70 data points. This implies that the 
sample size has to reach this level in order to converge to reliable estimates. Therefore, 
there is a chance that the correlation matrixes from companies of poorer safety standard 
include more spurious correlations. Especially the relevance of company Z9 may be 
criticized. On the other hand, because the correlation coefficient decreases with 
increasing sample size, it might be questionable to compare the matrixes of the larger 
samples with samples of average size. In order to answer these questions random 
samples of 80 respondents were taken from the larger samples, and then the excise was 
carried through again. As all companies now have about the same number of 
respondents variations in sample size can be ignored. Now the correlations between the 
matrix indictor and the accident statistics indicator increased to significantly 0.84. The 
correlation with the safety inspection indicator was 0.67. If the company Z9 was 
excluded the correlations were respectively 0.78 and 0.80. These number shows that 
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there is a relationship. Earlier the correlation between the two performance indicators 
was estimated to be 0.62. If we assume that the latter correlation matrix indicators are 
true, this indicates that safety culture maturity describe all of the correlation between the 
two performance indicators (0.62-0.80⋅0.78=0). Hence, the safety culture maturity may 
alone explain all the correlation between the two performance variables. Therefore, the 
importance of safety culture can be justified based on quantified estimates. As figure 4 
show that company 1 to 5 might represent characteristics of about 30% to 40% of the 
ships in the world fleet quantification is also confirmed. It is possible to estimate what 
the effect will be if the safety performance of the remaining 60% to 70% of the worlds 
ships were improved to what is typical for a committed culture. Based on an estimated 
distribution of accident rate for the world fleet (Soma, to be published), it can be 
concluded that such a lift would prevent about 50%to 60% of today’s accidents from 
occurring.  
 The next method illustrates that the less mature cultures do not only include 
spurious responses but also follows some sort of pattern. The idea of identifying the 
items that distinguished the safe companies and the less safe based on communalities 
may seem strange at first. However, as pinpointed earlier, the items having a high 
communality are typically present in several principal components and the other items 
explain a relatively high portion of their variance. These items do therefore in fact 
represent an underlying pattern beyond the principal components. In order to justify the 
content of these variables in a maritime context some descriptions of the maritime 
organisational cultures have been collected from literature. The managing director of the 
Central Union of Marine Underwriters (CEFOR) Forsmo’s (2002) reflection of the 
history of maritime safety regulation during the 1980s was “ ... developing a maritime 
safety consciousness was needed. Terms such as “compliance culture” and “evasion 
culture” were introduced as opposites to the ultimate panacea “safety culture”. Holt’s 
(1989) description of the typical shipping culture is that it is “…characterised by quick 
decisions in buying and selling, short-term solutions, emphasis on technology and 
tonnage, and neglect of people and human values”. These descriptions can be 
considered as expert judgments from the professionals in the domain and are probably 
not based on empirical evidence. The content of the extracted items seems to catch these 
features. The content of the items sorted out by this technique indicate that the 
underlying pattern of the less safe companies attribute normative behaviour. This 
normative pattern focuses on uncritical compliance to procedures, explicit hierarchal 
levels and ignorance of individual needs. In contrast the underlying pattern of the safest 
companies address tackling of abnormal and critical situations. Abnormal situations 
involve fatigue, emergencies and communication about errors and worries. Also items 
related to commitment were more explicit in the pattern of these companies.  Therefore 
the results from the techniques are consistent with real expert observations. Both 
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underlying systems of meaning are within the concept of safety culture, but are of 
different characters, efficiency and direction of interest. When the system of meaning 
acknowledge that safety is important it catches interests and if safety improvements is 
interesting it has a meaning beyond compliance to regulations. The underlying systems 
of meanings for the less mature safety cultures are imbalanced and do not sufficiently 
comprise the human element, which is needed when controlling the governing hazards. 
What is the central difference between a culture commitment to safety and compliance 
culture? While a compliance culture is anxious to not meet prescribed rules and 
procedures, a committed culture lives in a constant worry of not meeting the relevant 
hazards. Gerald Wilde addresses this issue in his Risk Homeostasis theory (2001). He 
argues that focus has to be reached towards a future goal at all times, and not on 
conserving aspects such as rules, in order to continuously move the individuals levels of 
target (or optimal) risk. If the individuals’ levels of target risk remain constant, 
fulfilment of strict procedures may give the operators an impression of unnecessary high 
safety, causing them not to avoid, or even seek, hazards not covered by the procedures. 
An opposing argument, experienced from one recent discussion into the importance of 
safety culture, was that “it is irrelevant what the crew on a ship thinks, as long as they 
do what they are supposed to do”.  The problem is that in at least 80% of the ship 
accidents, the crew did not do what they were supposed to do. This was not because 
they did not want to act correctly, but rather that their context forced, or lead them, to do 
so. It is also recognized that human failure has dominated over the technical failures for 
at least hundred years within the maritime domain. Considering the vast technological 
innovations that have taken place, it does not seem reasonable that further 
improvements in technology efficiently improve safety. In an economical perspective it 
is even rational to withdraw some of the technological artefacts and instead use the 
saved resources on making the context of the operators more advantageous (Krappinger, 
1971). Jens Rasmussen describes this as behaviour shaping features and criteria in his 
theories of Managing Risks in a Dynamic Society. He stresses that given the rapid 
changes in technology, competence, market conditions and political climate in 
combinations with the high loss potential in our current society, it is not rational to 
control behaviour through a normative approach e.g. through rules of safe conduct. 
Charles Perrow’s Normal Accident Theory may also support the focus on interests. 
Even though he refuses to accept that it is possible to totally control high risks solely 
through management, he recognizes that the theories of High Reliability Organizations, 
headed by La Porte and Consolini (1991), have a positive effect. Besides stressing the 
importance of group interests he is also addressing the relationship between power and 
interests in a risk perspective.  
There are other studies supporting the distinction between commitment and 
compliance cultures. In analysis of organizational cultures Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1983) 
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classified four stereotype cultures based on two dimensions. These dimensions were 
Organizational Process (‘Organic’ versus ‘Mechanistic’) and Organizational Orientation 
(‘Internal’ versus ‘External’). The four stereotypes of organizational cultures are the 
Adhocracy culture, the Clan culture, the Hieratical culture and the Market Culture In a 
analysis (Baker and Hawes, ) of the organizational cultures of 173 different U.S. land 
based companies, the four stereotypes in table 7 were identified. However, the most 
significant clusters were the cultures having an ‘Organic’ process versus the cultures 
having a ‘Mechanistic’ processes. In this context the Commitment culture revealed in 
this study seems to have similarities to the ‘Organic’ cluster, while the Compliance 
cultures have relations to the ‘Mechanistic’.  Covin and Slevin (1989) described the 
differences between the two Organizational Processes as “ ‘Organic’ structures permit 
rapid organizational responses to changing external environments, while ‘mechanistic’ 
structures are better suited to predictable environments where rapid organizational 
responses are not typically required”. Baker and Hawes found that the adaptability of 
the ‘Organic’ cultures made a good combination with a high degree of market 
orientation, which in turn resulted in a higher economical performance relative to other 
combinations of culture and market strategy.  
The results of the study seems to be in line with existing knowledge within 
safety management, such as risk homeostasis theory (Wilde, 2001), safety management 
understandings provided by James Reason (1998) and Jens Rasmussen (1997), High 
Reliability Organization (LaPorte and Consolini, 1991) theories. Because focus on 
compliance ignores the possibility of unforeseen system interdependencies and may 
take away the need for understanding the systems real functioning, even aspects of 
Charles Perrow’s Normal Accident Theory (1999) may support the results of this study. 
It is also worth noticing that this study actually validates the distinction between two 
levels of the Keil Centers, Safety Culture Maturity Model (2001) as the main difference 
between the compliance and commitment culture is involvement of the crew. It is also 
worth noticing that the involvement level is quantified as slightly better than the 
average. 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
This study has presented and validated a new tactic for measuring safety culture 
maturity. In contrast to existing techniques, which treat the cultural factors as 
independent aspects, the new technique focuses on the underlying pattern of 
dependencies between variables. In addition to valid quantifications, it is stressed that 
the method is more in line with the conceptual understanding of organizational safety, 
as well as definitions of safety culture. Even though it is demonstrated that the 
developed indicator describe all of the relationship between safety inspections and 
accidents, it is believed there is still potentials for improvement. It has been proved that 
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organisations having different nationalities and safety performance have a similar 
superficial safety cultural pattern. The variations in the shared pattern are smaller 
among organisations having a high safety standard compared to organisations of lower 
safety standard. The underlying cultural pattern of the less safe organisations put 
emphasis on normative behaviour, hieratical levels and lacking acknowledgement of 
individual needs. The safer organisations have an underlying pattern that put emphasis 
on tackling of abnormal situations like fatigue, emergencies and communication of 
errors and worries. This pattern also explicitly comprises rudiments of job satisfaction.  
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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper explores the relationship between the cycles of the shipping freight rates and time of 
ship accidents for the whole 20th century. In 1939 Koopman published his discovery that the 
cycles of the freight rates were determined by the overbuilding of ships during peak freight 
rates. Because it takes some months to build the ships, they are launched when the market is in 
recession causing the freight rates to decrease. For this book Koopman received a Nobel price. 
Even though his theories have been improved by several later contributions, there have been 
few (if any) studies that explore if the same dynamics have an effect upon the daily operation of 
ships. This is surprising because the costs of even small delays may be extreme during a market 
peak, while a ship loss or lasting docking may be profitable during a market depression. It is 
therefore fear to assume that the commercial interests in safety follow the freight rate cycles. 
This study demonstrates that the shipping market, probably through strategic and tactical 
decisions, in fact has dominated the occurrence of ship accidents for more than a century. While 
variances in strategy, in average causes some companies to double its accident risk, the various 
tactical decisions foretell when accidents will occur. The findings are discussed with reference 
to other industries, concepts like safety culture and risk homeostasis theory.  
 
Keywords: Safety culture, maturity, analysis of patterns 
 
 
1. THE FRAGMENTED WORLD OF SAFETY MANAGEMENT 
The 1980s was full of disasters. Chernobyl, Piper Alpha, Alexander Kjelland, 
Challenger, Bophal, King’s Cross, Herald of Free Enterprise and Estonia are some 
examples. The investigations into the range of these disasters revealed several 
characteristics. Human failures dominated the accident scenarios. Safety culture was 
assumed to be essential, because the organisations demonstrated impoverished attitudes 
towards safety (Reason, 1997). Organisational changes were considered to be of 
importance because several of the companies behind the disasters had economised on 
organisational resources prior to the accidents (Pat’e-Cornell, 1993; Vaughan, 1996). 
The increased focus on buzz-codes, like “outsourcing”, “downsizing”, “contracting” 
was by some seen as hazardous tendencies (Hovden, 1996) (Rasmussen, 1997). At last 
Perrow (1999) propose that it is normal to fail for any complex, tight-coupled system. 
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Therefore these designs require an intense safety commitment from both the managers 
and the operators on order to avoid accidents. Reason (1998) states that a recurrent 
accident scenario included at least three elements. The Universals (1) represents the 
ever-present hazards, the Local traps (2) are the characteristics of the work place that 
lure people into repeated patterns of unsafe acts and the Drivers (3) that make people do 
erroneous behaviour. Waagenaar (1997) suggests that an accident investigation should 
only focus on the causes that may reoccur. Rasmussen (1997) even indicates that it is 
unintelligent to focus on anything else than the Drivers of the recurrent accident 
scenarios.  
Even though disasters seemed to be relatively frequent during the 1980s, the causal 
attribution to organisational factors is old within shipping (Soma, 2003). In contrast to 
new technologies like aviation, nuclear power plants, space shuttles and large industrial 
plants, ship technology has a long history. Today’s Universal dangers within shipping 
also dominated a century ago. The task is then to understand what the Drivers behind 
these accidents actually are. In 1907, following a year of extremely high Norwegian 
losses focus was not only assigned to equipment and organisation but also the 
relationship between management commitment to safety and their commercial 
strategies. Emphasis was assigned to short business horizons and some even suggested 
that the over-insured ships deteriorated the aversion towards accident risks (Kysten, 
1907). Even a former prime minister of Norway, Michelsen, openly stated: “the best 
business a ship owner could do with his new bought ship was to let it be lost in an 
accident” (translated).  
While organizational factors have been an issue for a whole century, a modern 
interpretation is linked to segregation of management responsibilities triggered by cost-
cutting motives. The segregation of the traditional shipping organizations can be 
demonstrated by the Independent’s (1996) description of accidental vessel called Sea 
Empress “Built in Spain; owned by a Norwegian registered in Cyprus; managed from 
Glasgow; chartered by French; crewed by Russians, flying a Liberian flag; carrying an 
American cargo, and pouring oil onto the Welch coast”. As a response to this negative 
focus the most recognized association for contract managers, the International Safety 
Management Association (ISMA), has formulated the following description of the 
1980s and 1990s on their web page: “Ship managers had been made scapegoats for 
perceived deterioration in shipping standards over the proceeding two decades. The 
argument ran that, with the replacement of the traditional ship owner structures by new 
types of owner such as K/S investors, third party managers had become the instrument 
of cost-cutting and shoddy operations.”. These statements tacitly indicates that the 
relationship between economical parameters, management structure and operational 
safety. Even though these expressions have not been supported by sound accident 
investigation findings nor empirical evidence. This study provides this evidence. 
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2. THE STRATEGIES FOR UNDERTAKING COMMERCIAL RISK IN SHIPPING 
 “If you don’t get your market right, you don’t do anything right”, states Tronstad in his 
report of commercial risk taking in shipping. Commercial risk can be separated into 
financial risk and business risk. While financial risk is associated with financing and 
investments, the business risk is associated with the employment of the resources 
provided by the investments (Tronstad, 1980). There are at least three stereotype 
strategies to manage the commercial risks in shipping (Norman, 1981). These are 
labeled the ship speculators, the industrialists and the visionaries. The typical shipping 
speculator chose to carry a significant share of the financial risk and earn profits on 
asset play. Asset play is to buy a ship when its market value is believed to be below its 
future value, and sell it off when the market value is believed to be over its value in a 
future market. A fifteen-year old vessel can be bought to one third of the new-building 
alternative, and its value is relatively stable in a stable market. Because the speculator’s 
ships are old, they have relatively less time to get profit on their investment. Therefore 
they attempt to await the market with untied ships in the tramp markets. Ships are only 
tied up in irresistible time-charter or bare-boat agreements. The time perspective on 
their investments is typically from a few weeks up to a few years. They are dependent 
of a high earning within the remaining lifetime of the vessel. Because the asset values 
are of most concern they register their ships in Flags Of Convenience (FOC). This 
allows them to sail with ships that not comply with the regulative requirements and 
reduce the cost of the crew. They know that when the transport demand increases, their 
reputation and safety standard is of secondary importance. They consider the value of 
the vessels, and the risk of accidents, to be covered by insurance. Even though old ships 
have higher maintenance costs, this can be justified by their lower investments costs. In 
sum this strategy opens for the possibility of huge benefits for a reasonable price.  
The second stereotype is the shipping industrialist. These stable and large 
companies have a long business horizon, up to several decades into the future. Financial 
risk is avoided, but they are competitive in controlling business risk. They buy new 
ships directly from the yard and sell off when they reach a high age, typically over 
fifteen years. The newbuildings enter a signed time-charter agreement or a specific liner 
route. They may also have several ships in the spot market, because this is beneficial in 
the long term or to fine-tune their commercial risk. Their large size requires solid 
management. Their strength is their well-established trademarks, giving them 
competitive advantages. Because of their large market share these companies also 
obtain advantageous treatment by cargo owners, in ports, by insurance and by 
classification societies. They have a relatively new fleet, which in average is younger 
then 15 years (Soma, 2003). The new ships may have some deficiencies from their 
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birth. As the experience with the ship increases these problems are dealt with and 
improved, while also new problems occur.  
While the industrialists engross the majority of the worlds’ tonnage, and the 
speculator controls a considerable smaller portion, the shipping visionaries are in 
significant minority. These companies are similar to the industrialists in terms of 
ignoring the current state of the freight market, but more comparable to the speculator 
when it comes to market strategies. They are called visionaries in this text, because they 
are disciples of their forecasts and think they understand the market far better then their 
competitors. It is extremely difficult to be in the lead in international trade. On a 
specific route or specialized trade it is far easier to outline money-spinning forecasts. 
Their strategies of buying and selling ships are rooted in their own predictions and not 
the present market state. Therefore, these companies can find rational arguments to buy 
ships even at peak values. While the speculators have a narrow time perspective, and the 
industrialist’s plans far into the future, the forecasted scenarios determine the 
visionaries’ focus. In contrast to the industrialists, the visionaries are willing to carry 
considerable financial risks. Their foresights often imply a fast growth and aggressive 
acquirement of ships and competing companies. Therefore external finance is also 
expended. Because such finance has a short horizon, from a year to five years, it is 
necessary to produce money fast. The forecasted scenarios, determines their purchase 
policy.  
 
Table 1: Simple characteristics of various commercial strategies 
The shipping 
stereotypes 
Market forecast Organizational Focus Success criteria  
The visionaries “I know best” External:  Future market conditions  Reach targeted goals  
The speculators “I know something” External:  Current market conditions Produced gains  
The industrialist “I know-nothing” Internal Smooth running  
 
3. THE THEORIES BEHIND THE CYCLES OF SHIPPING FREIGHT MARKET  
The shipping markets can roughly be divided into the liner market and the tramp 
market. In a liner market the shipping company have a fixed route between defined 
ports, sailing according to a given schedule. In this market type there are many 
customers that each have relatively small portion of the total cargo. The liner companies 
therefore decide their freight rates based on what the customers are willing to pay 
independent of the transportation expenses. In contrast, the freight rates of the tramp 
markets are compelled by the dynamic relationship between supply and demand of 
transportation. The spot freight rates are given per ton of commodity carried on single 
voyages. The time-charter agreements are typically give on a stipulated rate of hire, 
typically for several months, according to the carrying capacity of the ship. Although 
the spot and time-charter rates may vary on an hourly basis, the large fluctuations are 
more rare. Occasionally, in a cyclical manner, the freight rates suddenly grow 
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significantly. During a market-peak a shipowner in the spot or tramp market may in a 
few months earn enough to finance his new-launched 70 million-dollar VLCC (Very 
Large Crude Carrier). The second-hand value of ships may at the same time rise 300%. 
The reason behind such peaks may of course be related to both a reduced transportation 
supply and an increased demand.  
There are three theories explaining the cyclical tendencies. Koopmans (1939) 
stated that the demand for shipping transportation was relatively stable. Therefore he 
argued for that the cycles were generated within the shipping market itself. He focused 
on the delay from a ship is being ordered until it is put into service as the explanation. 
Because the ships are typically ordered when the rats are high and launched in large 
quantities when the market is in recession the weak markets turn into more serious 
depressions. Although some shipowners need additional tonnage during a depression, 
the poor market opens for the alternative to charter cheap bare-boats. The future 
investment in new ships has also a smaller net present value and it is easier to get 
external financial support in a good market. In some cases the market is so 
overconfident that more than 100% financial cover is obtainable.  
Zannethos (1966) expanded Koopman’s theory. Zannetos’s argument was that 
Koopmans’s theories should produce gentle symmetric cycles and not peak cycles as are 
experienced in reality. Therefore, he added the market’s over- and under- confidence to 
the explanation of the cycles. While ordinary supply-demand curves has a single 
equilibrium, the over and under confidence in the shipping market produced two 
additional, but unstable equilibriums at respectively very high rates and very low rates. 
These theories have later been verified with more advanced computing (McConville, 
1999; Veenstra and de la Fosse, 2003). Stopford (1998) has a more ad-hoc explanation 
for the peaks in freight rates. Even though the demand for transportation is stable, a war 
or political decisions increase the transportation distance. If for instance the Suez- or the 
Panama channel close this will significantly increase the sailing distance and the 
available shipping supply is suddenly insufficient.  
 
4. THE 20.TH CENTURY’S DEVELOPMENT OF THE SHIPPING MARKET 
Although the shipping market is known for its possibility of generating large profits in 
short time the long time perspective is quite different. In general the profits on the 
investments would be larger in the average stock market (Stopford, 1998). During some 
depressions the shipowners pay the shipping out of their own pocket. Other vice, the 
ships are put in lay-up, scrapped or sold for remarkably low prices. The spot market 
rates for the 20th century and the world fleet size are plotted in figure 1. These rates are 
collected from four different sources (Stopford, 1998). The relative difference between 
these periods (1890-1914, 1921-1939, 1947-1997 and 1997-2003) is not known. 
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Therefore are values on the ordinal scale not included. The graphs do however 
distinguish between good and poor shipping market conditions. 
According to Stopford (1998) the large market peaks typically have a return 
period of seven years. The first nine market cycles in the 20th century are presented high 
in figure 1. These cycles are ranked based on its explicit shape and strength. In the 
figure the sinus shape is multiplied by its ranking order (9 is the most explicit and 
strongest, 1 is relatively indistinct). A real cycle may be of a more unsymmetrical or 
skewed nature. Anyhow it worth taking notice of that cycle five was the strongest and 
one of the shortest cycles. This cycle was both initiated and ended with exceptional high 
freight rates. Cycle three and nine reflects the most depressed market cycles. Fearnleys 
Annual Review (1985) described the later period as: “The last ten years of capital drain 
in the tanker industry have no historical precedent and we have witnessed a decimation 
of shipping companies which has probably no parallel in modern economic history, 
even taking into account the depression of the 1930s. The surviving member of the 
Independent tanker fleet must be akin to those of the of the world’s endangered species 
whose survival appeared questionable in a changing and hostile environment, but 
instead shown a remarkable ability to adapt.”. In other words the companies with a 
long perspective on their business remained in the market i.e. industrialists. Stopford 
also described the 1920s as a stable market with no room for asset play.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Freight rates, market cycles (Source: Stopford, 1998) and size of world fleet (Source: LMIS) 
 
Zannetos (1966) demonstrated that the freight market determine the shipping supply. 
While the building of a new ship typically takes a year, the delay of scrapping and 
docking has sudden effect. It is therefore three data sources that reflect the market 
condition. The freight rates on the spot rates reflect the daily market state. Freight rates 
for time-charter agreements roughly follow the spot rates but are generally lower and 
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Number of ships in world fleet Stopford's market cycles Freight rates
 1         1.WW     2       3      2.WW   4      5       6       7       8      9       Number
 6                   3       8              2       9       4       1       7      5       Ranking
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more volatile as they include expectation into the future market conditions. The 
difference between these rates may indicate the confidence in the market. If the 
difference is high, the conjecture indicates a belief in lower freight rates in the near 
future, and vice versa. The third data source is the changes in fleet size. If the order 
books at the yards are full and few ships are being scrapped, this indicates a good 
market, and vice versa. Because it is cheaper to build new ships in a poor market, there 
are examples that ships are build on speculation of higher rates in the near future. Even 
though it is most common to build ships that fit a specific time charter agreement or a 
specific route. Because it takes some time to build a ship, the fleet size data responds 
slower to changes. On the other hand a confident market may not be reflected in the 
freight rates if there is a parallel growth in shipping supply. Consequently, a market 
drop is most efficiently identified by a fall in freight rates, while growth in fleet size 
dominates an improving or confident market.   
 
5. STRATEGIC INFLUENCES ON SAFETY 
The different commercial strategies imply different attributions towards commercial 
risk taking. It is therefore tempting to assess if the various approaches commercial risk 
have an impact upon safety. The total loss ratio for the last century is plotted in figure 2. 
This data reflects the ratio of the motorised vessels over 100 gross tons that are lost due 
to an accident scenario (Source: LMIS). This plot demonstrates that there has been a 
significant reduction in the loss ratio the last century. In average, the yearly 
improvement is 2,4% (Ponce, 1990), but as the plot in figure 2 illustrate these 
improvement have been sporadic. After the 2.WW it was a huge emphasis on increased 
international safety regulation. The period from mid 1930s until the late 1970s seems, 
however, to vacillate around a loss ratio of 0.65%. The major improvements occurred in 
the 1920s, the 1930s and after 1980. These time periods have earlier been pointed out as 
the periods when the long strategically time perspective governed the market. It should 
be noted that some percentages of the world fleet was laid–up during the 1930s and the 
1980s. Due to the lower activity level the real drops in loss ratio may stretch over a few 
more years. For instance the world laid up tonnage was 35% higher in 1932 compared 
to 1929 (League of Nations, 1939). However, 1936 the laid-up tonnage was back to the 
level prior to the depression. If we consider the improvement from the early 1920s to 
the mid 1930s, the drop is roughly 50%. A similar drop appeared during the 1980s. 
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Figure 2:Total loss ratio (Source: LMIS) and market cycles (Source: Stopford, 1998) 
 
Because the industrialists have the motivation to survive depressed market conditions 
these companies are in general older then the speculators. Since the industrialist buy 
more ships from the yards they have a younger fleet. A small company may buy and sell 
their whole fleet based on speculations. Extremely large companies have relatively less 
possibility to gain on such short time speculations. An interview survey on shipbrokers 
accomplished by Tamvakis and Thanopoulou (2000) found that the vessels age were the 
most trusted quality criteria. They further concluded that 15 years represented an age 
where the quality shifted. But the most interesting finding was that the bulk market was 
not willing to pay for quality, giving no motives for the shipping companies to invest in 
quality and safety. In the post Erika tanker market old ships obtain somewhat lower 
rates in a poor market. It might be suggested that the reduced loss ratio during the two 
depressions (figure 2) were related to a new fleet. This hypothesis can be rejected when 
considering figure 3. The chart shows that the main improvement during these periods 
was related to improved navigational standard (Collision and Wrecked). As these 
accidents are highly caused by human failures it seems as if the companies that have a 
long business horizon have organisations with higher human reliability.  
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Figure 3: Categories of the world fleets’ total loss ratio (steam & motor ship larger than 100 gt.) 
(Datasource: LMIS) 
 
6. ARE THERE INDICATIONS OF A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MARKET STATE AND 
ACCIDENT RISK? 
Intuitively one may expect that any extreme market situation have a bad effect upon the 
accident rate. It could be assumed that good times causes companies and operators to 
take unnecessary high risk because of the great profits involved. During depression it is 
also believable that the safety focus is reduced and thereby increasing the risk of 
accidents. In figure 4 the annual change in total loss ratio and the annual change in 
freight rates are plotted together. The chart illustrates that prior to the second world war 
the fluctuations seems to be in phase. Peaks on freight rate series seems to roughly 
match peaks in total loss ratio series. In 1906 for instance, when the decrease in freight 
rates leveled out the total loss ratio nearly 170%. After the Second World War the 
relationship changes, however. The dips in the freight rate series seem to match the 
peaks of the total loss series.   
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To verify the relationships that vaguely can be seen in figure 4 several studies have 
been accomplished. For instance the freight rates are plotted along with the last 
century’s major ship accidents. The accidents causing more than 100 fatalities are 
included before 1970. After 1970 all accident causing more than 250 fatalities are 
included. It was found that years representing peaks and dips each roughly stands for 
30% of the of the total time period. The improving and decreasing market years each 
stand for 20% of the years. When taking account for these differences in time exposure, 
it can be found how the market situation influences the accident risk. After the 2.W.W. 
the accident risk is almost perfectly moved towards an opposite phase (figure 5). This 
means that depressing years involves the highest risk, while the safest years are when 
the market improves.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To roughly test the negative relationship between economy and accident frequency the 
post 2. w.w. freight rates series are compared with the total loss ratio. Because the 
freight rates are volatile the relationships are difficult to see. Therefore, the fluctuations 
were tuned down by use of a moving average approach. Each data point represents the 
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Figure 4: Annual percentage change in freight rates and total loss ratio for the world fleet 
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average of the last few years. The new series is then inversed and put on top of the total 
loss ratio. The inversion is done to assess the negative phases found in figure 4 and 5. 
As figure 6 illustrates, the relationship between the loss statistics (dotted plot) and 
freight rates (solid plot) may also be seen at this approach.  The peak to the right in 
figure 6 is the only fluctuation that is not reflected in the loss statistics. It should be 
recognized that this peak is the inversion of the market drop that forced the speculators 
out of the market (cycle 9 figure 2). This indicates that the companies that have a long 
time perspective have a safety-standard that is relatively insensible to a poor market. It 
should however be mentioned that the late 1980s and the early 1990s a number of 
disasters such as Herald of Free Enterprise and Dona Paz in1987, Exxon Valdez in 
1989, Scandinavian Star in 1990, Agip Abruzzo, Haven and Salem Express in 1991, 
Aegan Sea in 1992, Braer in 1993. Simultaneously the insurance claims increased by 
200%. These characteristics indicate that there is a peak in accidents seriousness also 
during the 1984-1993 peak (figure 6), even though the frequency of losses decreased 
(dotted line).  
 
7. ANALYTICAL APPROACH 
There is one problem in directly comparing data from the freight market with accident 
statistics. The freight rates are increasing over time (Figure 1) while the corresponding 
characteristic for the accident frequency is decreasing (Figure 2). It is therefore 
advantageous to analyze the series with respect to more short term fluctuations. Both 
the slope of the world fleet size series and the loss series have varying strength. By 
focusing on this strength, the relationship between market condition and accident 
frequency can be considered in more detail. Therefore the analytical focus in the 
subsequent study is concentrated on the curvature of the time series. The whole series 
are therefore sorted in convex and concave segments through calculation of the 
approximate second order derivative (δ2X/δ2t).  A positive value indicates a convex 
curve segment ( ∪ ), while negative values indicate a concave curve segment ( ∩ ). The 
approximate second order derivative of the series are calculated by a Matlab 6.1 
software.  
As indicated in figure 5 it was suggested that the accident frequency and market 
cycle before the 2.W.W. followed the same phases. The second derivatives of the 
freight rate, the world’s loss ratio for sail and steam ships with respect to time is plotted 
in figure 7. The plot for the steam ship has the most stable characteristic. The 
correlation between the freight rate series and the sail ship loss series is significantly 
0.59. If the three last years were rejected the correlation would grow to 0.66. Even 
though the plot for the steam ships is less stable, it still follows the same phases. This 
tendency is not properly reflected in the correlation coefficient. Also national fleets 
follow the pattern illustrated in figure 7. 
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Figure 7: 2.derivate of total loss ratio, fleet size and freight rates 1889-1904. 
 
It is not certain when and why the relationship between the market state and accident 
likelihood changed from following the same phase to the opposite one. Some 
explanations will later be provided. During the 1930 the relationships become more 
complex. The same analysis performed for this time period indicates that the accident 
frequency follows the freight rate when the market drops and then shift to follow the 
fleet size when the economical conditions improve. As suggested earlier this shift is 
expected, but makes the quantitative relationships difficult to compute. Figure 8 
illustrates the 2. derivatives in the period 1923 to 1938. Figure 9 presents the same plot 
for 1972 to 1985. 
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Figure 8: 2.derivate of total loss ratio, fleet size and freight rates 1923 – 1938. 
Figure 9: 2.derivate of total loss ratio, fleet size and freight rates 1972-1985 
 
The described relationship between the growth of the world fleet size and loss ratio 
improvements should be inspected in more detail. If this dependency is strong it should 
also be evident for individual ship types. The two ship types involving large risks to 
respectively environment and human beings are the oil tankers and the passenger ships. 
Figure 10 show that the tanker fleet size had a peak at the late 1970s and a dip at the late 
1980s. The growth of the fleet carrying passengers (Passenger General Cargo, RoRo 
passenger, Passenger liners and cruise and ferries) is more stable. There is however are 
also a varying growth rate for this fleet segment.  
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Figure 10: Loss ratio and fleet size for passenger and tank ships 
 
While tankers often are built to fit a general market need, the passenger ships are built 
to fit a specific route. The passenger ships are therefore considered to be more 
individualist then their tanker sisters. A passenger ships first route is therefore likely to 
be her optimal environment. If however, a passenger ship later is moved outside her 
planned route the design mismatches are more obvious then for tankers. During a period 
of large needs for passenger transport a large portion of old vessels are being put into 
new routes.  
Figure 11: Passenger ships 1976-2000 
 
Figure 12: Tankers 1976 - 2000 
 
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001
World's tanker fleet size series
World's tanker loss ratio series (multiplied by one million)
World's passenger ship fleet size series
World's passenger ship loss ratio series (multiplied by one million)
-0,005
-0,002
0,001
0,004
0,007
1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001
2. derivative of world's passenger ship fleet size series
2. derivative of world's passenger ship loss ratio series (Inversed)
-0,005
-0,002
0,001
0,004
0,007
1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001
2. derivative of world's tanker fleet size series
2. derivative of world's tanker loss ratio series (Inversed)
149 
In statistical terms we know that increase in world fleet size is a result of more ships 
being birthed relative to ships being scrapped. Full new-building order books and a 
reduced scrapping rate is therefore a certain indicator of a lucrative shipping market. 
Because it takes about one and a half year from a ship is ordered until it is launched, 
new building decisions are rooted in a longer time perspective. A delay in scrapping 
date is however immediate. This is an advantage for companies emphasizing on short 
time speculations. A fleet of old ships is therefore more likely to catch the benefits 
related to short time peaks in transport demands. Old ships also require less capital and 
therefore involve less investment risk. Besides gambling on freight rates these 
companies get a high profit if they sell off their old ships when the freight rates are 
high. These ships are off course also bought of companies attracted by older ships. 
Because the freight rates follow rapid changes the new built ships are typically set into 
the market when the peak is over, causing the rates to decrease even faster. A good 
freight market is therefore relatively more stressing for the business of companies 
having old ships.  
The calculated second order derivate of the worlds’ yearly ratio of ships lost due 
to respectively foundering, fire or explosion, collision, and grounding. The graphs are 
relatively volatile and generally out of phase. Five times, however, the four curves are 
in equal phase. The fact that they are in phase five times is not surprising, because it is a 
fair chance that they should be that within the specified time. What is more noteworthy 
is that the series are in phase exactly on five out of six of the most severe depressions 
within the given time frame. The collision curve was the only curve out of phase on the 
sixth depression (dark gray arrow). Anyhow, it is highly unlikely (significance level << 
0.001%) that a procedure that randomly selects five periods should all match the serious 
depressions. It is therefore proved that the in-phase characteristics between different 
types during depressions are not random.  
 
8. SUMMARY OF RESULTS  
The periods when speculator strategies are forced out of the shipping market the 
loss ratio drops with 50%. The increases in loss ratio when the market recovers are on 
some trades of the same size. Because the speculators have some differences regarding 
the age of their fleets, it is also possible to estimate differences between the speculators 
and industrialists by comparing various age segments. It is recognized that the total loss 
ratio, serious accident ratio and average number of safety inspection finding increases 
with 50% when considering old ships (older than 15 years) relative to the new ones 
(younger than 15 years).  
Before the First World War changes in the total loss ratio was positively 
correlated with changes in the freight market. The general characteristic after the 
Second World War is that the same variables are negatively correlated. Between the 
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world wars it seems as if the freight market correlated during a market fall, while the 
growth in world fleet correlated during recovery of the market. The fact that the world 
fleet grew before the freight rates recovered indicate that there was built ships on 
speculation. If however, this period represents a general shift in commercial strategies is 
however not known. When the market was really depressed during the 1980s, indicating 
low grade of speculations, the total loss ratio seemed to again be positively correlated 
with the freight rates. During a depression all types of accident scenarios are affected 
(Fire/Explosion, Foundering, Collision and Wrecking). 
There are in summary at least three important results that can be drawn based on 
the preceding analysis. The first is related to strategic focus. The second outlines the 
continuous relationship between market condition and total loss ratio. At last it is 
proved that this relationship affects all types of accidents. The casual explanation 
behind the identified relationships is unknown. Therefore these results are discussed 
with reference to various paradigms within safety management. From shipping we 
know that during periods of poor markets there is a tendency to downsize the 
organization through outsourcing various functions to contracting firms. Therefore the 
economies of for instance ship owners and contract managers are in opposite phase. If 
this is the causal explanation behind the opposite phases of in figure 18 is unknown.  
 
9. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
The findings of this study raise several questions. Knowing that there is a statistical 
relationship between economical conjectures and operational safety, what is the then 
casual relationship? This is necessary to understand in order to take implement this 
knowledge in daily operation. Even though the true explanations are unknown, the 
results are discussed with reference to established theories. Because the rise in accident 
frequency is dependent of economical parameters, the first issue to discuss is the 
decision making of the top-level management. One approach is to consider risk 
homeostasis theory. Risk Homeostasis is a psychological concept that is claimed to 
govern human behavior towards risk (Wilde, 2001). The concept assumes that any 
person has an inherent optimum level of tolerable risk. This level is called the target 
level of risk. If a person perceive that his risk exposure deviate from the target level, he 
will instinctively and unconsciously correct this deviation by changing behavior. An 
implemented safety measure that is perceived to be extremely effective, may therefore 
have a minor or even negative effect, if the operators target level of risk is not 
simultaneously lowered. Wilde (2001) assumed that the target level of risk was 
determined by the following four categories of motivating factors (table 2)  
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Table 2: Factors determining the target level of  risk 
Factor Relationship to economical perspectives 
A  The expected advantage of comparatively risky behavior alternatives. 
B   The expected costs of comparatively risky behavior alternatives. 
C  The expected benefits of comparatively safe behavior alternatives. 
D  The expected costs of comparatively safe behavior alternatives. 
 
Wilde has studied risk homeostasis within traffic safety. His study considers the 
relationship between a population’s prosperity and traffic deaths. That approach is 
therefore in principle similar to the one applied in this study. Wilde found, however, 
that wealth had an increasing effect upon the accident frequency, which is the opposite 
of the conclusions of this study. If the employment is high there is a tendency to drive 
more hazardous. Even though organizations consist of individuals this does not 
necessarily imply that the risk homeostasis principal is valid in organizational safety. 
With reference to the motivating factors (A-D) Wilde have complied the following 
explanation: “When the economy is in a recession, the benefits expected from risky 
behaviour are reduced, because time is worth less money. There is less to be gained 
from driving many km and from driving fast. There is less to be gained from driving 
through a red or amber light or from cutting corners in other ways”. 
 
Table 3: Examples of Risk Homeostasis theories 
Factor Car     Shipping in a good market                              Shipping in a poor market 
  A   Gaining time by speeding                         Increase profits    Cost saving 
  B Repair expenses, insurance surcharges  Potential disruption in income     Insurance coverage 
  C Insurance discount for safe driving             Higher income, branding                Branding 
  D Uncomfortable seatbelts                                 High operational expenses                             High operational expenses 
 
Based on the rationality presented in table 3, the operational tactics may change with the 
market conditions. In turn the tactical decisions influence the organisation thorough 
organisational changes, cost cutting and reduced manning. According to Cameron and 
Quinn (1999) changes that are carried thorough without a concurrent change in the 
organisational culture will fail. He states that: “This dependence to organizational 
improvement on culture change is due to the fact that when the values, orientations, 
definitions, and goals stay constant – even when procedures and strategies are altered- 
organizations return quickly to the status quo. … failed attempts to change, 
unfortunately, often procedure cynicism, frustration, loss of trust, and deterioration in 
moral among organizational members.”. Schein (1990) deified culture as “… a pattern 
of basic assumptions, invented, discovered or developed by a given group, as it learn to 
cope with its problems of external adaptation and integral integration, that has worked 
well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, is to be taught to new members as 
the correct way to perceive, think and feel in relation to those problems.” If the group is 
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defined by the organizational boundaries it is considered as the organizational or 
corporate culture. As Schein indicates in his definition, culture can be explained based 
on the external and internal focus and on how the cultural pattern fit (adaptation / 
integration) with the environment. Based on this duality four different stereotypes of 
organizational cultures can be defined (figure 14).  
There are several characteristics of the shipping environment that determine or 
at least influence the presence of the cultural stereotypes in figure 13. There is a range 
of hierarchal levels within the company from the owner, managers, masters, officers and 
down to the able seamen. The increasing regulatory regimes, that originated at the early 
beginning of the 20th century and grew significantly after the Second World War, has 
caused an extensive volume of compulsory rules and procedures that govern all sea born 
operations. The work onboard is today governed by professional rules and procedures. 
Before the 20th century the know-how was given by principles of “good seamanship”, 
which were passed on from the old hand to the recruits through training, supervision 
and correction of unacceptable behaviour. The change over the century therefore 
represents a shift in organisational focus from the internal flexible (clan) to a more 
internal stable (hierarchal). This shift is typical for any organisational cultures. Over 
time it has a tendency to become more stable (Cameron & Quinn, 1999). While the 
seaborn organisations are of an internal-stable format, the land-based organisation can 
be of an extremely external and flexible character. These cultural elements might be 
extremely present for speculating strategies. For example several enormous investments 
are based solely on the managements’ intuitions. Ships may be bought one day and sold 
the next. The stable internal organisational focus onboard the ships facilitate the process 
in changes in ownerships, as new qualified crews can easily be put together on new 
ships. The visionaries are typically of a more stable external focus. The main external 
criterion is market share, while the internal organisation can also be arranged to 
simulate a market.  
The internal-flexible elements are known to be of a poorer standard within 
shipping. Holt described the typical shipping culture “…characterised by quick 
decisions in buying and selling, short-term solutions, emphasis on technology and 
tonnage, and neglect of people and human values”. The lacking crew participation and 
job satisfaction have been identified by Parket et. Al (19xx) and Keltner (1995). It is 
natural that different commercial strategies result in different organisational cultures. 
For instance, is it likely that a shipping speculator need a more flexible management 
compared to an industrialist. The organisational focus onboard the ship is governed by 
international conventions such as solas, marpol, colreg and stcw. Therefore is the stable 
internal characteristic similar from one ship to the other. The investment in crew 
involvement varies from one company to another, but if the managers do not 
continuously put efforts in keeping it flexible, it will over time be more stable 
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(Cameron). Covin and Slevin (1989) describes the stable organizational process as 
mechanistic while the flexible were labeled organic. Based on their research they relate 
these attributes to how well they are suited for changes. “”organic” structures permit 
rapid organizational responses to changing external  environments, while ‘mechanistic’ 
structures are better suited to predictable environments where rapid organizational 
responses are not typically required”. This indicates that the modern organizational 
cultures within shipping are less suitable to changes in the environment, such as an 
unpredicted hazardous situation or a sudden drop in the freight market.  
Figure 13: Outline of Competing Values Framework 
 
The impact of economising on organisational features, such as reorganisation, 
outsourcing and contacting should be assessed in more detail. Such changes have both 
an immediate hazardous element and a more long lasting uncertainty. The immediate 
hazards are related to wholes in the experience and responsibility for the new structure. 
The uncertainties of a more long lasting effect are related to lacking communication and 
transfer of knowledge across the outsourced activates. It is possible to assess the 
importance of the first hazard. We know that Titanic founded at her virgin voyage and 
Scandinavian Star only sailed seven days in her new route before she became a disaster. 
Sleipner had been in operation for six months before she grounded and was not 
considered fully ready for service by the authorities. The Express Samina had been 
operated only nine moths under its new management before it hit some rocks outside 
Paros taking more than 80 lives. If experience influence on safety performance this may 
have an effect upon Port Stat Control inspection findings. Hence a random sample of 
nearly 400 passenger-carrying vessels is drawn from the International Association of 
Classification Societies (IACS) member fleet. The IACS member fleet covers about 98 
% of the world fleet tonnage. PSC data for this sample is collected from the Equasis 
database. It is a common policy to target passenger ships having new managers for 
inspection. Therefore 45% of the sample had changed manager within the last four 
years. Data is collected for ships having the same manager throughout the four-year 
 
Stability and control 
Flexibility and Discretion
Internal focus and integration External focus and differentiation 
Adhocracy Culture: 
Leader type: Innovator, Entrepreneur, Visionary 
Effectiveness: Cutting-edge 
Criteria: Output, creativity, growth 
Management: Innovativeness 
Theory: Fosters new resources 
 
Clan Culture: 
Leader type: Facilitator, mentor 
Effectiveness: Cohesion 
Criteria: Morale, Development of HR 
Management: Participation 
Theory: Fosters commitment 
 
Market Culture: 
Leader type: Hard-driver, competitor, producer 
Effectiveness: Market share 
Criteria: Goal achievement, competitiveness 
Management: Competition 
Theory: Fosters productivity 
 
Hierarchal Culture: 
Leader type: Coordinator, monitor, organizer 
Effectiveness: Efficiency 
Criteria: Timeliness, smooth functioning 
Management: Control 
Theory: Fosters efficiency 
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period, the group of prior managers and the group of new managers. The PSC 
distributions for the three groups are presented in table 4. 
 
Table 4: Importance of changes in ship management 
  Deficiency findings [%] Chi-Test 
  0 
1 and 
2 
3 to 5 6 to 15
16 to 
30 
31 or 
more
Detention 
[%] Un-
changed 
Prior  New 
Unchanged  938 inspections on 215 ships 43,4 16,8 17,2 17,5 3,9 1,2 7,4 1 0.92 0.79
Prior managers 586 inspections on 177 ships 43,9 15,4 14,5 19,3 4,8 2,2 6,0 0.92 1 0.87
New managers 304 inspections on 111 ships 38,8 15,8 19,1 20,7 3,9 1,6 7,9 0.79 0.87 1 
 
The table illustrates that there are some differences in PSC distributions for the three 
groups. These differences are not large enough to be statistical significant, but it is 
however not believed that the poorer performance of the new managers is spurious. The 
new managers had about 5% fewer inspections with zero deficiencies relative to the 
prior manager. With a large significance value of roughly 15%, it can be showed that 
the new managers have more deficiencies per inspection then the other two groups. It 
should be noticed that it is the same ships, which form the basis of both the old and new 
manager groups. The four-year time frame is relatively small. Therefore the drop in 
performance is related to the managers, and not the ships degradation.  
  The passenger vessels being totally lost in Europe during the period 1985 to 
1998 is analysed based on information from Lloyds register. Only 40% were carrying 
passengers at the time of the incident. This is also an indication of that non-routine 
operations may impose the largest risk. 30% of the vessels were lost under severe 
weather conditions. 34% had been taken out of operation and were lost during repairs 
etc. These non-routine conditions and the fact that any accident scenario by nature is 
unrealistic have given foundation for conspirator theories and rumours of insurance 
frauds. Over time it is recognized that several shipowners have earned large profits on 
the loss of over-insured ships. Given the huge amounts involved, it is in some cases 
likely that the champagnes pop at the investor’s office, when their ship hits the seabed. 
In some cases it is even suggested that the companies deliberately lose their ships.  
 
10. RELEVANCE FOR OTHER INDUSTRIAL DOMAINS 
It has earlier in the text been indicated that the theory behind the findings in the 
maritime environment is likely to be found in other domains. In fact there are several 
domains and accidents that easily fit to the picture outlined in this study. The several 
Russian nuclear submarine losses are probably not independent from their reduced 
budgets. Fargola (2001) describes how the conjectures of the oil prices influence on the 
oil companies’ willingness invest in operational features. One of the major findings in 
the Norwegian risk monitoring of offshore installation, are the uncertainties related to 
budget cuts (Oljedirektoratet, 2002). It has also been speculated upon the almost 
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simultaneous electric power losses in Sweden, Italy, Denmark and USA at the spring in 
2003 was a result of the competitive pressure on production. NASA is another 
candidate. The Columbia investigation report (CAIB, 2003) seem to emphasized on 
parallels to this theory by concluding that “Throughout the decade, the Shuttle Program 
has had to function within an increasingly constrained budget. Both the Shuttle budget 
and workforce have been re-duced by over 40 percent during the past decade. The 
White House, Congress, and NASA leadership exerted constant pressure to reduce or at 
least freeze operating costs. As a result, there was little margin in the budget to deal 
with unexpected technical problems or make Shuttle improvements.”  In both the 
Chernobyl and Seveso disasters the exact knowledge of what happened is unavailable. 
In Chernobyl, it is assumed that the accident was triggered by a series of six violations. 
In addition, safety was not prioritized in the design and selection of location for the state 
owned nuclear power plant. In Seveso the operators also failed to comply with the 
operating procedures. In both disasters the evacuation was delayed due to late 
announcement to the public. 
 
Table 5: Summery of external characteristics for some major disasters 
 Economical parameters and other external goals 
Three Mile 
Island 
The maintenance force was overloaded at the time of the accident and had been reduced in size during an 
economizing drive (Kemeny, 1979) 
Piper Alpha Economic pressure (Pate-Cornell, 1993), The government required that the platform should be fitted with a Gas 
Conservation Module, which had to be located at the available but an unfortunate location (Cullen, 1990) 
King’s Cross ..it is my view that the level of resources and degree of vigour they applied to enforcements ... were insufficient. 
It was in this climate that poor housekeeping and potentially dangerous conditions in underground stations were 
allowed to persist. (Fennel, D., 1988) 
Challenger Economic difficulties had focused the attention of NASA decision makers on the launch schedule, which 
became the means to scarce resources for the space agency (Vaughan, 1996) 
Columbia The organizational causes of this accident are rooted in the Space Shuttle Programs history and culture, 
including the original compromises that were required to gain approval for the Shuttle, subsequent years of 
resource constraints, fluctuating priorities, schedule pressures, mischaracterization of the Shuttle as operational 
rather than developmental, … (Columbia Accident Investigation Board, 2003) 
 
The listed examples in table 5, and several more have already been related to 
cost cutting. It would therefore not provide much new insight in detailed analysis of 
these. James Reason has found a more incomprehensible development in UK (Reason, 
1997). He describes the progress in the British industrial accidents: “Between 1971 and 
1980 there was a clear downward trend in overall numbers of both fatal and non-fatal 
accidents…. But from 1980-81 onwards, the UK industrial accident rate leveled out and 
then began to increase. More people were being seriously injured in the manufacturing 
1981-85 period the and construction industries at the end of then in then beginning. The 
causes of this upturn are still obscure.” Obscure causes give opportunities to 
demonstrate the applicability for new theories. Therefore, the trends in accidents for the 
UK are selected for more detailed analysis. The UK is highly internationalized and is 
large enough to provide solid data, but at the same time enough concentrated to assume 
that different industries are acting in a similar environment. The Health and Safety 
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Executives (HSE) has been a significant player in the development of European safety 
policies and provide available data on the Internet.  
Since the 1950s and the 1960s the UK’s economy was stable. The inflation rate 
had a small peak in 1951 of 12%, but the remained under 5% most of period. The Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) had continually increased, generally more than 2% each year 
(figure 15). Unemployment had been stable at 2%. At the turn of the 1970s the inflation 
increased somewhat. The growth in the GDP peaked to a value of 7% in 1973. Then 
suddenly, in 1974 the world economy turned downwards. For the first time on several 
decades there was a negative growth in the GDP. Inflation grew to a value of 15% in 
1974 and peaked to a value of 25% in 1975.  Unemployment rose slightly, but stabilized 
and had a decreasing tendency in 1978 and 1979. The growth in the GDP turned back to 
a stable positive level in 1976 and onwards. In 1979, however, the British economy was 
again hit by the conjuncture of the world economy. Again the growth in the GDP turned 
negative and the unemployment doubled on slightly more than one year. The inflation 
rate, which had been decreased significantly since 1975, also doubled in 1980. Again, 
the world economy recovered and by 1983 the economy had again stabilized. 
Unemployment, however, kept increasing until 1986 when it again showed a decreeing 
tendency. The British economy managed to be uninfluenced by the fall in world 
economy in 1985 –86. But, just when the economy seemed to have stabilized another 
shock appeared in 1988, when the growth in GDP again turned red. Inflation again 
peaked, but to a somewhat lower level then earlier. The decrease in unemployment rate 
again flatted out and nearly doubled during a few years. The periods 1974-75, 1979-81, 
and middle 1988-92 represent the only three periods with a negative growth in GDP 
after the 2.WW. In 1956 to 1958 the growth of the UK’s GDP was below one percent, 
which remained the lowest record until 1974. In 1957 the second worst train accident in 
the 20th century where 90 people were killed and more than 170 were injured.  
The large economical impacts in during the described periods required new 
measures. It is natural that cost saving, is the most ad-hoc alternative. “British industry 
is seen as being too partial towards its shareholders and top managers at the expense of 
investments, its workforce and its customers”(Gower, 1989). One can than speculate 
into why the UK’s major accidents occurred during these periods. A small crack on a 
tank at the chemical plant Felixborough resulted in improvised repairs to keep up 
production. The insufficient repairs resulted in an explosion that destroyed the whole 
plant and killed 36 people in June 1974. As Reason has indicated the continuous 
decrease in accident rates turned in the early 1980s. While three of UK’s 29 most 
serious train accidents after the 2.WW occurred in the first period (1974-75), nine of 
these accidents occurred in the latest period (1988-92). While these depressions 
represents about 16% of the time more than 40% of the accident train occurred within 
these time periods. It is statistically improbable too randomly select nine out of 55 years 
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that catches 12 out of 29 accidents (5% significance level). In addition the fire at King’s 
Cross took place a few months prior to the 1988-92 period (November 1987), resulting 
in 31 deaths. The Herald of Free Enterprise capsized in March 1987, killing 192 people. 
The Piper Alpha platform exploded in 1989, killing 165 workers. The number of serious 
accidents within airborne traffic is smaller. However, even by ignoring the airplane 
bombed over Locerby 1989, there is a slightly higher density within of accidents in the 
1988-92 period.  
 
Figure 14: Changes in UK’s GDP [*5], their major train accidents and some disasters plotted with respect 
to time 
 
What seems strange is that the 1979 to 1981 period seemed relatively safe. Reason, 
however, claimed to see a change during this period. The political situation changed 
significantly at the mid 1980s. The European Community challenged the barricade 
against free competition. The idea behind the EC was to establish a space without inner 
frontiers, in which the freedom of movement of goods, people, service and capital is 
ensured. However, still in the middle 1980s, the border controls within the EC where 
relatively stringent. Proposals for opening the inner market were getting more support, 
and in 1985 a white paper that outlined realisation of the four rights of freedoms was 
presented. The EC policies, together with the Thatcher regime caused an increased 
economical pressure in the later 1980s. 
Figure 15 gives a hint of what James Reason (1987) called obscure causes really 
was about. In this plot the annual fatal injury rates (per 100 000) as reported to all UK’s 
enforcing authorities for respectively employees and self-employed industrial workers 
are plotted with solid lines. The annual change in GDP presented in figure 15 is 
inversed and adjusted to fit the scales of the fatal injury rates (figure 16). It can be seen 
that there was a significant decrease in GDP in 1980-81 and in 1988-92 (plot is 
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inversed). It seems as if the self-employed are the ones most sensitive to economical 
conditions, which is what one would expect.  
 
 
It has been demonstrated that today, the accident risk and the economical 
conditions are in opposite phase. Earlier it was demonstrated that the ship accidents at 
the late 19th century was in phase with the economy (figure 4,5) opposed to today. Also 
Wilde (2001) demonstrated that car accidents have a tendency to be in phase with a 
society’s wealth. The fatal injury rate for the UK’s employees and self-employed also 
has a tendency to be in the opposite phase (Figure 16). There are at least two feasible 
explanations behind these changes. The first explanation is that there are opposite 
phases between organizational or system accidents and individual or component 
accidents. Car accidents, and occupational accidents are typical individual accidents. 
According to Perrow accidents in the more traditional simple systems, like 19th century 
ships, are caused by component failures and not system failures. Modern ship designs 
are however of a more complex and tight coupled character. For shipping, the changes 
in phase may also be related to economical and regulatory parameters. For the last 
century the shipping market has changed dramatically. Before the First World War 
shipping was not well regulated. Ships in international trade had to comply both with 
their own national requirements and with the requirements of their visiting countries. 
This made the juridical and operational situation complex. Stopford describes the 
market: “Although in the period before First World War the shipping market was 
intensely cyclical, conditions were generally prosperous, and freight market booms 
more than compensated owners for the difficult times during recession.” During the 
latest decades however, the ship owners would in general earn more money through 
investments in the open stock market (Stopford, 199). The dotted line in figure 1 
illustrates that the world fleet had an exponential growth in the period 1947 to 1980. 
During the 1980s the growth in the world fleet was marginal, but in 1991, the growth 
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speeded up again. 1991 can be considered as a turning year. First the tankers spot rates 
at dropped by nearly 30%, before it again grew by 50%. During 1992 the rates again 
dropped 60%. Such enormous fluctuations attract ship speculators represented an end to 
the drop in total losses from the early 1980s. The dry cargo time-chartered rates also 
dropped about 40% in 1992. For the first time in almost a decade the total loss ratio 
increased (figure 2). This tendency can also be seen on the plots for the tanker and 
passenger ships in figure 10.  
 
11. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK 
This study has demonstrated that there is a relationship between economical 
conditions on a macro level and the average accident frequency. For ships the 
relationship prior to the 1.WW was positive indicating that good economy resulted in 
increased accident risk. The same relationship has been found for cars (Wilde, 2001). 
On the other hand ships after the 2.W.W. have a negative relationship. When the 
economy is good the accident frequency is low and vice versa. This negative 
relationship was also found for large-scale accidents during the 1980s. The UK’s fatal 
injury rate also has a negative relationship when the economical conditions change 
significantly. Is should be noted that fatal injury rates both included organizational 
accidents and individual accidents which might have different characteristics influence. 
In summary, the considered ship accidents and several of the major disasters may very 
well be named system accidents, organizational accidents, or even normal accidents. 
But this study also puts them in an economical perspective, which is even closer to the 
core causes. It is therefore justifiable to call these accidents “commercial accidents”. 
The true casual explanation behind the identified relationships are yet unknown. 
However, the established literature within safety management seems to support the 
findings on a qualitative level. The explanation that seems to be most reasonable is that 
stable controls such as rules and procedures are effective in limitation of the risk related 
to overproduction in a good market. When the economy is good the management can 
demonstrate commitment to their employees through extra resources, promotions etc. 
Employees that are involved indecision making and perceive a management 
commitment towards safety, have a tendency to have a better safety performance. This 
informal safety engagement is called flexible control. When the economy turns, the 
managers se a need for cost reduction. Decisions are taken without the involvement of 
the employees. Resources are held back and the salaries are frozen. Reorganization and 
manning reductions further reduce the responsibility, motivation and attention towards 
safety issues. Several accident investigators relate these characteristics to an immature 
safety culture. The stable controls are less effective during organizational changes. 
Hence the efforts of cost saving may deteriorate the flexible controls at the time when 
the stable controls are less effective. This causes the risk of accidents to increase.  
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To become more familiar with the casual relationships, a study should be carried 
out on a micro level for individual companies. This in the process of being finalized for 
a range of passenger and tanker companies. Also other industries should be investigated 
in more detail. Even though the relationships demonstrated in this study have not been 
outlined in such a detail earlier, the qualitative understanding of the relationships has 
been known. In the end the effective measures that make the managers able to control 
risk also during commercial changes have to be developed. Another issue that should be 
understood is why some systems have an accident frequency that is  
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ABSTRACT 
 
An earlier study has demonstrated that the intensity of maritime disasters increase in a 
depressed market. While that study pinpointed this relationship on a macro level, this 
study considers ten individual passenger ship companies. Based on economical 
performance such as net income or stock values and the point of time accidents 
occurred, it was estimated that the accident rate increased by a factor of 20 when the 
economical conjuncture turn from a good state to poor state. Even though this value is 
uncertain the last depression of the world economy can be read out of the companies’ 
accident statistics, thereby proving that there is an inverse relationship between 
economical performance and accident risk. 
 
Keywords: Safety culture, maturity, analysis of patterns 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
There are six well-defined conditions that might give a company a competitive 
advantage (Porter, 1980). These conditions include characteristics like high barriers for 
market entry (1), the uniqueness of the products (2), the customers (3) and the suppliers 
(4) dependence on the products and destructive rivalry among other competitors (5). At 
last, a large market share (6) is generally a competitive advantage. Larger companies 
have higher possibilities to compete on price and survive from a depressed market. In a 
free competitive market the relevance of the five first characteristics are reduced, 
increasing the relative importance of large market shares. However, Cameron and 
Quinn (1999) argue for that the suitability of the organizational culture often makes a 
difference. According to their Competing Values Framework, organisations that have a 
biased concentration towards market shares are too stable to efficiently tackle 
organisational changes. As a result homogenous free competitive market favours the 
companies that have large market shares, but at the same time the organisations that are 
too centred towards market shares are less suited for fast growth. Another aspect is that 
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the allocation of resources for growth implies fewer resources allocated for operation 
and maintenance. In this context the decision makers are forced to make a trade-off 
between high commercial risk and high operational risk.  
Roughly 80% of the accidents are caused by human failures, while the remaining part is 
of a technical nature. Statistics also indicates that the majority of ship accidents occur at 
times when the circadian rhythm of the operator is at a minimum level or is disturbed. 
Because it is difficult to assess if operators are fatigued or behave hazardous, it is 
relatively easy to unnoticeably or unknowingly cutback on safety. As a result the 
concept of safety culture was defined during the mid 1980s. Simultaneously, changes in 
the organizational structures were considered as hazardous. Buzz words like 
“outsourcing”, “downsizing”, “contracting” and “re-organization” worried the safety 
experts (Hovden, 1996; Cameron & Quinn 1999). Also inadequate resources and cost 
cutting had been evident in several of the disasters. These trends triggered the quality 
assurance reaction during the 1990s, but the totality of these characteristics and their 
relationship are yet unexplored. The missing feedback on actual accident risk has made 
Rasmussen (1997) propose a model describing how a company continuously move 
operation towards the boundary of functionally acceptable performance. When reaching 
this limit Rasmussen states that: “Ultimately, a quite normal variation in somebody’s 
behaviour can then release an accident. Had this particular ‘root cause’ been avoided 
by some additional safety measure, the accident would very likely be released by 
another cause at another point in time. In other words, an explanation of the accident in 
terms of events, acts and errors is not very useful for design of improved systems”. 
Therefore, in a qualitative sense, there exists a link between commercial strategies, 
safety culture, fatigue and accidents. 
During an earlier study of the relationship between ship disasters and the state of the 
shipping market it has been demonstrated that these parameters are negatively 
correlated. In a poor market the frequency of disasters increase. This relationship was 
demonstrated on a macro level for segments of the world fleet at various periods during 
the 20th century. Because economical conditions seem to determine the likelihood of 
accidents, they are labelled “commercial”. The relationships were both found on long 
time trends over several decades and the development from one year to another. To 
pinpoint on the yearly changes, comparisons were done on the curvature of the time 
series (second derivatives). Figure 1 presents the relationship between the curvature of 
the tanker fleet size (dotted and inversed line) and the fraction of ships being lost each 
year due to accidents. In a good market the fleet size increases (Koopmans, 1939; 
Zannetos, 1966; Stopford, 1997).  
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Figure 1: Dependency between fleet size and TLR for passenger ships on a macro level. 
 
2. SCOPE OF STUDY 
It has earlier been demonstrated at a world fleet level that disasters are more frequent in 
a falling market (Soma, to be published b). Detailed causal knowledge behind this 
relationship is not directly accessible even though there exist considerable research that 
may be relevant. The objective of this study is three folded. First, this study is to assess 
if it actually is an inverse relationship between economical parameters and safety 
performance at a company level. Secondly, potential causal explanations behind this 
relationship are assessed within an organisational context. Thirdly aspects of regulative 
and customer demands that may trigger the inverse relationship are explored.  
Six passenger ship companies are considered in detail in this study. Of these 
companies Stena Line is the only considered company that has not been directly been 
involved in any disasters, and has over time obtained an image related to quality and 
safety. The development within Stena Line over time is however of special interest. The 
remaining five passenger ship companies are White Star Lines, Towsend Thoresen, 
Hardanger Sunnhordlandske Dampskipselskap (HSD) and Minoan Flying Dolphin 
(table 1). The economical development of the companies is described in terms of 
investments, stock values or annual results. Because the disasters themselves are a small 
dataset, both serious and non-serious accidents are collected from the Lloyd’s Fairplay 
LMIS (Lloyd’s Maritime Information Service) database. Both of these accident types 
are of a technical nature. Serious accidents represent those events when the ship requires 
assistance, such as collisions, extensive fires, groundings and loss of propulsion. The 
non-serious accidents are the reported incidents that are of a milder nature. In this way 
the relationship between the accidents and the economical power of the companies can 
be assessed. To control for possible placebo effects related to the accidents impact on 
economy two of Minoan Flying Dolphin’s competitors, NEL and ANEK are also 
assessed. Similarly are three of HSD’s competitors Troms Fylkes Dampskip Selskap 
(TFDS), Sogn og Fjordane Fylkeskommune (Fylkesbaatane) and Ofoten Vesteraalens 
Dampskip Selskap (OVDS) are assessed (table 1).  
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Table 1: Considered companies, their geographical area and scientific relevance 
Area Company Scientific Relevance 
Atlantic White Star Line Titanic (1912). 1500 fatalities 
English Channel Towsend Thoresen Herald of Free Enterprise (1987). 197 fatalities 
Kategatt Stena Line Retrospective 
Minoan Flying Dolphin Express Samina (2000). 83 fatalities 
NEL Placebo control of disaster impact 
Mediterranean 
ANEK Placebo control of disaster impact 
HSD Sleipner (1999). 16 fatalities 
TFDS Placebo control of disaster impact 
Fylkesbaatane Placebo control of disaster impact 
North Sea 
OVDS  Placebo control of disaster impact 
 
 
3. REGULATING THE PASSENGER SHIP MARKET 
The shipping markets can roughly be divided into the liner market and the tramp 
market. While the tramp market are governed by the tons of commodity carried or a rate 
of hire, the liner market is governed by the willingness to pay for transportation in a 
fixed route between defined ports, sailing according to a given schedule. Passenger 
ships are typically operated in a liner market. In regional and international routes 
(Transatlantic, English Channel and Kategatt) the liner companies act in a competitive 
environment, in contrast to the more lenient character of the traditional domestic routes. 
In Europe the governments has considered it reasonable to subsidise the domestic routes 
and control them through a licence system (Mediterranean and North Sea). In a safety 
perspective, the advantage of a liner market is the stable conditions that make it easier to 
learn about the governing hazards. Learning is crucial, as a passenger ship is typically 
specially designed for a given route, has frequent port leaves and typically crosses the 
sailing pattern of long distance cargo ships. In some cases the government also holds 
owner interests in the shipping companies. Actually all routes have periods of increased 
competition (table 2), generally influenced by the authorities.  
 
Table 2: Considered companies, their geographical area and scientific relevance 
Area Time of increased competition Regulatory factors influencing on competition 
Atlantic Late 19th and early 20th century Increased transport, national competition 
English 
Channel 
Middle 1980s Increased transport, privatization, tunnel, break-up 
of cartels 
Kategatt Late 1980s and early 1990s Abolition of the duty-free sales, introduction of 
Flags of Convenience with low cost crews, bridge 
Mediterranean Late 1990s and early 2000s EC compulsory tendering system, break-up of 
cartels. 
North Sea Late 1990s and early 2000s EC compulsory tendering system, compulsory cost 
saving programs, bridge. 
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After the Herald Of Free Enterprise accident Crainer (1993) stated that “Competition 
is traditionally based on the ability to meet timetable demands rather than on quality of 
service and safety. If a company fails to compete on these terms, it is simply fails to 
compete. Safety is not unusually deemed to offer a ‘competitive edge’. Even though 
safety and competition was seen as a critical combinations this was not considered when 
the EC compulsory tendering systems replaced the licence system at the late 1990s. A 
licence system implies that only one accredited company can operate in a given 
connection. Even though the licenses are given over a restricted number of years, it 
became common to automatically renew these licences. The disadvantage with a liner 
market is that the operation may be too stable. A secured market position, stable time 
schedules and a predictable environment might in fact produce an organisational inertia. 
Monopoly characteristics can also reduce the customer’s opportunities to directly 
influence the decision making of the companies. In order to increase competition the 
European Community (EC) challenged the license barricades in the domestic routes. 
The idea behind the EC is to establish a space without inner frontiers, in which the 
freedom of movement of goods, people, service and capital is ensured. Even though this 
process started in 1968, there were still stringent border controls between the European 
communities in the middle 1980s. In the maritime arena this policy was strengthened in 
1985 and 1992 (table 3).  
 
Table 3: Some years of increased EC market regulation 
Year Topic 
1968 Process of inner market started 
1985 A white paper that outlined realisation of the four rights of freedoms was presented 
1986 Council regulations (4055, 4056, 4057, 4058) were adopted to ensure freedom to provide 
services in ocean trade. 
1992 A regulation (3577/92) specifically aimed at maritime cabotage (domestic transp.) was adopted. 
Even though the regulations should be implemented within 1998 there are still European routes 
sailing on licence. 
 
For the ferry operators the article four of the 1992 regulation was of special interest, 
as it stated that the license system was to be revealed by a compulsory competitive 
tendering system, ideally within 1998. In principle this means that a ferry company may 
loose its right to operate on a specific route, if a competing company could offer a more 
attractive service. The article further states that all the Community shipowners should 
be treated equally. Therefore the allowed tender obligations were limited to concerning 
what ports to be served, regularity, continuity, frequency, capacity to provide the 
service, rates to be charged and manning of the vessel. Safety was seen as irrelevant, 
since safety should be ensured by other requirements and regulative regimes. In a 
shipowners’ point of view, however, the obligations represent a ticket to trade. 
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Consequently, the strategies for the whole European ferry fleet had to be adapted to the 
competitive situation and the stated obligations.  
 
4. ORGANIZATIONAL ASPECTS 
In order to theoretically understand how the relationship between the market strategies 
influences on organisational features it is necessary to familiarise with the concept of 
organisational culture. Schein (1990) deified culture as “… a pattern of basic 
assumptions, invented, discovered or developed by a given group, as it learn to cope 
with its problems of external adaptation and integral integration, that has worked well 
enough to be considered valid and, therefore, is to be taught to new members as the 
correct way to perceive, think and feel in relation to those problems.” If the group is 
defined by the organizational boundaries it is considered as the organizational or 
corporate culture. As Schein indicates in his definition, culture can be explained based 
on the external and internal focus and on how the cultural pattern fit (adaptation / 
integration) with the environment. The theoretical model is entitled Competing Values 
Framework and is widely used within organizational analyses (Quinn and Rorbraugh, 
1983) illustrated in figure 2. Based on these two variables Organizational Orientation 
and Organizational Processes it is possible to roughly describe the organizational 
culture within a company. The Organizational Culture Assessment instrument (OCAI) 
is a six-item ipsative questionnaire that is developed based on the CVF (Cameron and 
Quinn, 1999).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Outline of Competing Values Framework 
 
Cameron pinpoint that the nature of the rapid changes in our dynamic society and the 
complexity of the organizations in principle favour specific organizational cultures. It is 
fear to assume that the organisational processes of a liner company adapt to the stability 
of its environment. In fact, it is known that over time the processes of any organisation 
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tend to adapt processes of a stable and inflexible character (Cameron and Quinn, 1999). 
The relaxed business pressure, the invariable surroundings and the stable operation 
should further increase the stability of these organisations. Baker and Hawes (?) 
explored the organizational culture behind various market strategies and organizational 
performance. They found that the firms obtaining the optimal performance were those 
who had a high level of market strategies combined with an organic (flexible) culture 
i.e. Clan or Adhocracy. These cultures are also far better in tackling changes. A Clan 
culture involves management commitment and a decentralised organisation causing 
each employee to take responsibility and feel an ownership of the company’s service or 
products. In (Soma, 2004) it is indicated that commitment is crucial to obtain a good 
safety performance. The operators perceived responsibility is in principle one of the 
major findings in LaPorte and Consolini’s (1991) research into High Reliability 
Organizations.  
 
5. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TRANS ATLANTIC COMPETITION 
During the late 19th century the cross Atlantic traffic increased significantly. The 
international trade had been increasing and the American economy matured. Even 
though there was an open competition, there was also sharpened national struggle 
between the German, American and British steamers. Throughout the 1880s, speed was 
the key competitive factor. The Spanish-America war and the Boer war absorbed huge 
volumes of shipping tonnage. At the same time America export increased causing the 
cross Atlantic market too prosper. From 1900 to 1902 the number of passengers 
increase by 24%, and the annual number of passengers turned one million. Some 
shipowners realised that speed had been pushed to the limits, and that it would be 
favourable to relax the competition through development of a company structure that 
could dominate the market. These shipowners obtained financial support from an 
American magnate Pierpont Morgan who acquired the International Navigation 
Company, the White Star Line, the Belgian Red Star Line, the Domino Line, the 
Atlantic Transport Line and the Leyland Line, and formed his International Mercantile 
Marine Company (IMMC). When the war ended the market declined. This was 
observed prior to the formal takeover. It was realised that the acquisitions turned out to 
be twice as expensive as estimated. However, the public attention and the involved 
prestige pushed the process forward. As a result the IMMC collapsed soon after its 
formation, recover and again went into a bankruptcy in 1915. Even though the White 
Star Line continued to produce profits, its market share declined relative to the Cunnard 
Line and the Germans.  
The step to compete on luxury and comfort instead of speed seemed to be a failure. 
Ismay, under pressure from the American co-director, ordered the Olympic to sail faster 
than her original schedules. A few months after the Olympic’s maiden voyage in 1909 
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she collided with a warship. Also the Baltic, operated by White Star Line, grounded in 
dense fog this year. This ship had earlier been ignited by an exhausted watchman, but 
was by pure luck recognized and distinguished. Her captain, Edward J. Smith, who was 
held responsible for the Olympic collision was also in charge onboard Titainc on her 
maiden voyage. Even though several authors have recognized the harsh competition, it 
is difficult to directly relate this to the series of accidents. 
The Titanic had a safe design with several watertight compartments giving her the 
nickname “the unsinkable ship”. The high belief in the vessel’s safety standard resulted 
in several awkward decisions and habits (Håvold, 1999; Caridis & Tsitsonis 1998). The 
ship had a lifeboat capacity cowering only about one third of the people onboard and 
was also insured for only one third of its real value. He further writes that “It seemed 
important for the National Administrator’s to maintain an national industry and 
therefore did not push for << costly>> safety measures. The incentives for the decision 
makers seem to be more of on short term financial and survival criteria, rather than on 
long term safety impact.”  support this view. Also emphasis is assigned to the rapid 
paste of new technology (Cahill, 1990). The Titanic hit an iceberg on her maiden 
voyage and subsequently foundered resulting in more than 1500 deaths. Table 4 
presents some findings categorised in the competing values framework.  
 
Table 4: elements of the competing values framework for White Star Line 
Clan Hierarchal Market Adhocracy 
Not found. The crew had not 
been satisfactory trained. The 
captain had a history of 
accidents. 
The ignorance of the ice 
warnings contradict flexible 
controls. 
Traditional shipping 
organisation with explicit 
hierarchy. Safety is 
incorporated in rules and 
procedures and in passive 
safety devices such as 
watertight compartments  
The competitive strategies were the 
driving forces for the company. Even 
the merge was known to be costly the 
stability of the organisation brought it 
forward. The high speed, and the 
unwillingness to change courses even 
being aware of the ice indicate strong 
goal orientation. 
It was a visionary and 
innovative strategy to 
consider comfort as a 
competitive factor and to 
build large, relatively fast 
and safety ships. 
 
6. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CROSS CHANNEL MARKET 
The United Kingdom became a member of the EEC in 1973. For some years the 
UK’s trade pattern shifted towards the Continent of Europe. Because the southeast part 
of England could provide the most efficient transport routes to the mainland, this area 
became the zenith of British trade. The motorway capacity on both sides of the channel 
had been increased for several years. These characteristics, in addition to the short 
sailing distance, made the efficient loading and unloading of Roll on-Roll off (Ro-Ro) 
vessels far more competitive compared to containerised transport. In fact, the channel 
between England and the continent of Europe became one of the world’s most heavily 
travelled waterways (Boyd, 1996) where Ro-Ro vessels carried a great deal of the traffic 
(Branch, 1988). During the early 1980s several factors affected these routes. While Ro-
Ro vessels are extremely efficient in loading and unloading the design is extremely 
vulnerable for the free surface effect of water ingress. According to Branch, the 
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shipowners were very aware of the cross channel growth from the early 1960s. The 
Daily Telegraph (10.mars, 1987) describes the Governments decision in 1979 to break 
up what they called “the unofficial cartel by which channel companies liased on fares 
and sailing” as the real opening for the cross channels competition. The newspaper 
further writes: “Competition is reaching suicidal levels among ferry firms with some 
collapsing and all making big economics”. Companies such as the British and Irish 
Steam Packet was making heavy losses. Hover Lloyds and SeaSpeed had been force to 
merge. Sealink was demanding manning cuts and the P&O London-Ostend hydrofoil 
route were closed. The government had also contributed to a more competitive situation 
when it kicked off the privatisation of SeaLink UK Ltd in July 1984, which previously 
was a subsidiary of the government owned British Rail. At that time SeaLink UK, its 
European state-owned counterparts and a private company called Townsend Thoresen 
dominated the cross-channel operations. The competitive pressure was further stressed 
in 1986 when the plan for the tunnel between England and France was accepted.  
The company structure of Townsend Thoresen was relatively complex. In 1968 there 
was a merge between the two companies Townsend Brother Ferries and Thoresen Car 
Ferries. Together they form the European Ferries Group and become the largest 
independent ferry company in Europe. In 1971 the Atlantic Steam Navigation Company 
was purchased for £5.5 millions. The P&O Normandy Ferries was acquired in 1985, 
which operated five ships. By the mid 1980s Towsend Thoresen had been diversifying 
its corporate aims and had invested in various ventures, such as Airship Industries and 
an ambitious building project in Denver, Colorado. The costs of the later investment 
grew beyond the company’s capacity. Therefore fresh capital was necessary and 
American investors became leading shareholders. Peninsular and Oriental Steam 
Navigation Company (P&O) had also accumulated shares in the company and struck a 
deal to buy out the Americans. The whole group became a subsidiary of the P&O on the 
5.th December 1986. Although the ownership changed at this date, the company 
remained unchanged for a whole year. However, a few moths after the acquisition the 
Herald of Free Enterprise disaster took place. Townsend Thoresen was relatively early 
strategically preparing itself for a more competitive position. A heavy new- and 
“jumboising” programme responded the end of cross-company collaboration in 1979, 
meaning in principle that the size of the vessels was significantly increased.  A new 
vessels design called the Spirit class was the basis for three new Ro-Ro vessels. The old 
ships that were not rebuilt were sold off. One of the subjects for jumboising was the 
five-year-old Ro-Ro vessel European Gateway, accomplished in 1980. It seems that 
another wave of investment takes place in 1985, when the P&O Normandie Ferries was 
acquired and the remaining part of the old ships were jumboised. Herald of Free 
Enterprise (HFE) was a Sprit class vessel that was launched in 1980. The 433 feet long, 
7,950 gross ton vessel was the largest of her kind and was specifically designed to 
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operate the route between Dover and Calais. Also the route between Dover and 
Zeebrugge was within her operational plan. She accelerated rapidly to 22 knots and 
could carry 1400 passengers. The 10th of July, two months after delivery from the yard, 
the Herald of Free Enterprise managed to take the speed record for conventional ferries 
sailing between Dover and Calais. To obtain a maximum efficiency, the ports at Dover 
and Calais had arrangements to simultaneously load and unload her two main vehicle 
decks.  
Figure 3: The relationship between economical conditions and accident density for Towsend Thoresen 
 
In December 1982 the first sign of insufficient safety within Towsend Thoresen 
became publicly available. After leaving berth at Felixstowe the master onboard the 
European Gateway decided to abandon the practice to pass the incoming vessel 
Speedlink Vanguard, owned and operated by SeaLink U.K., on her port side. Besides 
the time gained on such a manoeuvre is marginal, the European Gateway’s master did 
only inform the Traffic Control centre about his intentions. The captain onboard 
Speedlink Vanguard observed European Gateway, but being unaware of her initiative to 
pass at her starboard side, he decided to stick to international accepted procedures for 
collision avoidance (COLREG). When he realised that European Gateway did not 
manoeuvre as he expected, he managed to reduce the speed significantly before the 
encounter. European Gateway was hit in her starboard side. Her crew had left three 
watertight doors open, causing the situation to escalate rapidly (Spouge, 1985). She 
listed, flooded, and soon broke free from Speedlink Vanguard’s embedded bow. 
Fortunately the rescue response was immediate. A pilot vessel nearby managed to 
evacuate most of the passengers through her pilot launch. Some more were saved after 
the vessel had capsized in shallow water. The following investigation considered it 
remarkable that only six lives were lost.  
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The management did not take the company’s problem of closing watertight doors 
seriously. In contrast to most Ro-Ro vessels, that have bow visors to prevent water 
ingress on the vehicle decks, the Spirit class vessels were fitted with clam doors. This 
type of doors is impossible to visually observe from the bridge. In order to ensure water 
tightness, one of the crew had to enter the vehicle decks before leaving port, to ensure 
that the doors were closed, and then report to the master. Both the HFE and her sister 
the Pride of Free Enterprise (PFE) started visiting the port at Zeebrugge, which did not 
have the adequate ramps on land. The single ramp reduced the port efficiency and was 
slightly too low to reach the upper decks. Therefore these vessels’ bow had to be 
trimmed down by pumping in ballast water. At the port in Dover, the time schedule was 
too tight to allow proper discharge and loading. Consequently, the company’s crew and 
management, felt their need to gain some surplus time at other operational phases. The 
most efficient strategy was to urge the leave from Zeebrugge. As soon the ship was 
fully loaded, it had to leave, independent of its planned departure. The stress can be 
exemplified by the announcing of the crew to go to their positions even before the 
loading was complete (Crainer, 1993). The written procedures required some of the 
crew to be at two locations at the same time. In this stressing situation it became regular 
for the masters to assume that the doors were closed if not the contrary was reported. On 
a few occasions this negative reporting failed. In 1984 the PFE left Dover with both 
bow and stern doors open because the assistant bosun had fallen asleep and failed to 
carry out his duty. The masters then several times requested the onshore management to 
install indictor lights had to be installed on the bridge, in more easily ensure that the 
doors were closed. These requests were rejected. On the 6th mars 1987, Herald of Free 
Enterprise sailed from Zeebrugge with 459 passengers onboard. Because of the 
inadequate ramps at the berth, the ship had a forwardly trim. The bow doors had not 
been closed. Within only a few minutes the car deck had accumulated enough water to 
capsize the ship in shallow water. The ship was rapidly filled with water and at least 150 
passengers and 38 crewmembers lost their lives. The characteristics of Towsend 
Thorsen in a CVF context is summarised in table 5.  
 
 Table 5: elements of the competing values framework for Towsend Thoresen 
Clan Hierarchal Market Adhocracy 
Not Found:  Factors that 
disagree with this culture: 
Initiatives nd responsibility 
taken by the captains on two 
occasions to implement bow 
visor indicators were not only 
rejected by the management, 
but also responded in an 
arrogant phrasing. Crews 
were pressured to work 
The traditional shipping 
hierarchy existed. Rules and 
procedures were supposed to 
dominate the work onboard. 
However, these procedures 
were in conflict with each 
other and were in practice 
impossible to follow. A 
practice of negative reporting 
emerged. Therefore, the 
elements of this cultural type 
were present, but deteriorated. 
The acquirement of 
competitors indicates a focus 
on market share. Competition 
was also aimed against other 
ship designs such as RoRo 
train ferries, Container 
vessels and the cross channel 
tunnel.  
Goal oriented: Extreme 
pressure to keep time 
schedule. 
In the competitive lead 
Were ahead of the competitors 
through “jumboising” the old 
vessels and was early at the 
yards to modernise their fleet. 
The marketing was innovative 
with a reliable time schedule 
and extra services such as 
subsided drivers meals, 
vouchers for us in shop or bar, 
free cabins and driver’s clubs, 
computerised reservation, 
documentation, billing and 
customs, etc.  
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7. THE DEVELOPMENT IN THE KATEGATT ROUTES 
The Kategatt is located between Denmark and Sweden and is an important line of 
transport between these two countries. Its adjacency to the Baltic sea and the coast of 
Norway, Germany and Poland further increase the intensiveness of the transport across 
the Kategatt. One of the major players in the RoRo shipping in this area is the Stena 
Line. The history of Stena Line can be tracked back to 1939 when the Swede Sten Allan 
Olson inherited a freight boat from his father. In 1960 the company operated 15 freight 
boats. In 1962, a radical strategic change took place by the acquired the Gothenburg-
Skagen ferry route. This was a successful move. During the 17 first months the net 
profit was of 22 million (Swedish Crowns), which is on of the company’s best results in 
history relative to the size of the operation. In 1982 they acquired the Sessan Line, 
which significantly increased the company size. This was the first move of a long 
lasting expansion. From 1983 to 1989 the net profit of the company grew by 600%. A 
range of subordinates was developed comprising RoRo vessels, bulk and tanker vessels, 
offshore contracting, international finance, property management, hotels, restaurants 
and information systems.  
Even though cheap food and tax-free products were their main tactical success factor 
much of the profit making emphasis was given to speculations into buying and selling 
ships. According to Holt (1989) “it was more interesting to buy and sell ships at the 
second hand market than to carry passengers …At the bottom is the traditional shipping 
culture, characterised by quick decisions in buying and selling, short-term solutions, 
emphasis on technology and tonnage, and neglect of people and human values”. In 
1982, however, a change in leadership took place. The new leadership rejected this 
market strategy. The “New Stena Line” had objective of generating profit from the ferry 
operations as the main source of income. To attract passengers and to make them come 
back several market-oriented measures were implemented. Stena Line and Towsend 
Thoresen had several similarities. They both expanded during the early 1980s, they 
applied large RoRo-passenger ferries, “jumboised” their older ferries and were using an 
innovative marketing apparatus of a similar nature. However, Stena’s market orientation 
implied employee involvement, which was in sharp contrast to Towsend Thoresen. 
Stena’s tactic was to transform the old autocratic technology driven company to a 
decentralised market driven service organisation. Consequently a market oriented 
organisational culture had to be developed. In 1983 all 2000 employees were coursed by 
an external consulting company and attended to a conference. In 1984 a one-day 
seminar was arranged where the employees were directly involved in the process of 
developing a market orientated culture. The results of this process will be described 
later. As the manager did not feel that the obtained effect of this effort was satisfactory, 
all supervisors and middle managers had meeting and seminars on how the culture 
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should be further improved over the subsequent few years. Later new follow up projects 
were added. Holt (1989) summaries the development as this “ “It really represents a 
cultural clash”. A decentralised, market oriented culture with emphasis on profit 
generation through increased income represents a radical change from the autocratic, 
technology oriented traditions with top down order giving emphasis on cost saving.” 
Because, Stena acquired SeaLink, the only competitor of Towsend Thoresen, the 
cross channel tunnel was another competitive element. Also the sound bridge between 
Sweeden and Denmark would significantly influence the importance of the Kattegat 
routes. The opening of the European market indicated abolition of the duty-free sales. In 
1989, Stena Line pinpointed the dangers related to ships sailing under flags of 
convenience “It is of vital importance for the Swedish ferry transportation that the 
Nordic ferry companies compete on similar conditions”. In 1990 the VR DaNo ferry 
named Scandinavian Star went into competition on the Oslo-Fredrikshavn route sailing 
under Bahamas flag. The ferry had untrained and incompetent crew and turned into a 
disaster after seven days of operation, killing 158 peoples. In 1991 Stena Line presented 
ferry operators with crews from low-cost countries as one of the most important 
competitive threats. Under the following year there were several changes in 
managements and strategies. The company was listed on Stockholm Stock Exchange 
from 1988 to 2001.  
The significant emphasis on the participation of the employees can be seen in the 
objectives stated in 1988/89 annual report (table 6). But in 1995 however, the objectives 
had changed somewhat away from the employees to technological aspects, effectiveness 
and a secure workplace. While the efforts in the mid 1980s had references to a Clan 
culture, these new objectives are typical elements of a Bureaucratic culture. During 
1998 a serious reorganisation took place. In 1999 the objectives had been changed even 
further indicating elements of a Market culture (figure 1). The same year nearly 700 
employees were given notice to resign. The following year the lift-on/lift-off container 
service between Harwich and Zeebrugge was closed down. In the 1999 annual report 
the objectives had again shifted towards elements of a market culture.  
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Table 6: Stean Lina’s business objectives over time 
Goal and strategy (translated 1989) 
Business concept, objectives and strategy 
(1995) 
Vision, objectives 
and Business 
Concept (1999) 
The economical objectives is going to be 
achieved through development of service 
cultures that attract more customers within the 
concern’s various activities (volume goal) and 
meet the increasing demand of more refined 
products and services (refinement goal) 
 
The expansion of the service industry is 
dependent of the initiatives of each individual 
employee. It is the teamwork of the individual 
human’s that generates the company’s results. 
 
The concern’s strategy is therefore to create 
organisations having simple structures that 
give room for the potential of every individual 
employee. 
Running an attractive route network… 
 
Using modern, well maintained, safe ships 
adapted to customer’s requirement 
 
Providing a service which is perceived by the 
customer as positive and friendly, and as 
providing value for money. 
 
Constantly trying to be more efficient than our 
competitors in every sphere of operations 
 
Constituting a secure, developing and attractive 
workplace in which decentralisation and personal 
responsibility are the keys to the staff policy. 
Become profitable 
 
Maintain market 
position both in 
volume and price 
 
Increase company 
value by producing 
a health return on 
investments 
 
Attractive 
proposition to 
employees and all 
other stakeholder 
 
The adjusted objectives are likely to be a result of changes in the market. Therefore 
are two economical parameters plotted with respect to time in figure 4.  In the same plot 
serious and non-serious accidents recorded by Lloyds Register are presented as 
individual crosses. The accumulated density of these accidents is also presented. When 
the density is high, it is registered many accident per time and vice versa. To be certain 
that the variation in accident occurrences is not related to changes in fleet size it should 
be noted that in 1990 the company operated 14 routes with 30 ships. In 1996 the number 
of routes had increased to 17 but still with 30 ships. In 2002 the number of routes was 
still 17, but the fleet had increased to 33 ships. Even though the fleet size has varied 
somewhat this variation does not justify the cycles in accident illustrated in figure 4.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: The relationship between economical conditions and accident density for Stena Line 
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The figure illustrate that a cascade of accidents occurred simultaneous to the strategic 
change in the early 1980s. But after the change process there was almost a decade where 
hardly any accidents occurred. The two accidents in 1989 were related to the ship 
involved in a local closure of a ferry route between Helsingborg in Sweden and Grenaa 
in Denmark. The 1991 accident occurred under tough economical circumstances. A 
summary of the findings related to the CVF is presented in table 7. 
 
Table 7: elements of the competing values framework for Stena Line 
Clan Hierarchal Market Adhocracy 
Weak prior to 1982, strong 
after 1984 and then weaker 
again in the mid 1990s.   
The traditional shipping 
hierarchy existed. Rules and 
procedures were supposed to 
dominate the work onboard. 
However, these procedures 
were in conflict with each 
other and were in practice 
impossible to follow. A 
practice of negative reporting 
emerged. Therefore, the 
elements of this cultural type 
were present, but deteriorated. 
The acquirement of 
competitors indicates a focus 
on market share. Competition 
was also aimed against other 
ship designs such as RoRo 
train ferries, Container vessels 
and the cross channel tunnel.  
Goal oriented: Extreme 
pressure to keep time 
schedule. 
In the competitive lead 
Were ahead of the competitors 
through “jumboising” the old 
vessels and was early at the 
yards to modernise their fleet. 
The marketing was innovative 
with a reliable time schedule 
and extra services such as 
subsided drivers meals, 
vouchers for us in shop or bar, 
free cabins and driver’s clubs, 
computerised reservation, 
documentation, billing and 
customs, etc.  
 
  
8. THE OPENING OF DOMESTIC ROUTES FOR COMPETITION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 
In the early and mid 1990s the first competitive adjustments (table 3) could be observed 
in other European countries. The date for lifting of the ban of foreign operators to enter 
Greek domestic transport was first as late as 1. January 2004. Already in 1997, 
however, an Italian company tried to enter the market. The following two years 
involved large changes. In 1998 the Minoan Line went on the stock marked and was 
soon followed by the ANEK line. Similar to the break off of the cross-channel cartels in 
1979, the EC imposed fines on seven Greek companies for colluding at fix prices. 
Simultaneously a new company called Minoan Flying Dolphin (MFD) entered the 
market. This company was originally a subsidiary of the Minoan Lines, called Minoan 
Highspeed, which bought a majority of 60 per cent stake in a company named Ceres 
Hydrofoils. This 100 million dollar investment represented a first move in an extremely 
aggressive acquisition policy. Emboldened by the stock market boom in 1999, the 
Greek operators announced a slew of orders for new vessels and buy-outs. Within 2000 
the many merges, buy-outs and alliances created three groups of companies that each 
claimed a distinct share of the market. This year represented a terrible change in the 
market. The stock marked dipped, and a MFD experienced its first retreat by cancelling 
the partnership deal with the NEL Lines. Later, the September 11 attack resulted in 
fewer passengers and a 600% increase in insurance premiums. The oil price raised and 
the companies had agreed with the government on a fixed supply of transportation 
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independent of the transport demand. Consequently, several routes carried larger crews 
then passengers. MFD got into a serious dispute with the Panhellenic Seamen's 
Federation about overtime payment. The initiatives to merge now speeded up again to 
reduce administrative costs and obtain monopoly on some routes. The domestic routes 
were opened for free competition in November 2002, more than one year prior to its 
initial date.  
In contrast to the hurried opening for free competition in the Greek ferry market, the 
government postponed the introduction of international requirements for safety 
management (ISM-code). The ISM-code, that generally was mandatory for all 
passenger ships from its entry date the 1. July 1998, includes basic functional 
requirements for safety management. Later it was also revealed that maritime authorities 
had been issuing false fire certificates. An investigation demonstrated that all of the 15 
considered vessels held by MFD had false fire certificates. In this context it should be 
noted that this company have lost a vessel due to fire, and that the holding company, 
Minoan Lines, experienced three fires out of a total of eight accidents (represented as 
stars in figure 5) the last 20 years.  
Since the market entrance in 1998 MFD grew at an astronomical speed. In 2001 it 
operated about 70 ships and had liabilities that exceeded more than 105 million euros. It 
was however not only the growth of MFD that turned in 2000. Whereas Lloyd’s register 
only registered that the ferry Pasiphae hit a reef on her maiden voyage in a speed of 27 
knots in 1998, not any serious or non-serious accidents were recorded in 1999. In 2000, 
however, four grim accidents took place, whereof one was disastrous. The 12. 
December a Greek seafarer was killed and another ten were injured when a broken 
mooring struck them onboard Express Aprodite. The 22. August the hydrofoil ferry 
Flying Dolphin V was lost due to a fire. The 69 passengers on board and the crew of 7 
all survived the accident. The 29. September Express Artemis ran aground in shallow 
waters with 1081 passengers on board resulting in a 30 minutes blackout. The disaster 
happened, a few days earlier, at the 26. of September, when the Ro-Ro cargo ferry 
Express Samina hit some rocks in restricted waters. She sustained hull damage, flooded, 
listed and sank soon after taking 84 lives.In 2001 Lloyds recorded five serious and non-
serious accidents in the companies fleet. In 2002 the corresponding figure was ten 
accidents and at October 2003 as much as fourteen accidents were recorded this year. 
All these accidents are represented with crosses in Figure.  
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Figure 5: The relationship between economical conditions and accident density for MFD and Minoan 
Line 
 
The Express Samina and her sister Express Naias were two of the oldest ferries in 
Greek domestic fleet. Samina was built in 1966 and operated in Greece since the mid 
1980s. She operated in Greece from the mid 1980s. Until early in 2000 she sailed as the 
Golden Vergina. Both Samina and Naias were bought for a very low price by the MFD 
in the late 1999 and early 2000. Golden Vergina was then renamed Express Samina and 
her passenger facilities were refurbished. Unlike other passenger ship disasters the 
Express Samina had a record of public available warnings of her poor safety condition 
prior to the accident. A Greek travel guide book (Greek Island Hoppers) described her 
as “…this dreadful boat is arguably the worst Greek ferry afloat…she is definitely a 
boat to be avoided.”. Another media (ADAC Motorwelt) pinpointed Express Naias in 
1998 as especially substandard through their yearly safety inspections of about 30 
European ferries and ro-ro passenger ships.  
The Portes Islet is about 25m high, is topped with a navigation light that is visible for 12 
km. Thanks to this easily spotted landmark, it is a natural navigation target for boats 
entering and leaving Paros. It is therefore likely that the bridge crew set the automatic 
steering on the ferry, targeting the Portes Islet, with the intention of later assuming 
manual control as the vessel closed in on Paros. For some reason this appears not to 
have happened and the Express Samina was left to steam at full speed into the rocks. At 
the time of the collision the crew had left the bridge to watch the replay on one of the 
ship's TVs of a goal in an important local soccer match.  
When the ship got of the rock and headed for port the power supply failed which made 
the evacuation extremely difficult. The emergency equipment was in extremely poor 
condition and the crew failed to organize the evacuation. The presence of several ships 
in the area, the proximity to shore and the relatively calm weather allowed most of the 
passengers to be picked up of the sea and from the rocks. The investigation revealed that 
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the watertight doors, which could have closed of the flooded area, were left open. This 
caused the vessel to sink within only 45 minutes. 82 of the 550 passengers were lost. 
One of Minoan Flying Dolphins’ superintendent engineers revealed that the company 
was aware of serious mechanical problems on Samina’s speed and steering control. 
Samina’s captain had a few years earlier been in charge of a vessel called Nereus, which 
sank after a similar scenario as Samina. He was also in charge when Samina collided 
with another ferry short time prior to the accident. A summary of the findings in a CVF 
conext is summaries in table 8.  
 
Table 8: elements of the competing values framework for MFD 
Clan Hierarchal Market Adhocracy 
Weak: Dispute with the 
employees about overtime 
payments. The crew did not 
take responsibility. 
Hierarchal structures and 
authorities, but did not 
emphasis on control. 
Strong: Market shares and 
growth were the governing 
goals of the company. 
The visionary belief that it 
was necessary to be large and 
grow fast might be an 
adhocracy element. 
 
NEL plot ANEK. Of the16 Port State Control safety inspections recorded in 
ParisMOU in 2001 there were found 11 deficiencies and 1 detention. Minoan Flying 
Dolphin had at the same time 10 inspections resulting in 55 deficiencies and two 
detentions. ADAC Motorwelt (1998-2001) inspections Minoan Line vessels (six 
inspections) were in general in good conditions. Stena vessels (five inspections) were 
somewhat better than ANEK’s, (three inspections) both obtaining average scores. The 
condition of Minoan Flying Dolphin (eight inspection) vessels was in general poor. The 
PSC findings on these vessels roughly confirm the ADAK scores. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: The relationship between economical conditions and accident density for NEL 
(high) ANEK (low) 
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9. THE OPENING OF DOMESTIC ROUTES FOR COMPETITION IN THE NORTH SEA 
Norway’s decentralised population and its many fjords and islands has been a 
prospering basis for domestic ferry routes. Even though shipping is an extremely 
important for Norway, the safety and security of the maritime transport in Norway is 
distributed on practically all government departments. The Maritime Authorities is for 
some reason located under the Department of Trade. This segregation has resulted in 
several conflicting approaches. For instance, a governmental consideration of the 
challenges for the society’s safety and emergency preparedness specifically addressed 
the organizational culture of the shipping companies as a core improvement factor in the 
maritime segment (NOU, 2000). In contrast the models used to assess the risk of 
domestic ferry traffic at an operational level considers aspect of the company to have 
low importance relative to aspects of the traffic, fairway and technical features 
(Norwegian Maritime Directorate, 1999). The domestic ferry routes are under a license 
system and most of them receive subsidisation. The decision making into the 
requirements and amount of subsidisation is decentralised to the administration of the 
counties, employed and managed by a staff without any safety related competencies. 
This administration also enforces the earlier described tendering system. From time to 
time the segregated decision-making and the lacking focus on safety has developed 
hazardous situations and deteriorated safety standard.  
After entering the stock market in 1992, HSD’s stock values seemed to grow relative 
stable until mid 1997 when it suddenly doubled its value (Figure 7). To get an overview 
of HSD’s strategies some text are translated from its 1998 annual report. The company 
is presented under to motto: HSD - a competitive company. The stated business idea 
was: “HSD seek to be a competitive and profitable provider of goods and services 
related to transportation. The company is to be in the lead, within the traditional routes 
due to its good service, quality and effectiveness”. Something special about that years’ 
annual report is an added section called “Increased competition” following the 
presentation of their business idea, even before the presentation of the organization. 
This section states that: “During the last years HSD has moved towards services in the 
open market. Earlier a larger share of the activities has been related to public services. 
Tenders are becoming regular within the transport sector, and HSD is preparing itself 
on additional upcoming changes in market conditions. Customer service, marketing, 
cost-cutting and effective management is therefore in focus for the companies’ work and 
organization”. HSD had as the far majority of Norwegian and European domestic ferry 
companies, received subsidization from the government. In 1995 HSD agreed with the 
authorities to economise on their activities. In this agreement it was accepted to 
rationalize the high-speed ferry operation with an annual amount of 0,6 million within 
1999 (Figure 7). HSD’s organization was structured as an internal market place where 
the four divisions Fast ferry, Ferry, Transport and Buss bought their administrative 
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services from different departments. The adaptability of the organizational structure was 
also emphasized.  
In 1999 two new fast ferries, Sleipner and Baronen went into operation. Sleipner had 
only been operating for three months, when she was involved in a fatal accident. 
Because drills had not been satisfactory carried through, the Maritime Authorities 
limited the operational license of the vessel to only be valid under calm sea. This 
restriction was violated. The bad weather reduced the radar efficiency, and the 
experienced captain did not detect that the vessel entered two red sectors from 
lighthouses nearby. The rock was detected some seconds before the impact, allowing 
the captain to slow down from its 33 knot operating speed. The crew had poor or little 
training in emergency situations and evacuation. The public address system failed and 
the emergency rafts could only be released manually by executing 24 operations in the 
correct order, and the automatic release equipment was not yet installed. Hence, only 
one of the rafts was released. The life jackets were of an old design and were difficult to 
put on and fasten, which caused several passengers to jump to sea without it. The poor 
weather reduced the efficiency of the rescue and the cold water resulted in rapid and 
fatal cold shocks. 
The structure of the personnel safety representatives was divided into one 
organization for the land based activities and one for the seafarers. These organizations 
were separated because there are different regulations for the two areas. The Health, 
Environment and Safety (HES) work was summarized on two pages in their annual 
report. One of these pages illustrated the organization of the compulsory personnel 
safety representatives. Even though the committee of the safety delegates came 
forwards with safety issues, the top-level management had in practice no active role or 
responsibility in this process. Already in 1995 the safety management of the HSD was 
criticized. The investigation into the loss of a buss from their ferry revealed a lack of 
commitment from the management. After the Sleipner accident the management was 
confronted with the simple question “Who is responsible for safety in HSD?”. Even 
though the manager was open for questions, this one could not be answered. This has to 
be seen with reference the reports from the board of directors from 1995 to 1999 that 
barely mentioned safety. In the 1989 annual report, no quantitative safety goals, criteria, 
or references for improvement was mentioned, but rather that is will remain a on its 
present standard. The objective also included emphasis on procedures and routines 
indicating stable elements. Besides the employees health and work environment was 
given attention, green measures were presented. According to the annual report, the 
EHS education that had been given to the fast ferry crews were: service training, a 
navigational refreshment course and an English course for the whole crew. The only 
effort related to the employees’ attitudes and responsibilities was a project focusing on 
prevention of intoxication.  
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It is strange that the company did not assign more resources and attention to safety. 
Already in 1998 two of the companies’ catamarans were sailing in high speed, in dense 
fog, at a head-on collision course. At the last second the ferries managed to take an 
avoidance manoeuvre, which significantly reduced the criticality of the impact. Only 
one of the 139 passengers onboard the two ships were injured. Again questions about 
HSD’s safety management were raised, but no serious actions were taken. The Sleipner 
investigation opened for the possibility to get an insight into how the company worked 
with safety management. According to this investigation the company had recorded 6,1 
collisions for the fast ferries each year of the 5,7 considered years. The causes of the 
accidents were recorded as “unsatisfactory ship control” and “factors beyond the ships’ 
control”. “Navigational failure” and “Inattention” was each only recorded once. The 
relatively high portion of external causes was relatively common for maritime 
authorities a hundred years ago (Soma, 2003). Today, it is well accepted that more than 
90% of navigational accidents are related to operator failures. The company had only 
recorded one near-miss each of the considered years. Representatives from the shipping 
company inspected the Sleipner three days before the accident and found 34 non-
conformities but still considered the ship as seaworthy. The immature reporting and 
learning culture could also be read out of the newspapers. When the twin hull ferry 
Baronen stroke a rock at full speed outside its planned sailing route in the beginning of 
January 2000, the incident was intensely denied by the company’s representatives. 
When divers the following night picked up one of the vessels propeller from the 
specified rock the company had to admit openly that it tried to cover up the incident. On 
several occasions subsequent of the Sleipner accident, those employees that officially 
questioned the company’s safety practice were punished. In three occasions after the 
Sleipner accidents crewmembers have tested positive on alcohol while on duty. In 
summary HSD was a company that implements advanced technological features with 
little systems for adaptation, training and learning. They punished whistle-blowers and 
explained away incidents as unavoidable or caused by external factors. The feedback in 
terms of near misses was almost absent. The safety organisation, the safety objectives 
and even the training had a clear external focus by referring to regulations and how the 
company wants to be seen. There were few signs of management commitment or 
structured continuous improvement.  Both in economical terms, and with respect to 
accidents, the year 2000 was depressive for HSD (figure 7). With respect to safety it 
should be noted that more than 50% (34 mill. NOK) of the deficit was directly used in 
EHS activities. Figure 7 illustrates that the Sleipner accident was one of a cascade of 
accidents occurring over a short duration in time. The density of accidents and the 
economical result before tax follow an inverse relationship. 
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Figure 7: The relationship between economical conditions and accident density for HSD 
 
In the following text the development of the safety management function within HSD is 
considered in more detail. In 1999, the year of the Sleipner accident, several changes 
occurred. Minor clauses were added to the objective statement. A range of measure 
were proposed and implemented. One of these actions was to form a committee that 
should review the philosophy of their EHS activities. The committee’s work was, 
however, restricted to follow a four-item guideline. The objective of the three first items 
was to obtain sufficient insight through a full system review (1), risk analysis (2) and 
collection of external experience (3). The forth item was aimed at implementation of 
improvements and is translated: “Suggest measures that will increase effectiveness and 
improve the company’s EHS work, in such as way that HSD will be known for being the 
best in this field.”. Consequently, the written goals indicate that safety measure that did 
not have a direct link to the external image of HSD should be ignored. Therefore, even 
after the Sleipner accident HSD held onto its external focus on safety. Later the zero-
risk philosophy was adopted. In theory this criterion is unreachable. However, 
governmental departments and companies use it to break through old habits and mind 
sets to promote no tolerance for accidents in any operations. Later, HSD has also started 
using targets for the annual performance goals, which is an acknowledged approach.  
All employees were involved in a process into the development of a new philosophy. 
This process ended in February 2001. The result was a poster containing seven bullet 
points. These statements are presented in table 9. In this table the results of a similar 
process that took place in 1982 within the Stena Line is also presented. The Stena Line 
process had a slightly different scope as it was addressing the development of a market 
oriented culture. The process within Stena Line has been described earlier in this paper, 
and indicated their strong internal focus. While Stena Line’s statements are aimed at 
details in the practical conduction of the employee’s daily tasks, HSD’s statements are 
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of a more distal character. The superficial statements have parallels to objectives or 
advertisements. While a research institute published “the nine hard Stena 
commitments”, HSD’s statements was printed on the first page of their annual report 
2000. According to the managers the involvement of the personnel had a good effect on 
their safety attitudes. In 2001, the year following the internal process was almost 
without reported accident (Figure 7).  
 
Table 9: Comparison between HSD’s EHS poster and the nine hard Stena commitments 
HSD’s EHS poster The nine hard Stena commitments 
• A safe workplace is clean and orderly 
• We cancel activities that not can be 
carried though completely safe. 
• We emphasize on the well-being and 
personal development for all employees. 
• We carry through work aimed at 
protection of the environment. 
• We work for a continuous improvement 
within EHS. 
• We obtain competitive advantages 
through good EHS results. 
• We take responsibility for a good work 
environment and a safe workplace. 
We shall : 
• be professional in our jobs 
• see to it that there is a real cooperation between the manager and 
his people 
• mutually recognize our contributions 
• see to it that the communication between the departments work 
• take the responsibility of profitable operations 
• eliminate obstacles that prevent the customer from perceiving us 
as a real service company 
• demonstrate that we care about the customer 
• offer the customer more friendliness and individual service 
• work hard to make all our customers so satisfied that they want 
to come back 
  
In June 2001 a new manager of the concern took place. In the 2001 annual report he 
described himself as a tough competitor. He announced that it was time for change, and 
that the future competitive environment was going to be harsh. He further announced 
strategic changes. Probably due to the change process his business ideas was not printed 
in the annual report. The focus within the EHS department changed from safety, 
towards environmental issues and the employees’ well-being. The new manager was 
giving high priority to the personal development of the individual workers. He 
considered this as crucial for further market orientation and to turn the growing absence 
due to illness. The new vision of the company is that “the harmony between our 
customers and our employees will make HSD a winning company…because we care”. 
This vision has an obvious relation to the attributes internal and external elements. 
Table 10 summarise some of the development within HSD.  
 
Table 10: elements of the competing values framework for HSD 
Clan Hierarchal Market Adhocracy 
Until 2001: Poor alcohol 
habits indicate a poor work 
morale. Training was not 
carried through.  
From 2000: Employees were 
involved and became a key 
issue in their vision for the 
future.  
Hierarchal structures and 
authorities, but did not 
emphasis on control. The 
company violated the 
restricted operational 
requirements. The instructions 
had to be improved. 
Market share has been the 
governing goal of the 
company, except for the time 
subsequent of the Sleipner 
accident 
 
The visionary belief that it 
was necessary to be large and 
grow fast might be an 
adhocracy element.  
 
 
 
In order to assess if the development within HSD was unique and independent of its 
competitors, the accidents and economical parameters for the three companies Troms 
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Fylkes Dampskip Selskap (TFDS), Sogn og Fjordane Fylkeskommune (Fylkesbaatane) 
and Ofoten Vesteraalens Dampskip Selskap (OVDS) is presented in figure 8. The charts 
show that also these companies had weak annual results (black solid line) in 2000 and 
2001. The frequency of accidents was also higher when the economical parameters 
vanquished.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Annual result before tax and accidents for TFDS (highest), Fylkesbaatane, and OVDS (Lowest) 
 
 
10. RESULTS 
The sources for the applied information are based on accident statistics and the annual 
reports of the companies. The accidents represent incidents like collisions, fires, 
groundings, foundering and loss of propulsion. The analytical approach is to see wetter 
the occurrence of accidents are more frequent during market recession. Periods of 
promising market conditions can in some cases be manifested through solid positive net 
incomes and increasing stock values. Periods of recession can be manifested through 
falling stock-values or stable and low or even negative net incomes. When the net 
income is high, no closing of routes or cost saving are necessary the economy is said to 
be good. 
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Table 11: Classification of economical conditions for various years 
 Poor economy Good economy Unknown or unclassifiable 
Stena Line [1981,1983], 
1991, [1995,2003] 
[1986,1990], 
[1992,1993] 
 [1984,1985], 1994** 
Minoan Lines [2000,2003] {most of 1999} [1988,1998] 
M. Flying Dolphin [2000,2003] {1998, most of 1999} - 
NEL [2000,2003] {most of 1999} 1998 
ANEK [2000,2003] {most of 1999} - 
HSD {1999, 2000} [1996-1997], 2002 [1992,1995], {1998**,2001***, 2003} 
TFDS {2000,2001} [1997-1999] 2002 
Fylkesbaatane 1999,2000  2001  
OVDS 1996, 2000, 2001 1997-1999, 2002  
Towsend Thoresen [1988,1989]**** {1979,1980,1986} [1975,1978],[1981,1985],{1987} 
* The two accidents in 1989 were on the route that was closed down. These accidents are assigned to the poor economy account.  
**HSD 1998, and Stena 1994 are a difficult year to classify. The net result was solid, but the stock values were falling, in addition 
the end of the cost saving period was closing in. In order to be conservative this year is described as unclassifiable.  
***2001 was very volatile on the stock market. Even though the rates were at bottom the volatile characteristics indicated some 
uncertainty. 
**** Everything stayed on statuesque after P&O takeover. 
 
The numerical values in table 12 demonstrate that the risk of accidents is about 20 times 
higher during times of poor economy. There are uncertainties related to the 
classification of economy in table 11 and therefore this value should be interpreted with 
care. It can however be concluded that the risk increases significantly in a depressed 
market. The validation of this statement is simple. If the plots in figure 3 to 8 are 
considered (in total nine companies) it can be read out that there was increased accident 
intensity in 1988 to 1993. This is the exact duration of the last depression in the world’s 
economy, which can be manifested in decreased world trade, falling stock indexes and 
decreased gross domestic product on a national level. 
 
Table 12: Classification of economical conditions for various years 
 
11. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
There are several conclusions that can be drawn from this study. First it is demonstrated 
that the characteristics of “commercial accidents” can be identified on a micro level 
 Poor economy Good economy Unknown Total  
 Acc. S-Y Acc. S-Y Acc. S-Y Acc. S-Y 
Stena Line 23 333 0 143 5 53 28 529 
Minoan Lines 3 55 0 11 3 116 6 182 
M. Flying Dolphin 15 291 1 125 0  15 416 
NEL 5 42 0 8 1 8 6 58 
ANEK 3 61 0 12 2  6 73 
HSD 10 77 1 113 7 244 18 434 
TFDS 2 66 2 94  34  194 
Fylkesbaatane 3 68 0 36    104 
OVDS 5 93 0 124    217 
Towsend Thoresen 6 44 0 80 4 245 10 369 
Total 65 1086 2 666 22 455 89 2207 
 65/1086=0.060 2/666=0.003 22/455=0.048 89/2207=0.040 
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within the passenger ship companies. This implies that it is inadequate to assess 
commercial risk and accident risk independently. This again implies that it is inadequate 
to regulate a market and its safety standard independently. In sum this study produce 
quantitative proofs behind a great deal of the theories developed by Jens Rasmussen 
(1997).  
On a qualitative level this study demonstrates that the national governments and 
the EU have a central role in the creation of market conditions that undermine safety. 
The EU has forced the development of a more competitive domestic passenger 
transportation market within Europe without giving significant attention to safety 
implications. The Stena Line expressed their fear for increased competition from ships 
flying Flags of Convenience in 1989. The next year their Bahamas registers competitor 
Scandinavian Star burned down partly due to their incompetent and untrained crew, 
killing 157 people. The breaking up of cartels, reduced subsidisation, developing 
competing transportation structures and the abolition of the tax- and duty-free sales may 
isolated seem rational, but the simultaneous increased competition through imposing a 
tendering system reduce the possibilities to compensate the lost income. In contrast to 
the public EU tendering system the private oil cargo owners have safety as the key issue 
for allowing shipping companies to submit tenders. The fact that the various European 
shipping nations have an interest in allowing their own shipping companies to be 
competitive in the inner market may also vaguely be observed. The maritime authority 
in Greek hurried the opening of the competition and postponed the requirements for 
safety management systems. The Norwegian Authorities have developed a risk analysis 
system that ignore the quality of management (Norwegian Maritime Authorities, 1999) 
and allowed Sleipner to sail with a series of deficiencies. The investigation revealed 
several deficiencies made by the management of the company. This study demonstrates 
that the Sleipner accident should not bee seen independent of the other accidents within 
the company.  
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RISK DRIVERS IN THE TRAMP MARKET 
Commercial Accidents 
– an assessment of four leading tanker companies 
Torkel Soma 
Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Department of Marine Technology, Trondheim, 
Norway 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study first demonstrates how the market conditions influence on the accident 
frequency of four of the world’s largest tanker companies. It is demonstrated that the 
accident frequency increases with a factor of three when the freight rates turn from a 
positive to a negative development. This difference is significant, but far lower than 
what was found within the passenger ship market. 
 
1 COMMERCIAL ACCIDENTS 
During an earlier study of the relationship between ship disasters and the state of the 
shipping market it has been demonstrated that these parameters are negatively 
correlated. In a poor market the frequency of disasters increase. First this relationship 
was demonstrated on a macro level for segments of the world fleet at various periods 
during the 20th century. Later an additional study found the same characteristics on a 
micro level within several passenger ship companies such as Towsend Toresen (Herald 
of Free Enterprise), Minoan Flying Dolphin (Express Samina), HSD (Sleipner). The 
negative relationship between accident risk and economical conditions were also found 
within companies that not had experienced fatal accidents. Because economical 
conditions seem to determine the likelihood of accidents, they are labelled 
“commercial”. The relationships were both found on long time trends over several 
decades and the development from one year to another. To pinpoint on the yearly 
changes, comparisons were done on the curvature of the time series (second 
derivatives). Figure 1 presents the relationship between the curvature of the tanker fleet 
size (dotted and inversed line) and the total loss ratio (TLR). In a good market the fleet 
size increases [1]. The total loss ratio represents the fraction of ships being lost each 
year due to accidents [2].  
 
Figure 1: Dependency between fleet size and TLR for tankers on a macro level. 
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The described negative relationship is statistical valid. To understand the casual 
relationship is however ambiguous. The suggested causal relationship is explained by 
risk homeostasis principles at a top-level management [3]. When the economy is in 
recession it represents an increased commercial risk. Consequently, a more optimal 
overall risk level is obtained through economising on organisational features. The 
impact on organisational factors can be described through the Competing Values 
Framework developed by Quinn and Rohrbaugh [4]. It is known that that shipping 
companies base their safety controls on stable (or mechanistic) controls such as 
hierarchies, rules and procedures. Stable controls are not suited when the organisation is 
exposed to interfering austerity measures [5]. Flexible controls are obtained when the 
operators do not only know the correct task procedures, but also feel a responsibility 
and autonomously endorse safe operation. In the process of achieving this, several 
authors have described commitment from top-level management as the most important 
factor [6]. The organisations having both stable and flexible controls do in fact fall 
within the concept of High Reliability Organisations described by LaPorte and 
Consolini, [7]. When organisations become a target for austerity measures the operators 
are seldom consulted and feel no ownership for the measures. This results in a reduced 
motivation, weakened self-image, increased absenteeism, lowered morale etc. 
Consequently these changes deteriorate the flexible controls. Because the remained 
stable controls are not very effective during changes, the likelihood of accidents tends to 
increase. 
  
2 SCOPE OF STUDY 
Four large tanker companies were considered. These are TeeKay, Bergesen, Frontline 
and Odfjell. Bergesen and Odfjell are old and well developed companies.  Odfjell is the 
largest shareholder of the chemical tanker market, claiming to hold 24%. They have a 
uniform fleet and own several ports. Bergesen is one of the largest tanker companies in 
the world with several large oil tankers and have a 2% share of the gas tanker market 
having several VLGCs (over 70.000 cubic meters of loading capacity (cbm)), LGCs 
(between 50 and 70.000 cbm), MGC (between 20 and 40.000 cbm) and Handy/Igloo 
size (between 8-20.000 cbm). They have declared that shipping of gas is to become their 
largest business focus. Frontline and TeeKay have during the last decade grown to 
become the largest shareholders of their respective oil tanker segment. Frontline has 
become the largest company within the Suezmax (ranging from 120-165.000 dead 
weight tons (dwt)) and the VLCC market (Very Large Crude Carrier 200-300.000 dwt). 
TeeKay has become the largest shareholder of the Aframax market. (about 80-105.000 
dwt.)   
The sources for the applied information are based on port state control 
inspections, accident statistics, freight rate statistics and the annual reports of the 
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companies. The accidents represent incidents like collisions, fires, groundings, 
foundering and loss of propulsion. The analytical approach is to see wetter the 
occurrence of accidents are more frequent during market recession. Periods of 
promising market conditions can in some cases be manifested through solid positive net 
incomes and increasing stock values. Periods of recession can be manifested through 
falling stock-values or stable and low or even negative net incomes. During the analysis 
it was found that the economy of Frontline and TeeKay were comprehensible. They 
have a uniform fleet and a focus on growth. Therefore, their profits are gained from 
transportation. Their stock-values, net results, and the freight rates for oil tankers seem 
to correlate. The economies of Bergesen and Odfjell were more complex. Non-
transportation factors such as ships sales, changes in tax systems, strength between the 
US$ and the Norwegian Crown (NOK) seemed to have a significant influence on their 
profits. In some cases it was even claimed that profits were partly due to cost saving 
programmes. This made it difficult to apply their stock values and annual profits as 
economical indicators. Therefore their economical considerations were solely based on 
the relevant freight rates.   
 
3 COMPARISON OF TANKER COMPANIES 
There are several differences between the various tanker markets, the companies’ 
organisational structures and their strategies. The chemical and the gas tanker markets 
are small and require advanced technology. The barriers for entering these markets are 
consequently high. While the oil tanker market can be considered as a perfect 
competitive market, the gas and chemical tanker markets have also some oligopoly 
characteristics. Bergesen and Oddfjell have a traditional organisational structure, 
integrating both ownership and ship operation. In 2000 Odfjell merged with Ceres 
Hellenic Shipping. Hence both Odfjell and Ceres are responsible for the management of 
their distinct share of the fleet. Bergesen and Odfjell favour one flag and one 
classification society. Oddfjell has 3200 employees and Bergesen has 2700. In contrast, 
Frontline has 40 employees and retains a range of contract managers, flags of registries 
and classification societies. This magnitude of associates creates competitive 
environments that Frontline can gain advantages from. TeeKay is in between the two 
structures, issuing most of the contract management agreements to a range of their own, 
competing subordinated. TeeKay have 4100 employees. They favour two classification 
societies and one flag.  
 
3.1 Fatal accidents 
Three of the shipping companies have been involved in disasters. Bergesen lost their 
ore-oil carrier Berge Istra back in 1975. Only two of the 32 crewmembers survived. 
Even though the exact causes of the accident are unknown, it is believed that hot work 
in the ships double bottom triggered an explosion causing the ship to founder in a few 
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minutes. A similar accident occurred in 1979 onboard Berge Vanga. Nobody survived 
this accident. Frontline have not directly been involved in any disasters, but have links 
to the Sea Empress that caused major oil spills in 1996. Sea Empress was owned by the 
major shareholder of Frontline, registered and managed by Frontline’s contract 
managers and is today in the Frontline fleet sailing under the name Front Spirit. The 
investigation of this accident concluded however that the pilot and a failed salvage 
operation caused the spill. Odfjell was involved in a disaster in 2003, when the Bow 
Eagle collided with a fishing vessel. Well aware of the encounter no assistance was 
provided as the ship continued its course towards Rotterdam.  
 
3.2 Port State Control performance 
A tanker is a target for inspection. The flags of registry have the responsibility for 
certifying that the ships comply with international regulations provided by the 
International Maritime Organisation (flag state control). Because some flags of 
convenience have neither motivation nor competence to ensure compliance, port nations 
have began to carry out inspections on visiting vessels (port state control (PSC)). In 
addition the classification societies, cargo owners and the companies themselves carry 
out safety inspections [8] Table 1 presents the PSC performance on the applied ship 
management companies. It ca be seen that Frontline favour the contract managers 
having most detentions while the largest share of TeeKay’s fleet is assigned to the best-
performing manager. 
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Deficiencies Detentions 
TeeKay S. Canada 53 52 317 1 25% 0,3 % 
TeeKay 
Remaining nine mng. 23 177 636 4 31.6% 0.6% 
Bergesen Bergesen  66 224 3 33.93 % 1.34 % 
Odfjell  30 179 5 27.4 % 2.79 % 
Odfjell 
Ceres Hellenic Ship.  39 209 1 32.54 % 0.48 % 
V. Ship UK 20 61 277 5 30.3% 1.8 % 
Golar Mng.. UK 10 6 45 1 28.9% 2.2% 
Quimica Naviera 9 9 52 5 75.0% 9.6% 
Total for three largest 39 76 374 11 36.3% 2.9% 
Frontline 
Remaining 14 mng. 43 314 864 7 32.0 % 0.7% 
Table 1: Port State Control performance for the ship managers 
 
4 RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ECONOMY AND ACCIDENTS 
In order to assess if there is a relationship between the economical conditions and the 
occurrence of accidents, their freight rates, stock values or the annual net income is 
plotted with respect to time. Also the time of the accidents are plotted as crosses in the 
chart. A solid line indicates the density of these accidents. Figure 2 presents Odfjell’s 
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accidents and the freight rates. It can be seen that the accidents occurs in clusters either 
prior to or after freight rate peaks. No accidents occur at peak freight rates.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The relationship between freight rates and accident density for Odfjell 
 
Also Bergesen’s accidents were plotted along with the freight rates for the various gas 
fleet segments (figure 3). The cluster of four LGC accidents in 1997 and 1998 occurred 
during a relatively high freight rates, but the earning (including waiting time and 
offhire) only seemed to stabilise in a more or less continuous decline since 1995 (dotted 
line). No accidents were recorded by Lloyd’s Register after the decline in 2001, but the 
annual report mentioned two fires and one engine breakdown in 2001 and a collision 
and hard weather damage in 2002. These resulted in the two worst years since 1997 
with respect to unplanned offhire. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The relationship between freight rates and accident density for Bergesen 
 
The negative relationships between accident risk and economical parameters can more 
easily be observed for Frontline. The chart indicates that when the company had strong 
economical growth in 2000 and most of 2001 no accidents occurred. However, when 
the conditions turned at the end of 2001 and 2002, a peak of accidents took place. In 
1997 and 1998 the stock values was unavailable. The freight rates for oil tankers in 
general were growing in 1997, but turned downwards during 1998 and 1999. Even 
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though the net income was positive for both Frontline and TeeKay (figure 5) the market 
was on downturn.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Frontline’s time series        Figure 5: TeeKay’s time series 
Event though the figures 2 to 5 visually illustrates that accidents (acc.) have a tendency 
to occur during a poor market, this dependency is quantified. Table 2 illustrates how the 
years are coded with respect to economical parameters. Based on this information and 
the relevant ship-years (S-Y) are compiled into table 3.  
 
 
 Poor economy Good economy Unclassifiable 
Frontline {1998, 1999, last half of 2001, 2002} {2000, first half of 2001, 2003} {1997} 
TeeKay {1995, 1998, 1999, 2002} {1996,1997,2000,2001, 2003} {} 
Bergesen [1995,first half of 1999] 
{1992,2001,2002} to 2003 for Igloo 
[first half of 1993, 1994],{last 
half of 1999, 2000} 
{first half of 
1993, 2003} 
Odfjell [1995,2000] {1994} [2001-2003] 
Frontline {24, 35, 61, 69} {58, 61, 77} {19} 
Table 2: Classification of economical conditions for various years 
 
 Poor economy Good economy Unclassifiable Total 
 Acc. S-Y Acc. S-Y Acc. S-Y Accidents S-Y Frequency 
TeeKay 8 254 0 349 0 0 8 603 0.013 
Bergesen 14 473 1 167 1 96 16 736 0.022 
Frontline 10 158.5 2 165,5 1 19 13 343 0.038 
Odfjell 10 228 2 31 4 138 16 397 0.040 
Total 42 1113.5 5 712.5 6 253 53 2079 0.025 
Frequency 24/1113.5=0.038 2/514..5 =0.0070 6/ 253 = 0.024 53/2079=0.025 
Table 3: Classification of economical conditions for various years 
 
4 CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK 
This study conforms that the negative relationship between accident risk and economy 
that was found on a fleet level can also be found on a company level. The calculations 
indicate that the when the market turns from good to poor the tanker accident risk three 
doubles. This is far lower than the figure found for group of passenger ship companies 
indicating that the strength of this difference is still uncertain. If only Frontline and 
TeeKay were considered the difference between good and poor economy would 
increase from three to seven times as risky. It is worth taking notice of that not only the 
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net income, and stock values but also the time of accidents seem to correlated between 
the tanker companies. The year 1998 for instance, is a year with high accident density 
for all four companies. TeeKay and Bergersen have the lowest accident ratios and the 
best PSC performance. Even though the difference in safety performance between the 
companies is considerable the dependency to economical conditions seems to be 
common.  Some investigation has been accomplished to see if the principle off 
“commercial accidents” is valid within other industrial domains. This is confirmed but 
there is needed research to fully develop this concept.  
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MAIN CONCLUSIONS AND RESULTS 
This thesis describes what characteristics that differ from the ships and shipping 
companies having a high safety standard, called blue chip, from those having a lower 
standard. This chapter summarises the findings of the thesis. The thematic structure of 
the thesis is indicated in the five levels of figure 8 (p.14). The first level includes the 
actual losses and the causes are described in the subsequent levels. The second level 
describes the onboard workplace factors, typically assessed through a safety inspection 
or a safety audit. The third level describes the safety standard based on organisational 
factors, with a specific focus towards safety culture. The fourth level considers the 
management’s strategic and tactical decisions in relation to the environment (level 5). 
The environment specifically considers at the business environment, but also addresses 
regulative and societal factors. Each of the ten papers addresses various aspects of this 
model. The two first papers form a background for the model itself based on the state-
of- the-art knowledge. The third paper is a first attempt to quantify important 
relationships between the levels. The next papers relate aspects of the various levels to 
safety standard.  
 
MAIN RESULTS 
In figure 1 relationships between safety relevant variables are mapped into the model 
presented in figure 8 (p.14). The grey lines (line 1 to 15) indicate relationships that are 
validated in published literature. The black lines indicate relationships that are validated 
in this thesis. The variable names on white background are variables that are generally 
accepted as relevant for ship safety. The variable names on grey background are 
variables that this study has proved to be relevant. The figure illustrates that 
considerable of the exiting knowledge is centred towards the Flag, Ship Type and Ship 
Age. Published literature relates these variables to the new cluster of three variables in 
the lower right corner of the figure. It can also be demonstrated that these variables are 
related to safety performance.  
 
It is intuitively accepted that there exist a relationship between Safety Inspections, 
carried out by Port State Control, and risk of accidents. This relationship has earlier 
been demonstrated through an intermediate variable like the Flag of the vessel 
(Kristiansen & Olofsson, 1998; Alderton & Winchester, 2000). In Paper 3 this 
relationship is validated (relationship 16 in figure 1). This paper estimates a norm 
distribution for the variation in safety standard of the world fleet, analogous to the 
normal (gaussian) distribution represents the variation of Intelligence Quota (IQ) in a 
population. While an estimate of a person’s actual IQ is based on IQ test scores, 
estimates of a ship’s safety standard is based on measures of experienced safety 
performance i.e. accident frequency and safety inspection findings. These measures are 
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calculated through validated frameworks. This paper also demonstrates that the 
substandard ships do not only obtain more deficiencies in Port State Control 
inspections, but also has more deficiencies related to core safety requirements. 
 
Figure 1: Mapping of relationships of relevant variables into figure 8 page 14. 
 
Safety Culture is an acknowledged safety concept that still has little empirical evidence. 
In Paper 5 difficulties with existing measuring principles are demonstrated. Measures of 
safety culture are typically obtained from questionnaire responses. In existing 
measuring principles it is common to calculate scores based on how positive the 
responses are. At the same time it is known that a characteristic of a poor safety culture 
is to present themselves as extremely positive. Therefore, the assumption that positive 
responses manifest a good safety culture is discarded. Instead, focus is aimed at the 
pattern of the questionnaire responses. It is assumes that the employees of an 
organisation that have a good safety culture have more consistent responses and that the 
pattern of a poor safety culture is of a more odd nature. A technique (paper 6) that 
measure these two features produce scores that correlates with safety standard estimates 
(Paper 3). In the last approach (paper 7) a technique is developed, that extract an 
underlying pattern of questionnaire responses. This pattern demonstrates that the good 
safety cultures have larger focus on abnormal situations like tackling of fatigue, explicit 
communication about errors and worries and a higher job satisfaction (relationship 17, 
18 in figure 1). The average safety cultures have a relatively stronger focus on normal 
situations, like uncritical compliance to rules. There was also a stronger focus on 
hierarchal levels in the organisation and less room for individual needs.  
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At the lower right part of figure 1 there are three variables that are highlighted. These 
are “Company age and/or size”, “Company Economy” and “Freight market Cycles”. 
Literature have illustrated that these variables do not only have a relationship to each 
other but also with the variables that have an acknowledge relationship to safety e.g. 
Ship Age. Paper 1 illustrates that there both is a relationship between the size (and age) 
of the ship management company and the ship age (relationship 21 in figure 1) and a 
relationship to safety performance (relationship 22 & 23). Paper 8 shows that the there 
is a relationship between the freight market cycles and the accident rate (relationship 
24). In order to be sure that this relationship was not spurious, it was also searched for 
and identified on a company level (relationship 25 in figure 1 from Paper 9 & 10) 
 
MAIN CONCLUSION 
This thesis has found that the typical ship accident follow a recurrent accident scenario. 
This scenario describe what characteristics that distinguish ships and shipping 
companies that may be called sub-standard from those demonstrating a superior safety 
standard (called blue-chip). Reason (1998) states that a recurrent accident scenario 
included at least three elements. The Universals (1) represents the ever-present hazards, 
the Local traps (2) are the characteristics of the work place that lure people into repeated 
patterns of unsafe acts and the Drivers (3) that make people do erroneous behaviour. 
Within shipping the Universals are the hazards that have been present in shipping 
forever; rocks, shoals, currents, tides, loose cargo and equipment, free surface effect, 
burning materials, poor water integrity, lack of stability, etc. The Local traps are the 
neglect of the human element in general and emphasis on normative behaviour (paper 5 
& 7). The staff of blue-chip companies is more satisfied with their job, has a culture that 
is more focused on abnormal situations like tackling of fatigue and communication 
about worries. The Drivers are related to commercial considerations (strategies and 
tactics) stimulated by the dynamics of the freight market (paper 8 to 10). The terms 
commercial accidents is described in the subsequent text. 
 
COMMERCIAL ACCIDENTS 
During the last decades, the understanding of accident causes has advanced 
significantly. Studies from the 1960s, like Beer (1968), focused on technical 
descriptions and weaknesses related to the enforcement and content of regulations. 
During the 1970s focus was moved to the human element (Quaille, 1974; Cashman, 
1977). Even though it became common knowledge that at least 80 % of all ship 
accidents was a results of operator errors (Gardenier, 1976; Wagenaar, 1987; Carver 
(Lord), 1992).  Over time, however, it was realised that accidents in several domains 
were results of a multitude of independent operator errors and technical failures. 
Therefore it seemed awkward to only focus on the human elements. There had to be a 
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more fundamental cause that triggered, or allowed the multitude of failures to occur.  
These types of accidents were therefore called Organisational (Reason, 1997) or System 
accidents (Perrow, 2001). The main difference between the Organisational and System 
accidents is the acknowledgment of cultural and technical aspects. Reason emphasis on 
explanations of failures that are results of organisational weaknesses, while Perrow 
emphasise on the complexity and tight coupled features of system designs. Both draw 
the distinction to the accident scenarios of a simpler character called Individual 
(Reason) or Component (Perrow) accidents (Table 1).   
 
COMMERCIAL ACCIDENTS VERSUS EXISTING KNOWLEDGE 
Rasmussen (1997) has defined a related hypothetical conceptual model of Functional 
Abstraction. He describes the daily operation as an adaptive search in the Space of 
Possibilities (Figure 2). “During the adaptive search the actors have ample opportunity 
to identify ‘an effort’ gradient and management will normally supply an effective ‘cost 
gradient’. The results will very likely be a systematic migration towards the boundary of 
functionally acceptable performance and, if crossing the boundary is irreversible, an 
error or an accident may occur.” This model also describes the cascades of accidents 
within the same organisations in periods of poor economy (paper 9 and 10). Given that 
the operation is close to the boundary of functional acceptable performance Rasmussen 
states that: “Ultimately, a quite normal variation in somebody’s behaviour can then 
release an accident. Had this particular ‘root cause’ been avoided by some additional 
safety measure, the accident would very likely be released by another cause at another 
point in time. In other words, an explanation of the accident in terms of events, acts and 
errors is not very useful for design of improved systems”.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Functional Abstraction: Migration toward the boundary (Rasmussen, 1997) 
 
Figure 2 outlines how various needs within an organisation may result in a migration 
towards the boundary of functionally acceptable performance. However, this thesis 
(figure 1) indicates that these needs are not of an independent nature. Management 
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Pressure towards Efficiency (figure 2) may exploit ruthlessly on human resources and 
therefore the Gradient towards Least Effort (figure 2). Management Pressure towards 
Efficiency (figure 2), in a market where safety has little commercial value, may also 
weaken the management commitment towards safety (Keil Centre, 2001). This will 
therefore again deteriorate the Counter gradient from campaigns for ‘safety culture’ 
(figure 2). Therefore, various existing conceptual knowledge, incorporated into the 
structure of figure 1, may together describe the deterioration in greater detail (figure 3). 
The applied knowledge sources are Risk Homeostasis (Wilde, 2001), the Competing 
Values Framework (Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1983), and the Common Performance Model 
(Hollnagel, 1998). The volatility of the freight market, together with the low safety 
demand from the maritime stakeholders, influence the way management make decisions 
(Risk Homeostasis in level 4). Management decisions influence the organisational 
processes (flexibility versus stable) and their orientation (external versus internal) 
(Competing Values Framework, level 3). In a poor freight market the management may 
implement cost saving measures to reduce costs. The result of the cost-saving measures 
tends to be a reduced internal organisational focus and less flexible organisational 
processes. The comprehensive international prescriptive requirements do probably also 
influence on this shift, towards an External-Stable character. In sum, these 
characteristics determine the Adequacy of Organisation, Working Conditions and 
disturbance on the Circadian Rhythm (Common Performance Model, Level 2). At last 
these characteristics may determine the likelihood of losses (Level 1). 
Figure 3: References to existing knowledge about safety 
 
In sum figure 3 demonstrates that the findings from this study show that the maritime 
recurrent high-risk and complex accident scenarios are related to commercial 
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considerations, stimulated by the volatility of the freight market. The ships may be 
modern complex and tight coupled or old, simple and deteriorated. The dependency to 
commercial pressure seems to occur both for sub-standard and blue-chip companies 
(paper 8-10), but as figure 2 indicates, blue-chip companies have a stronger counter 
gradient from safety culture. Both the Organisational and System accidents seem to 
focus on the Local trap elements of the recurrent accident scenario. As Rasmussen states 
“an explanation of the accident in terms of events, acts and errors is not very useful for 
design of improved systems”. This indicates that the Drivers of the recurrent accident 
scenarios are of greater importance to fully understand and effectively prevent these 
accidents. Therefore the term Commercial Accidents is proposed. This term is not 
proposed to confuse or challenge existing definitions, but rather because these accidents 
are manifestations of a biased focus on short horizon profit aims at the expense of the 
principles for safe shipping. Both the System- and Organisational accident distinguish 
themselves from respectively Component- and Individual accidents in terms of the 
severity of the performances (table 1). The consequences of the Commercial Accidents 
are typically of a limited character because the ships typically are in open sea, in calm 
weather or in an area of little traffic. These accidents are typically recorded as a 
blackout, engine failure, loss of navigational control, or a heel. The exact same 
combinations of onboard failures may however in some cases result in a disaster if the 
surroundings are less friendly (e.g. busy fairway, wind, current, high sea, rocks, etc.). 
Because the severity of the performances is determined by factors external to the ship 
organisation it seems awkward to label the disasters as Organisational accidents and the 
less serious accident as Individual accidents. Similarly, as the performances is 
determined by factors external to the ship’s systems it seems awkward to label the 
disasters for System accidents and the less serious accident for Component accidents. 
As the definition of the Commercial Accidents base its definition on the root cause of 
the accidents, rather than its outcome (Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Characteristics of Individual, Component, Organisational and System Accidents. 
Type of Accident: Individual or 
Component  
Organisational System  Commercial  
Frequency:  
Consequences: 
Defences: 
Number of Causes 
Root Cause 
 
Length of Scenario 
Lifespan 
Frequent 
Limited  
Few or no  
Limited  
Slip, trips, lapse, 
technical failure 
Short  
Centuries 
Rare 
Widespread  
Many  
Multiple  
Product of new 
technology 
Long  
Ca. 30 years 
Rare 
Widespread  
Many ‘fixes’ 
Multiple  
Complex and tight-
coupled systems 
Short/Long 
Ca. 30 years 
Rare cascades 
Varying  
Typically many  
Multiple  
Commercial 
pressure 
Varying 
At least 100 years 
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SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
In the following text a summary of results are presented at a more detailed level. 
However, as this thesis consists of 10 papers that can be considered independent from 
the complete story, there exist results that are not included in this text. The presentation 
of results follows the same thematic structure as the presentation in the Overview of 
thesis chapter (figure 8, page 14).  
 
EXPERIENCE WITH DATA INTERROGATION 
In this study the term data interrogation is used to describe the analytical approach. 
Even though Fragola (2003) describes the features of this approach, few (if any) studies 
have openly or knowingly applied this approach. The approach is however very old. 
The idea is to combine data with other background knowledge to reveal patterns. 
Although a data interrogation involves numbers, it is not fair to call it a statistical 
analysis. An excellent statistician may not be able to conduct the analysis, as it requires 
knowledge of the domain (e.g. maritime safety). For instance, the Norwegians used data 
interrogation in 1907 to understand why the Norwegian ships experienced heavy losses 
compared to other flags. In the search for insight the accidents were plotted on top of 
other logical knowledge to identify patterns. The back ground knowledge structures 
were geographical maps, trade pattern, ship age, cargo, class notations, ship type, 
human causes, insurance agreements, commitment from the maritime authorities, owner 
history of the ship and organisational factors. This search resulted in an in depth 
understanding of how organisational factors were linked to owner history, ship age and 
trading pattern with only a small data material. It was concluded that the companies that 
were speculating on ship values were linked to the root cause. To mitigate the root 
cause, a 20-year age limit of ships purchased from foreign countries entered to force 
some years later. Today, almost a century later, age limits are still used as a response to 
accidents like Express Samina, Erika and Prestige, but with no reference to the causes 
determining why old ships have a higher accident rate. Therefore it seems as modern 
safety regulation have a biased focus towards statistical inference relative to reasoning 
based on cause-effect chains. There exists however exceptions such as MAIB’s data 
interrogation of 65 navigational accidents to demonstrate the significance of 
watchkeeping fatigue (MAIB, 2004)  
 
BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE ABOUT ACCIDENT SCENARIOS 
This part of the thesis collects, review and interrogates knowledge about maritime 
recurrent accident scenarios. These scenarios are described in terms of Causal 
Conditions, Rules and Performances (Figure 2, p. 4). Reason (1998) defines three 
elements that may describe the Conditions of a recurrent accident scenario. The 
Universals (1) represents the ever-present hazards, the Local traps (2) are the 
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characteristics of the work place that lure people into repeated patterns of unsafe acts 
and the Drivers (3) that make people do erroneous behaviour. According to 
Rasmussen’s (1997) model in figure 2, there is little need to focus solely on the 
prevention of Local traps (2).  
 
THE PERFORMANCES 
The Performances of ship accidents have changed over the last century. It is possible to 
roughly evaluate the last century’s safety improvement process. Over the last century 
the average annual reduction in accident rate is in the area 2-3 percent (Ponce, 1990; 
Paper 1). Figure 4 (from paper 1) shows, however, that these improvements have been 
sporadic (compiled from LMIS). Apparently, the total loss ratio dropped about 30% 
during a few years around 1930, and the period from mid 1930s until the late 1970s 
seems to vacillate around a loss ratio of 0.65%. In this context it is worth noticing that 
IMO was constituted in 1949. From the late 1970s until 1990 the yearly improvement 
again speeded up to nearly 10% each year. 
Figure 4: World fleets’ total loss ratio (steam & motor ship larger than 100 gt.) (Data source: LMIS) 
 
During the 1930s and the 1980s the two largest market depressions of the 20th century 
took place. The instant drops in loss ratio may therefore be explained by a reduced 
shipping activity. From 1929 until 1932 there was about a 35% increase in laid up ships. 
In 1936, however, this laid up tonnage was back to level of 1929 (League of nations, 
1939; Hegna, 1936). Therefore, a reduced activity level does not necessarily explain the 
improvements. An alternative explanation is that the ships were managed and operated 
differently. According to several sources the harsh market pushed the ship speculators 
out of the market (Fearnlay, 1985;  Stopford, 1998). Also the early 1920s was 
unattractive for speculations into ship values, because there was a balance between 
shipping demand and transport (Stopford, 1998). It is already shown in figure 4 that 
these periods coincide with large drops in accident frequency. 
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In figure 5 the loss ratio is considers with respect to the four underlying categories 
Wrecked, Collision, Burnt and Foundered. It can be seen that the loss ratio of foundered 
ships have not decreased significantly during the last 70 years. However, the loss ratio 
of wrecked ships are have decreased most significantly. In 1927 more ships were lost 
due to collision than to fire, but this tendency turned in the years around the 2.W.W.  
Figure 5: Categories of the world fleets’ total loss ratio (steam & motor ship larger than 100 gt.) (Data 
source: LMIS) 
 
There are some characteristics that are worth noticing. The reduction in loss ratio during 
the early 1930s and the 1980s are due to reductions in the wrecked ships. Early in the 
period more than 60 % of the losses were categorised as wrecked, and on average for 
the period 1927 to 1939 it represented 55% of the losses. In 1996 only 17 % of the 
losses were in this category and on average for the period 1978 to 2001 it represented 
24% of the losses. The average values for foundering for the same periods (1927-39 and 
1978-01) were 14% and 43% respectively. The relative number of losses due to 
collisions has been 11% during the whole period, while the corresponding values for the 
Fire/Explosion category are 8% and 15% respectively. Another characteristic is that the 
loss series correlates during some periods. The correlation between the collision and 
wrecked loss ratios vary over time (figure 6). High correlation values indicate that there 
is a dependency between the categories. If various accident categories occur 
interpedently of each other this might be an indication of lack of safety control and vice 
versa. As a result a search for dependencies, i.e. correlation, might be a new metric 
within safety management.   This characteristic is explored in paper 6. 
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Figure 6: Dependency between the world fleets’ total loss ratio due to collision and wrecked from 1927 to 
2001 (steam & motor ship larger than 100 gt.) (Data source: LMIS) 
 
THE CAUSAL CONDITIONS 
It is known that operator (human) errors constitute at least 80% percent of the accident 
causes (Heinrich, 1959; Gardenier, 1976; Wagenaar, 1987; Carver (Lord), 1992). The 
dominance of operator errors over technical failures as accident causes have been 
evident for almost a century (figure 7). The major change in the recording of accidents 
is that fewer accidents are considered to be unavoidable and caused by factors external 
to the ship itself. The most apparent trend is the reduction of causes considered to be 
external of the ship (e.g. other ships or foreign pilot) and unavoidable (e.g. storms, sea, 
ice, self ignition or misfortune). However, even though the recorded causes often were 
of this kind, experts expressed a century ago that organisational factors were most 
important (Kysten, 1907). It is also worth noticing (figure 7) that while the reduction in 
accident rate is 75%, the reduction in operator causes is only 44%. This indicates either 
that the investigators knowledge has matured and therefore perceive more causes as 
operator errors today, or that the safety improvement efforts during the last century has 
been biased towards technical and external / inevitable factors.  
 
In contrast to the emphasis on the human element there is also significant statistical 
evidence proving that the accident likelihood of a ship correlates with its age (paper 1). 
This was earlier demonstrated in figure 6 (p.9). The causal explanation behind this 
correlation has attributed deterioration of technical features. Therefore it seems as if 
there exists two conflicting basic interpretations that both are supported with statistical 
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evidence. Figure 15 confirms that older ships are more risky, but that the causal 
explanation behind this relationship can be explained by differences in the company 
characteristics. Smaller and younger companies are more often managing old ships. Old 
ships are relatively more often in a spot market were the business horizon is shorter 
(Stopford, 1998). This indicates that the typical ship accident is a result of failures 
within the organisation, management or aspect of the whole socio-technical system. 
Figure 7: Recording of accident causes for the Norwegian fleet over 100 gt. 
(Data source : Sjøfartskontoret, 1911-50; DAMA, 1990) 
Figure 8: Company age versus fleet age (Sources: fairpaly, LMIS) 
 
In order to more precisely define the link between accidents and organisational, 
management and socio-technical system more than 30 symbolic models were assessed 
(paper 2). Based on the assessment of these models, it was suggested that a five level 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Average age of fleet
A
ve
ra
ge
 a
ge
 o
f c
om
pa
ny
Managers of 25 ship losses 
in 2000 (5.6 deficinceis per 
PSC inspection)
Random sample 
of 30 Single ship 
Managers
The 5 largest managers 
(0.57 deficiencies per PSC inspection 
149 ships per manager, 744 ships in total)
Average fleet age of all 
single ship managers 
(4383 ships in total)
Average age of world fleet 
(2.5 deficinceis per PSC inspection)
The 5 largest contract managers 
(0.91 deficiencies per PSC inspection
42 ships per manager, 209 ships in total)
The 10 largest managers 
(0.77 deficiencies per PSC inspection
111 ships per mngr., 
1112 ships in total)
The 70 largest managers 
(0.77 deficiencies per PSC inspection
63 ships per manager,
 4381 ships in total)
0
0,002
0,004
0,006
0,008
0,01
0,012
0,014
0,016
0,018
1911-13 1922-25 1946-50 1981-90
Operator error Technical failure External or Inevitable cause
0  %
1 0  %
2 0  %
3 0  %
4 0  %
5 0  %
6 0  %
7 0  %
8 0  %
9 0  %
1 0 0  %
A
cc
id
en
t f
re
qu
en
cy
 
210 
model (Figure 8, p. 14) was suitable for representing this link. This study also 
concluded that the model should aim at variables that describe actual behaviour and not 
normative behaviour e.g. regulation.  
 
Another interesting finding was that the iceberg models, first proposed by Heinrich 
(1931) might change over time. Figure 9 presents models from land-based industries. 
The figure 9 shows that the total volume of indicators increases with time, while there 
tend to be fewer non-injury accidents per major injury. In this context the iceberg 
models tend to be higher and sharper. 
Figure 9: Comparison of three iceberg models from different time periods 
 
Figure 10: Constructed simplified maritime iceberg models  
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This trend can also be seen in the accidents prepared by LMIS (the three highest levels 
in figure 10). The three highest levels in figure 10 tend to be sharper. At the same time 
the port state control inspectors find more deficiencies and failures (paper 1).   
 
THE RULES OF THE SCENARIOS 
The results this far can be summarised briefly. Figure 7 shows that a lower percentage 
of the Norwegian ship accidents are recorded today with factors external to the ship or 
being of an unavoidable nature. This indicates that it is an increased belief in prevention 
of accidents. According to Kristiansen (2000) “It is often more easy to identify failures 
in the last stages of an accident than in the initiating stage. Decision makers therefore 
tend to look for measures that limit the damage rather than avoiding the accident” (ref. 
figure 3, p.5). Regulators therefore repair direct causes, typically of a technical nature. It 
has also been common to blame the individuals involved in the accident (Wagenaar, 
1997; Pidgeaon & Leary, 2000). Over time the accident rate has decreased. However 
these reductions seems to be independent of regulatory efforts. Figure 4 show that the 
major improvements in accident ratio occur during a stable or depressed market. These 
periods are characterised by its need for a long business perspective and its poor 
possibilities for asset play2 (Stopford, 1998). This indicates that the Drivers of the 
recurrent accident scenario are related to economical motives (figure 11), which may 
have an effect upon a multitude of organisational aspects (diverging phase). Laid-up 
vessels may on a short time basis explain the drops in accident rate during these market 
states. However, small and young companies have less possibility to survive these 
depressions and often have to leave the market (Stopford, 1998). When the freight 
market improves the accident rate tend to remain at a low level (figure 4). It has been 
known for a century that old ships have a higher likelihood of being involved in an 
accident (paper 1). It has been believed that this relationship is related to technical 
degradation (figure 6, p. 9). This is in sharp contrast to the finding presented in figure 
14. However, figure 8 indicates that old ships also seem to be managed by a different 
kind of company being younger and smaller. Knowing that it is this type of companies 
that leave shipping during market depressions these findings are consistent. It is 
suggested that ship age is a Perceived danger (figure 11), with no actual involvement in 
the causal sequence and that the company characteristics are more relevant in the 
recurrent accident scenario.  
 
                                                 
2 Asset play means to speculate with buying and selling ships i.e. to buy a ship when its market value is 
believed to be below its future value, and sell it off when the market value is believed to be over its value 
in a future market. 
1
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The improvements in accident rate during the depressions in the early 1930s and the 
1980s were due to a reduction in wrecked ships. Wrecked ships are most likely a result 
of navigational errors (Gardenier, 1976; Kristiansen & Soma, 1999). According to 
Goossens & Glansdorp (1998) who investigated more than 300 navigational incidents 
“…in two-thirds of the cases, incidents began with a tactical event, meaning relatively 
close to the point-of-no-return. … Errors involving decision-making and implementing 
a new course and speed seems to be minor (substantially less than 10 percent)”. 
Wagenaar (1987) has showed in an investigation of 100 ship accidents that it is 
impossible for a operator to see in advance that the error or decision is critical, because 
other failures (that makes it critical) are hidden or unidentified (Perrow, 1999) 
(converging phase in figure 11). The scenarios are complex and evolve over time during 
normal operation (Karlsen & Kristiansen, 1980; Wagenaar, 1987). Because the 
regulators focus on the direct causes of the accident (fainted, high in figure 11), and not 
the organisational causes or the Drivers of the scenario (figure 11) there may be fewer 
observable indications of the high risk-accidents (figure 9 & 10). Underneath the 
observable indications however the total magnitude of latent failure may still diverge for 
other accident releases (figure 9 & 10). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Refinement of figure 7 p. 10 
 
RESULTS OF DATA INTERROGATION WITH ARTIFICIAL NEURAL NETWORKS 
The interrogation approach implies that relationships are identified through heuristic 
searches with techniques like artificial neural networks and learning Bayesian networks. 
Figure 11 indicates that certain causal conditions, when combined in certain complex 
ways (rules), has an accident as the outcome (in figure 2 p.4 : condition + rule → 
performance). If it is assumed that data on any possible Conditions were available, and it 
was possible to identify any combinations of these data (Rules) that produce the 
performance (accident or not) the actual causes in figure 11 could be identified. This is 
the task of a neural network. A first attempt (Paper 4) in finding variables that 
distinguished the safe ships from the less safe was to develop a hybrid artificial neural 
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network. The network is labelled hybrid because certain limits were built into the 
network in order to fit the symbolic model in figure 1. Because the relationships in this 
model were assumed to be valid, the idea was to force the network to emphasis on the 
relationships that were still unknown. Input variables were information about the ship 
and the companies. The network was then trained to describe the known safety 
performance of various ships based on these variables. This approach was effective, but 
did not have the ability to explain the total variation. This was related to limitations in 
the data. A simpler approach that was found to be efficiency was to compare data 
patterns. For instance the time of an accident for a shipping company may alone present 
an irregular pattern. However, when the time of the accident is considered in relation to 
the economical performance of the company, a regular pattern could be identified 
(paper 8, 9, 10). It was also found a correlation was a suitable metric for evaluating the 
quality of the safety management (paper 6) and safety culture (paper 7) 
 
NORM FOR ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY STANDARD  
In order to find robust rules and conditions that govern a recurrent accident scenario it is 
necessary to not only consider accidents (figure 3 p.5), but also the organisations that do 
not experience accidents (in figure 2 p.4 the term Performance may also be good i.e. 
absence of accidents). If the safety performance can be assessed both for Sub-Standard 
and Blue-Chip companies it is possible to extract the organisational differences between 
them. In order to assess if a ship or company has a good safety performance, it is 
necessary to know what the general safety standard of the world fleet is. In order to 
describe this norm analogies are drawn from the measurement of IQ. Similar to the 
distribution of IQ, a skewed distribution is estimated to represent the distribution of 
accident rates for the world fleet. This distribution, shown in figure 12, was developed 
both for total losses and serious accidents. Based on this distribution it was concluded 
that the ships being among the 25% having the highest accident rate (C: Sub-standard) 
have roughly seven times as many accidents as the group of ships 25% having the 
lowest accident rate (A: Blue chip). Consequently, the safest ships (A) only experience 
7% of all accidents, while the most substandard (C) are involved in more than 50% all 
accidents.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Performance characteristics of various safety standards for the world fleet  
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Having identified the groups A, B and C, the characteristic of their safety inspection 
records was considered. In this analysis the Port State Control inspections were used as 
a data source. The type of safety inspections findings (e.g. unsatisfactory 
documentation, fire equipment, etc.) was considered to compare the 25% most sub-
standard (C) with the 50% average (B). It was concluded that also the types of 
deficiencies varied between these groups. The most sub-standard ships did not only 
have more deficiencies, but the relative frequency of deficiencies related to core safety 
issues was relatively higher (Figure 13). These deficiency types were related to accident 
prevention, International Safety Management (ISM) code, lifesaving appliances and 
safety in general. This indicates that the most substandard ships not only have a general 
lower degree of compliance, but that especially core safety requirements are ignored. 
Figure 13: Portion of ships in world fleet and their portion of accidents 
 
Knowing the distribution of accident rate for the world fleet, it was possible to state 
how likely it is that a given fleet belong to each of these groups based on its experienced 
accident statistics and safety inspection findings. This technique was fully validated and 
found to be reasonable consistent. It was also found that accidents like Erika and 
Express Samina could be foreseen if their performance data had been analysed prior to 
the accidents. On the contrary ships being a member of International Safety 
Management Association (ISMA), Green Award and Intertanko were found to be better 
than the average. Figure 14 presents the scatter plot of results from nine shipping 
companies Z1 to Z9. Company Z1 is ranked as the safest company, while Z9 is the most 
sub-standard company. 
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Figure 14: Relationship between indicators of safety inspection and accident history 
 
The value in figure 14 is the likelihood that a company belongs in class A (25% best) 
minus the likelihood that it belong in class C (25% worst) (P(A)-P(C)). On the abscissa 
this estimator is based on the accident statistics, while the values on the ordinal axis are 
based on safety inspection deficiencies.  
 
RESULTS OF DATA INTERROGATION INTO ORGANISATIONAL FACTORS 
Three articles in this thesis address organisational factors. The first compares the 
responses on the Ship Management Attitude Questionnaire (SMAQ) from four 
companies having the same nationality (Z3, Z6, Z7, and Z8 in figure 14). The response 
distributions of various questionnaire items were extracted to fit various conceptual 
models within safety management (paper 6). As an example various items that fit the 
continuous improvement loop (Deming’s (1991) Plan-Do-Check-Act) are presented in 
figure 15. At first these distribution of responses seems to be relatively independent of 
the ranking of the companies. It can however be seen that the most company Z8 in 
general is more neutral to the questions. The selected Plan-item at the higher right 
section of figure 15 it can be seen that a lower portion of the responses have a very high 
satisfaction with the safety manuals. At the lower right section, the selected Do-item is 
presented. This item illustrates that the portion of strongly agreement with the statement 
“Emergency drills are conducted as prescribed” seem to fall with from Z3 to Z8, with 
the exception of Z7. This indicates that Z8 to a lower degree than the other companies 
do what they are supposed to do. At the lower left section of figure 15 it is shown that 
the portion of responses indicating that checklists are omitted “only” 0-20% of the cases 
fall with decreasing safety standard. At the higher left section the selected Act-item is 
presented. This illustrates that company Z8 has a different pattern of responses.  
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Figure 15: Item responses arranged in a continuous improvement loop perspective 
  
Other conceptual models and perspectives were also considered. The perspective that 
most efficiently discriminated between the safety standards was the Competing Values 
Framework developed by to Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1983) and Cameron and Quinn 
(1999). The idea behind this framework is that organisational culture can be measured 
on two scales representing the internal versus external orientation of the organizational 
focus and its stable versus flexible processes. Even though it was developed 
questionnaires that measure these features directly, items from the SMAQ that 
correspond with the two scales were considered. In figure 16 items that describe stable 
versus flexible focus are presented. The left distribution shows that the wish to have a 
stable work condition increase with falling safety standard. Asked in the opposite 
direction the right distribution shows that the wish to have a changing work condition 
fall with decreasing safety standard.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17 shows perceived values related to the job itself (internal) versus aspects 
focusing on more external aspects. The right distribution shows that the desire to obtain 
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a personal sense of accomplishment (internal) fall with falling safety standard, while the 
right shows that the Z8’s dominating desire is to be recognised by others (external).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17: Distribution of responses related to internal versus external focus 
 
Paper 6 culminated in a principal component analysis to describe the differences in 
safety standard. This analysis groups correlated items into independent components. 
The name of the seven components is presented in figure 18. From figure 14 the relative 
difference in safety standard between the companies were known. Even though the 
average scores on some components correlated with the ranking (Figure 18), it was 
argued that these scores were invalid for representing such a relationship.  
 
By using a Learning Bayesian Network, the relationships between the items within a 
principal component could be found. Arrows between items represent these 
relationships in a network called a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG). The DAG indicates 
that the response on one item, determine the responses on the items that the arrows 
point to. It was found that there were common items in several components. Hence, it 
was possible to put the DAGs from individual components into larger structures. The 
four principal components called Safety Rehearse, Communication, Job Satisfaction and 
Commitment formed a common DAG presented in Figure 19. This structure indicates 
several issues. Focusing on the Safety Rehearse DAG, it can be seen that experiences 
from the past determines the attitudes towards the present condition, which again 
determines the attitudes towards potential future situations.  
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Figure 19: Combined DAG of four principal components 
 
The insight obtained from the paper 6 indicated that the traditional measuring technique 
of safety attitude data through scores on principal components (figure 18) was 
insufficient. Alternative techniques had to be developed. Two approaches were applied. 
The first technique is based on the finding that principal components like Commitment, 
Motivation and Job Satisfaction are identified in different organisations and different 
domains.  The fact that similar components are identified in different organisations 
indicates that there is a universal core of attitudes towards safety issues across national 
cultures and companies. In shipping the environment, technology, regulation, 
competencies and several other factors are common for all commercial ships. This 
uniform context indicates that there should be dependencies in experience and attitudes 
between different companies. This can be illustrated by a norm of principal components, 
which should be identifiable in a shipping organisation (figure 20). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20: Two levels of safety cultural patterns. 
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It was proved that there is a dependency between pattern of attitudes across nationalities 
and companies. This justifies the assumption that a norm of principal components is 
true. It was then assumed that there are smaller variations among the cultural pattern of 
the mature cultures relative to the less mature (grey components in figure 20). 
Therefore, an immature culture is of a more unique character. The similarity of cultural 
pattern between the companies was therefore used as a measure of safety cultural 
maturity. The relationship to the indicators in figure 14 is presented in figure 21 and 22.  
The ordinal axis in figure 21 represents the abscissa axis in figure 14, while the ordinal 
axis in figure 22 represents the ordinal axis in figure 14. The abscissa axis in figure 21 
and 22 is the average correlation of the attitude pattern between different companies. 
High values indicate that other companies within the sample has similar attitude 
patterns (left in figure 20), while low values indicates that the attitude pattern is of a 
unique character (right in figure 20). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21: Relationship between accident statistics indicator and correlation matrix indicator  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 22: Relationship between safety inspection indicator and correlation matrix indicator  
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By definition the principal components are independent as illustrated in figure 20 and 
left in figure 23. However, the fact that the principal components in figure 19 can form a 
reasonable structure of a dependent character indicates that it might exist an underlying 
level of relationships (figure 23). This underlying pattern can not directly be estimated 
by a principal component analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23: Two levels of safety cultural patterns. 
 
The described technique applies the whole pattern of attitudes extracted from item 
responses. The next technique focuses on the items that both are central to the cultural 
pattern and the safety standard. Key items are present in different principal components 
and their variance is well described by the principal components (high communality 
values). It was found that items related to normative behaviour were more explicitly 
described by the underlying cultural pattern of the poor performing organisations. Such 
behaviour involves uncritical compliance to procedures, emphasis on hierarchal levels 
and disregard for individual qualities. The companies having a high safety standard 
distinguished themselves on an underlying pattern that emphasised on handling of 
extraordinary situations, job satisfaction and commitment. Such situations involve 
fatigue, emergencies and communication about errors and worries. 
 
In order to justify the content of these variables in a maritime context some descriptions 
of the maritime organisational cultures have been studied in the literature. The 
managing director of the Central Union of Marine Underwriters (CEFOR) Forsmo’s 
(2002) reflection of the history of maritime safety regulation during the 1980s was “ ... 
developing a maritime safety consciousness was needed. Terms such as “compliance 
culture” and “evasion culture” were introduced as opposites to the ultimate panacea 
“safety culture”. Holt’s (1989) description of the typical shipping culture is that it is 
“…characterised by quick decisions in buying and selling, short-term solutions, 
emphasis on technology and tonnage, and neglect of people and human values”. These 
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descriptions can be considered as expert judgments from the professionals in the 
domain and are not based on empirical evidence. The content of the identified items 
seems to catch these features.  
 
RESULTS OF DATA INTERROGATION INTO MANAGEMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
The most important business variable for management is the freight rates. The freight 
rates in shipping are extremely volatile but also follow long terms cycles (Koopmans, 
1939; Zannetos, 1966; Stopford, 1998). It was found that the total loss ratio was 
significantly reduced two or three times during the last century (figure 24). These 
periods were the early 1920s, the early 1930s and the 1980s. These periods have one 
thing in common. There were no room for speculation in buying and selling of ships. 
During the early 1920s the market was relatively good, but the increased shipping 
demand combined with increased new buildings kept the rates at a stable level. The 
1930s and the 1980s were the two most serious and long lasting depressions in the 
market. A high portion of the tonnage was laid-up indicating that the drop in loss ratio 
in reality was somewhat less instant than illustrated in figure 4. During these periods 
only the companies’ with a long-range perspective remained in the market. The chart 
also indicates that during the 30 years after IMO’s establishment (1950 to1980), no 
significant improvement was achieved.  
  
Based on several smaller studies it was concluded that the accident rate followed an 
inverse relationship to the development of freight rate at the late 20th. In figure 24, for 
example the general freight rates after the 2.W.W is inversed and then put on top of the 
total loss ratio series. It can be seen that, except for the 1980s that is earlier described, 
the inverse relationship can be seen.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24: Total loss ratio and inversed freight rate series  
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It is known that over time the accident rate follow a decreasing trend, while the freight 
rates typically increase. Therefore it was necessary to be sure that the inverse 
relationship between accident rate and freight rates was not spurious. The short time 
variations was therefore analysed with reference to the second order derivatives of the 
series. These yearly fluctuation also followed the earlier descried relationships (Figure 
25). At the late 19th century however the relationship was not inverse, but followed the 
freight cycles. Hence, a good market indicated increased A shift was indicated in the 
1930s.    
Figure 25: 2.derivate of total loss ratio, fleet size and freight rates 1972-1985 
Finally the study found inverse relationship between accidents and economical 
conditions at a company level. Figure 26 presents the stock values of Minoan Lines, the 
holding company of Minoan Flying Dolphin that experienced the Express Samina 
accident. The crosses indicate the time of accidents and the continuous plots the 
aggregates density of these accidents. The plot shows that the accident risk increases 
after the drop in stock values in year 2000. Similar relationships are evident for the two 
considered competitors NEL and ANEK. Also the Hardanger Sunnhordlandske 
Dampskipselskap (HSD) that experienced the Sleipner accident in 1999 has been 
analysed. This company experienced few accidents during the beginning of the 1990s. 
In 1995, the company was forced by the authorities to start a cost cutting program. This 
went well as long as the stock values increased. However, when the market turned in 
1998 a full speed head-on collision between two of the companies high-speed 
catamarans occurred (Figure 27) 
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Figure 26: The inverse relationship presented for Minoan Flying Dolphin and Minoan Line 
 
 
 
Figure 27: The inverse relationship presented for Hardanger Sunnhordlandske Dampskipselskap 
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and were even worse in 2000 (figure 27). At the same time a cascade of accidents were 
recorded, where Sleipner was one of them. Also the involvement by the employees that 
ended late in 2000 triggered an accident free year in 2001 before a new management 
took place. These findings are consistent with the findings of organisational values 
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found. Figure 28 and 29 illustrates the relationships for the two largest tanker 
companies Fronline and TeeKay. For these companies the stock values correlates and 
not surprisingly the net results correlates. However it is worth noticing that similar to 
the passenger ship companies the accident density also correlates with peaks in mid 
1998 and early 2002.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 28: The inverse relationship presented for Frontline 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 29: The inverse relationship presented for TeaKay 
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profits on transportation rather than its earlier focus on ship speculation. An important 
step in this shift was the stronger involvement of the employees. At the middle 1980s all 
employees were participating in seminars and meeting specially aimed at developing a 
decentralised and value driven organisation. During the next decade only three accidents 
were recorded. Both accidents in 1989 were on a specific route that was about to be shut 
down. The 1991 accident occurs simultaneously as a transient fall in economical results. 
During the late 1980s and early 1990s the company focused on the development of their 
employees (ref. figure 16, 17) in business ideas and objectives. As the economical 
results were deteriorated the annual reports strengthened the focus on cost effectiveness 
and saving at the expense of human resources. Figure 29 illustrates that the density of 
accidents increased as the economical trend became negative. It can be seen that the 
trends are negatively correlated.  
Figure 29: The inverse relationship presented for Stena Line 
 
Based on the findings presented above it can be concluded that the maritime high-risk 
recurrent accident scenarios have a relationship to market conjectures. Because no 
shipping company alone can influence on the market state, the causal direction of this 
relationship is from commercial risk towards operational risk. In this perspective the 
Drivers of these recurrent accident scenarios are related to Commercial Risk 
Management. Hence, a Blue-Chip company either keep operational management 
independent of commercial management or have better safety barriers to prevent 
operational losses from taking place compared to a sub-standard company. Anyhow 
neither the terms organisational accidents (Reason, 1997) nor system accidents (Perrow, 
1984) address the Drivers of the general ship accidents considered in this study. 
Therefore the term Commercial Accidents seems to be a more representative term. END 
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